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The importance of political parties for contemporary representative democracies is beyond 
dispute. Despite their significance for state-level democracy, political parties continue to be 
regarded as oligarchical and to be criticised because of their internal practices. For this reason, 
intra-party democracy (IPD) warrants in-depth analysis. This thesis investigates IPD in Turkey, 
primarily from the perspective of participatory democracy, with the purpose of suggesting 
reforms to the Turkish Political Parties Law (TPPL). 
Turkish political parties and Turkish party regulation provide an interesting case because there 
is a significant difference between mature democracies and Turkey regarding IPD regulation. 
IPD in established democracies has always been regarded as a private concern of parties and 
has been left unregulated. IPD in Turkey, by contrast, is provided for both by the constitution 
and the TPPL. Although IPD is a constitutional and legal requirement in Turkey, however, 
political parties in fact display a high level of non-democratic administration. The main reason 
is that the TPPL only pays lip service to the idea of IPD and requires no specific measures apart 
from establishing a party congress with a representative form of democracy. By establishing 
and holding party congresses, political parties are perceived as conforming to the requirements 
of IPD under the law. In addition, the contested nature of democracy as a concept has impeded 
the creation of efficacious legal principles. Thus, the existing party law fails to tackle the lack 
of IPD within political parties and, for this reason, is in need of reform.  
Furthermore, almost every Turkish party’s own constitution highlights the importance of IPD 
and promises IPD. However, these declared commitments to IPD in their constitutions alone, 
especially in countries where the democratic culture is weak, are unlikely to make much 
difference in practice. Accordingly, external regulation is necessary to ensure the protection of 
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the rights and interests of the party members with regards to their participation in intra-party 
decision-making processes.  
Nevertheless, in spite of a general consensus in favour of reforming the TPPL, a lack of 
consensus exists as to what kind of reforms should be adopted. This thesis proposes that 
reforming the TPPL in line with an approach based on participatory democracy could provide 
better IPD within Turkish political parties, citing as evidence comparative case studies of the 
participatory practices for policy-making, leadership selection and candidate selection in 
mature democracies. This thesis also analyses membership registration and the effect of state 
funding on IPD, which are highly problematic in Turkey and represent impediments to the 
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When I first began to consider the obstacles to democratic consolidation in Turkey, my attention 
was drawn to the lack of democracy within political parties. Despite decades of experience with 
a competitive multi-party system, political parties, unfortunately, fall short of being democratic 
internally in terms of policy-making and the selection of leaders and candidates. The absence 
of intra-party democracy (IPD) is not a characteristic of any one party or period, but has been a 
fundamental aspect of Turkish Politics since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, and can 
even be traced back to the Ottoman period. For instance, as will be discussed below in the 
historical overview of political parties in Turkey, the first party of the Turkish Republic, the 
Republican People’s Party (RPP), governed in a highly oligarchic way, being under the control 
of one man or at most two for nearly three decades. Similarly, over the past few years, the 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) – which has been the ruling party in Turkey for thirteen 
years – has gained notoriety for being highly authoritarian. Thus, for instance, Caroline 
Lancaster in her research on the JDP claims that: 
[I]ntra-party democracy owes its existence to three indicators – inclusiveness, 
decentralisation and institutionalisation. Conversely, it should be observed that a party 
shifting from democratic to oligarchic or personalistic intra-party rule will display 
decreasing levels of these three indicators in terms of policy formation and candidate 
selection. By tracing AKP’s [JDP] internal party operations since its founding in 2001, 
I demonstrate a gradual deterioration in these indicators, reflecting a gradual 
deterioration of democracy within the party to oligarchy and then to personalism.1 
                                                 
1 Caroline Lancaster ‘The Iron Law of Erdogan: the Decay from Intra-party Democracy to Personalistic Rule’ 
[2014] 35 Third World Quarterly 1672, 1672. 
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This authoritarian tendency and the corresponding lack of IPD has been characteristic not only 
of the ruling party and main opposition party, but of other small opposition parties as well. 
Moreover, the history of political parties in Turkey suggests that, when the political parties 
practice IPD and fulfil its requirements, as was the case with the Democrat Party between 1950-
1960, the Motherland Party between 1983-1991 and the JDP between 2002-2015, Turkish 
democracy makes progress, but when IPD practices weaken, democratic progress in the country 
is inhibited. Indeed, a political party which in itself is non-democratic or is controlled by a small 
oligarchic cadre at the top can hardly be expected to further a democratic agenda within the 
country at large.  
Some scholars, however, doubt that IPD actually furthers the development of state-level 
democracy. Richard Katz, for instance, called into question the hypothesis that “if you make 
the parties more democratic, you make the system more democratic.”2 He objects that it remains 
unclear precisely what would constitute “a more democratic party”; that the meaning of 
democracy itself is contested; and that forcing the parties to be democratic would itself be an 
undemocratic act.  
Yet while Richard Katz takes the position that more inclusive parties are inherently more 
democratic, others, such as James Gardner, have argued that “populism is premised on the belief 
that more know better than fewer, and consequently populist assumptions compel the inference 
that the accuracy of any decision is always enhanced when it is made by a greater number.”3 
Further, while the definitions of democracy and IPD remain contested, scholars and observers 
have developed meaningful criteria for assessing the relative degree of democracy within the 
various parties. As for the objection to the use of regulatory means in the furtherance of 
                                                 
2 Richard S. Katz, ‘Democracy and the Legal Regulation of Political Parties,’ (the USAID conference on 
‘Changes in Political Parties: United States Agency for International Development,’ Washington, D.C., October 
1, 2004) 1, 1. 




democracy, it may be noted that, while liberal democracy has always correlated with limited 
regulation, there has recently been increased regulation of political parties in Western liberal 
democratic countries. In this study it will be argued that – in particular from a Turkish 
perspective – consolidation of democracy on a state level is intimately connected with increased 
democracy within political parties. 
Two approaches have generally been employed in promoting internal democracy in political 
parties; one depends on advocacy, while the other is legal or regulatory. The advocacy approach 
employs a classical liberal understanding of democracy in which, while there is a freedom of 
association for parties, democratisation within parties should be supported from outside by civil 
organisations such as democracy-promoting organisations. External support for a greater role 
by the rank and file in party decision-making can boost the role of party members and will in 
turn enhance the parties’ democratic credentials.4  
Turkey may be considered an example of the latter approach. In Turkey, regulations regarding 
IPD were originally enacted by the military regime in order to diminish oligarchic tendencies 
within the political parties. While devising the new constitutions in 1960 and 1982, the military 
regime, in consultation with various lawyers and political scholars, chose to enshrine IPD in 
these texts in order to minimise the risk of oligarchic tendencies within the parties. Moreover, 
both Turkish Political Parties Laws of 1965 and 1982 explicitly gave special attention to IPD. 
Although Turkish parties are coerced by law into adopting a specific organisational structure 
and specific democratic internal procedures in order to promote IPD, the parties have 
consistently fallen short of meeting these criteria. This situation has fostered the assumptions 
that, first, politicians disrespect the laws and are uninterested in internal democracy, and, 
second, that the laws governing political parties are poorly written, in particular lacking any 
real institutional design for working IPD. 
                                                 
4 Peter Burnell ‘Building Better Democracies: Why Political Parties Matter’ (Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy 2004) 18. 
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With regard to the first assumption, the lack of IPD in Turkey has, quite rightly, always been 
associated primarily with a behavioural, educational and cultural point of view. Political 
scientists often claim that cultural factors may hinder the proper functioning of a democracy, 
not only at the state level but also within the political parties. Thus the prominent Turkish 
constitutional lawyer Bülent Tanör claims that the lack of IPD is best explained in terms of 
culture, education and understanding of democracy in Turkey. Although Tanör acknowledges 
the shortcomings of the Turkish Party law on IPD, he is suspicious about whether it can be 
solved through legislation.5  However, while most Turkish scholars give pride of place to 
political culture in these considerations, they do not underestimate the significance of the laws 
that govern political parties.  
Another factor that is related to political culture and that obstructs the emergence of democratic 
parties is the party members’ demand for IPD. From this perspective, while politicians may not 
be respectful of IPD, ordinary party members also remain reluctant to demand democracy. As 
Nahomi Ichino and Noah Nathan argue, “democratisation within a party is not only a result of 
top-down, supply-side electoral calculation by elites but also a consequence of bottom-up, 
demand-side pressure from local party members.”6  
It must be remembered, however, that there always exist certain oligarchical tendencies 
emerging from human nature and organisation itself, whatever the level of education or nature 
of the culture in any given society. For instance, Ronald Syme in The Roman Revolution claims 
that “In all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it monarchy, republic or 
democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the façade.”7 At the same time, these anti-democratic 
                                                 
5 Bülent Tanör ‘Siyasi Partiler Yasası: Demokratik Standartların Yükseltilmesi Paketi Tartışma Toplantıları 
Dizisi – 1’ (Mayıs 1997 Tüsiad-T/97-5/213) 19. 
6 Nahomi Ichino and Noah L. Nathan ‘Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana’ 
[2012] 42 British Journal of Political Science 769, 772. 
7 Ronald Syme The Roman Revolution (Oxford University Press 1961) 21. 
14 
 
tendencies can differ from country to country and party to party, and are naturally relatively 
pronounced in developing democracies like Turkey.  
Before proceeding to the our second assumption, regarding the nature of the laws, it is important 
to mention a survey regarding state-level democracy and IPD that was conducted in 2007 of 
100 Turkish MPs.8 When asked whether Turkey is a democratic country or not, 64 per cent of 
MPs answered in the affirmative. When asked whether business within their own parties is 
democratic, 82 per cent of MPs also assented.9 From the perspective being advanced in this 
study, the high percentages of MPs professing faith that their nation and even more so their own 
parties are democratic is best, if paradoxically, understood as a consequence of the fact that the 
parties have been purged of voices of internal opposition.10 
Further, when asked to name factors that account for the lack of IPD in Turkish parties, 47 per 
cent of participants pointed to the political culture, 29 per cent to the Turkish Constitution and 
the TPPL and 25 per cent to the parties’ own constitutions. Another question asked of MPs was 
whether the current Turkish constitution favours IPD, to which only 29 per cent answered in 
the affirmative.11 
Turning now to the second assumption regarding the failure of legal measures to advance IPD 
effectively, the lack of a clear definition for what constitutes an internally democratic party, 
along with the absence of working institutional design in the TPPL, means that the provisions 
relating to IPD have nothing more than a declarative status. Indeed, although the TPPL has 150 
articles, is 43 pages long and regulates the workings of political parties in a very detailed 
manner, the articles related to components of IPD, namely policy-making, leadership selection 
                                                 
8 Saime Müjde Önal ‘Türkiye’de Parti İçi Demokrasi: CHP ve AKP Örneği’ (Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal 
Bilimler Enstitüsü Yüksek Lisans Tezi 2007). Participants include 56 from ruling party the JDP, 40 from the 
main opposition party the RPP, 3 from the Motherland Party and 1 independent MP. The total number of MPs, 
constituted 18% of all MPs. 
9 ibid194-200. This number is 80.4% in the JDP and 83.4% in the RPP.  
10 ibid 188. 
11 ibid 188-192. 
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and candidate selection, give almost all power to political parties with regard to these three 
crucial issues. In addition to the Turkish citizens’ lack of the strong democratic values that are 
found in mature democracies, political institutions – namely political parties – lack strong 
democratic institutions that have been founded on a firm legal basis. According to Murat Yanık, 
an improved party organisation set on a firm legal footing is a sine qua non for the democratic 
functioning of political parties in Turkey.12 This point is also the starting point of this thesis. 
 The TPPL adopted a representative model of democracy by establishing a party congress 
system. However, party congresses are old-fashioned institutions for exercising IPD, which was 
originally designed for mass parties. Maurice Duverger’s mass party idea was presented as an 
internally democratic party model which is structured based on a bottom-up approach, 
proceeding from the grassroots to the highest level, with a traditional form of representative 
democracy. However, as most scholars point out, the “golden age” of mass parties has now 
passed,13 and new types of political parties have emerged, such as catchall (which aims to attract 
constituents with different perspectives that will be popular with a large segment of the voting 
public),14 cartel (which uses the resources of the state in order to maintain power),15 electoral–
professional (which is a more advanced version of the catchall party that places relatively more 
power in the hands of the leadership)16 and modern cadre parties (which are dominated by 
activists).17 Thus, there is a need for conceptual renewal of party organisation and party law, 
since the mass party concept does not meet the present-day realities. 
                                                 
12 Murat Yanık, ‘From the Standpoint of Intraparty Democracy, Local Organizations of Political Parties in 
Turkey’ [2007] 20 Journal of Qafqaz University 15, 15. 
13 Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies: 1980-2000’ [2001] 7 
Party Politics 5-21. 
14 Otto Kirchheimer, ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in Joseph LaPalombara and 
Myron Weiner (eds) Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton University Press 1966). 
15 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party’ [1995] 1 Party Politics 5–28. 
16 Angelo Panebianco Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge University Press 1988). 
17 Ruud Koole ‘The Vulnerability of the Modern Cadre Party in the Netherlands’ in Richard S. Katz and Peter 
Mair (ed) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies (Sage 
1994) pp. 278–303. 
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 This representative system was also proposed by Macpherson as “a pyramid delegative 
model” designed to facilitate the participation of citizens in the decision-making process. 
According to this model, participation takes place as direct democracy at the base and delegate 
democracy at every level above that. In political parties, low-level party members select their 
delegates to serve in the next highest level on the pyramid through open and fair elections.18 In 
Turkey, party congresses at each level (district, provincial and national) work as the central link 
in a chain of delegation that connects party members to the central party. Although this system 
was proposed as an alternative institutional arrangement for participatory democracy, it has not 
brought about real democratisation, especially in Turkey. Turkish parties violate the ideal-type 
chain of delegation in many ways, insofar as the central party and the party leader play a 
predominant role at each stage.  
 The feasibility of the party congress in the context of new types of party models must 
be reconsidered, or new alternatives must be found, in order to promote IPD. In sum, it is 
important to reform the party law in the light of the changing dynamics of politics and 
democracy. Notwithstanding, this study will proceed in full accord with Susan Scarrow’s 
observation that “realistic practitioners recognize that intra-party democracy is not a panacea: 
some procedures are better suited to some circumstances than to others.”19 
Purpose of this study 
 Since most people realise that, in a democracy, there is no alternative to political parties, 
much of the current debate in Turkey centres around new policies aimed at making parties more 
democratic and responsive.20 Thus, the present study aims to reveal the reasons behind the lack 
of IPD in Turkey by examining the current legal structure that regulates the Turkish political 
                                                 
18 Crawford Brough Macpherson The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford University Press 1977) 108. 
19 Susan Scarrow Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Implementing 
Intra-Party Democracy (Washington, DC: NDI 2005) 3. 
20 Ergun Özbudun ‘The Institutional Decline of Parties in Turkey’ in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds), 
Political Parties and Democracy (The John Hopkins University Press 2001) 261. 
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parties. The identification of legal problems that have impeded IPD in Turkey and the choice 
of inclusiveness as a reform that can increase the level of IPD together form the basis of this 
thesis, which aims to explore the link between inclusivity and party regulation in a Turkish 
context. In the opinion of Richard Katz, those who are concerned with improving democracy 
often look first to legal reforms, since political practice in a country mostly depends on political 
objectives, political culture and political institutions, whereas in the short run institutions can 
easily be changed by way of legislative reforms.21 
 Scholars in the fields of Turkish political science and constitutional law have disputed 
the extent to which political parties, from left to right, nationalist to conservative, have been 
administrated in undemocratic ways. Nevertheless, the precise reasons for this situation and the 
extent to which democratic institutions have failed to take root have rarely been subjected to 
legal and comparative research. For instance, the prominent Turkish constitutional lawyer 
Ergun Özbudun claims that: 
Strong party discipline often stymied parliamentary mechanisms of accountability. 
Election campaigns stressed the personal qualities and trustworthiness of individual 
leaders rather than party programs or policies. Party leaders were presented as “saviors 
of the country.” Their policies in office typically bore scant resemblance to what they 
had promised while campaigning. The key explanatory variable here is strong party 
discipline and the absence of intraparty democracy. With top leaders in control of 
nominations and patronage, MPs are highly dependent and docile. Patronage in 
particular is a prominent feature of politics in Turkey as it is in Latin America. No doubt 
the Turkish tendency toward personalismo also draws strength from political culture 
and historical traditions.22 
                                                 
21 Katz (n 2) 1. 
22 Ergün Özbudun, ‘Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?’ [1996] 7 Journal of Democracy 123, 136-137. 
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In analysing the TPPL, some weaknesses in the law that aggravate the situation and pave the 
way for oligarchic tendencies become readily apparent. For this reason the TPPL is here 
regarded as an important issue before the democratisation of political parties. However, this 
thesis does not intend to offer a comprehensive analysis and discussion of each and every detail 
of the TPPL, but will naturally focus on those details pertinent to IPD. Therefore, in critiquing 
these details, specific attention will be given to the principles of participatory democracy and 
inclusiveness in political parties. Since intra-party democratisation means the extension of 
ordinary party members’ right to participate in the important decision-making processes in 
political parties, the participatory democracy approach to inclusiveness is considered the key 
requirement for reforming the TPPL.  
 The main reason for choosing the inclusiveness model is that mature democracies are 
moving towards a more participatory model in governing their political parties. Moreover, the 
current delegatory democracy model being practised by Turkish parties is simply not working. 
In recent years, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) has become entirely dominated 
by the executive branch of government and has wielded almost no power in policy-making or 
in holding the government accountable for its actions and policies. There are several reasons 
for this state of affairs. First, the party leaders are neither accountable to the party members nor 
to the MPs. Second, because the MPs are chosen by the party leaders, they are not accountable 
to their constituencies or to party members. Although most countries have experience with these 
issues, it will become clear in the course of this study that the situation in Turkey is worse than 
in Western democracies. Therefore, while it seems difficult to control the government outside 
the context of the party, IPD could help to reinforce government accountability. Moreover, it 
will be argued that the existence of internal democracy within political parties may encourage 
the development of a democratic culture on the state level. This is particularly important for 
countries like Turkey, where the democratic culture is still in an early stage of development. 
19 
 
 Theoretically, the notion of improving IPD might sound hollow or even illogical. 
Attempts to improve IPD by way of legal reform are unlikely to be successful in the country at 
large until and unless they are not only drafted but also implemented by the parties. As Anika 
Gauja puts it, “Whilst intra-party democracy is an honourable ideal and quite easily translated 
into formal regulations and party rules, it is very difficult to achieve successfully in practice.”23 
The concept of intra-party democracy 
 Investigating what is meant and understood by IPD – both in theory and in practice – is 
crucial for proposing alternative systems. Political scholars have long discussed the necessity 
of IPD in the functioning of political parties. Actual political practice shows that political parties 
are more or less oligarchical in every country, whether an established one or a developing 
democracy.  
 As in the case with the definition of “democracy,” there is no universally accepted 
definition as to exactly what IPD means. Generally speaking, the most basic and literal 
definition of IPD is rule by the party members. Nonetheless, there are different degrees of IPD. 
In internally democratic parties, decision-making processes are consistent with the bottom-up 
principle that proceeds from the grassroots to the top level.  
 For the purpose of this study, IPD will be analysed with respect to three specific 
procedures that will illustrate the extent to which the TPPL can be considered democratic and 
how it could be reformed: (1) policy-making procedures, (2) methods for selecting party leaders 
and (3) methods for selecting candidates. According to Scarrow, Webb and Farrel, these are the 
three key areas in which members have the potential to exert influence within parties.24 Of 
course, there is no standard form of IPD for all political parties, for the concept relates to a wide 
                                                 
23 Anika Gauja ‘The pitfalls of participatory democracy: A study of the Australian Democrats’ GST’ [2005] 40 
Australian Journal of Political Science 71, 84. 
24 Susan E. Scarrow, Paul Webb, and David M. Farrell ‘From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The 
Channging Distribution of Power within the Political Parties’ in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg 




variety of factors beyond policy-making processes, leadership selection and candidate 
selection, though the scope of this thesis precludes a detailed consideration of all the areas 
related to IPD. These procedures are important for examining and comparing the direct 
participation of party members and indirect methods within a given political party. The outcome 
of the participation of party delegates or party elites on those important processes is not the 
same as the outcome brought about by empowering party members. A more detailed discussion 
on the conceptualisation and indicators of IPD will be presented in Chapter 3. 
The concept of party law 
 According to van Biezen, party law is a common denominator for the legislation within 
political parties embodied in the constitution and other statutes such as political party laws, 
political finance, electoral and campaign laws.25 Müller and Sieberer mention two definitions 
of party law: as legislation explicitly designed to regulate the life of party organisations, or more 
broadly as the total body of law that affects political parties.26 The term “party law” in this study 
accords with the first definition, and refers to a narrow body of party law that explicitly regulates 
the internal life of the Turkish political parties. This study is thus interested in the perspectives 
offered by the TPPL and the Turkish constitution on the realisation of internal democratisation, 
since these are two main legal sources of IPD in Turkey. This definition of party law will 
become clearer in the following analyses, the goal of which is to identify how party law affects 
IPD in Turkey, with a focus particularly on the internal functioning of political parties. Further, 
since there is a significant difference between the legal requirements and actual practices 
regarding the operation of political parties, this study will also analyse briefly the actual 
situation within two large Turkish parties. 
                                                 
25 Ingrid van Biezen ‘State intervention in party politics: the public funding and regulation of political parties’ 
[2008] 16 European Review 337, 342. 
26 Wolfgang C. Müller and Ulrich Sieberer ‘Party Law’, in Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty (eds) 
Handbook of Party Politics (Sage 2005) 435. 
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The relationship between legal theory and political parties 
 The underlying assumption of the research and analysis presented here is that both 
political theory and legal theory are conceptually linked and interdependent. Despite the 
increasing importance of the IPD in established democracies, the subject has been remarkably 
neglected in constitutional law and has received little scholarly attention from constitutional 
lawyers. Although there has been a shift of emphasis in recent years, and valuable research has 
been done on the subject of party regulation,27 there are still gaps in this area. These gaps have 
been largely created by the dominant notion that the internal functioning of the political parties 
should be outside the scope of laws in liberal democracies, on the grounds that regulation by 
the state may violate their right to freedom of association. For example, Gauja claims that, in 
liberal democracies such as the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, the law has only 
recently recognised political parties as anything more than mere “voluntary associations” akin 
to social and sporting clubs.28 However, the situation in Turkey is different from that in Western 
democracies, where political parties have been regarded as institutions of constitutional law for 
nearly six decades. While the political parties have been one of the important components of 
the constitution since 1960, they have mostly been studied by constitutional lawyers, in contrast 
to Western democracies, where this area has mostly been studied by political scientists.29 For 
instance, in the British context, Bogdanor notes, “it is perhaps because the law has been so late 
in recognizing political parties that constitutional lawyers and other writers on the constitution 
have taken insufficient note of the fact that parties are so central to our constitutional 
arrangements.”30 
                                                 
27< www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/ >Website on Party Law in Modern Europe, which is the portal for research on 
the legal regulation of political parties in post-war European democracies accessed 01 December 2012. 
28Anika Gauja Political Parties and Elections: Public Law, Political Parties and Representative Democracy 
(Ashgate 2010) 1. 
29 For detailed study of how the political science emerged from law in Turkey look at Bogaç Erozan and İlter 
Turan, ‘The Development of Political Science in Turkey’ [2004] 37 Political Science and Politics, 359-363 
30 Vernon Bogdanor ‘The Constitution and the Party System in the Twentieth Century’, [2004] 57 Parliamentary 
Affairs 717, 718. 
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 It is also important to note that this study, to some extent, draws on political theory 
(namely, participatory democracy) in order to understand the nature and content of IPD. The 
nature of this study emerges from the political theory that I have been and will be discussing. 
Since the subject is enshrined in the constitution and a special law has been adopted for the 
enforcement of certain rules, this study also touches on constitutional and legal theory. Thus 
this thesis draws throughout on insights from constitutional and legal theory on one hand, and 
political theory on the other. 
The concept of participation 
 Most literature on IPD calls for enhanced membership participation in party decisions. 
As will be seen later, some procedural mechanisms designed to promote membership 
involvement in party decision-making have been instituted at all levels of party organisation 
with the TPPL. Although there are similarities between political participation in state-level 
democracy and in IPD, there are also differences in some respects. For instance, in state-level 
democracy, political participation means voting in general elections, which is a minimalist 
definition of democracy. This idea has been defended by such scholars of elitist democracy as 
Schumpeter. Voting in a general election also provides equality among citizens. Pateman argues 
that, in the participatory theory, “participation” refers to (equal) participation in the making of 
decisions.31 
 On the other hand, a maximalist definition, identified with Dahl’s approach, “includes 
a wide range of actions, directly or indirectly influencing the government, voluntary or 
involuntary, conscious or unconscious, and also including information seeking or information-
sharing, consuming media, expressing attitudes, etc.”32 Van Biezen summarises the ideals of 
participatory democrats as follows:  
                                                 
31 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, (Cambridge University Press, 1970) 43. 
32 Nils Gustafsson ‘Leetocracy: Political participation, social network sites and inequality’ [2013] 169 Lund 
Political Studies 28. 
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While for pluralists and democratic elitists individual participation in politics is not in 
itself an important ideal, for participatory democrats a high degree of political 
participation and a sense of civic responsibility is necessary for a political system to 
warrant the label democracy. 33 
 Although participation may take various forms, there are two main practices for IPD. 
The common model of participatory democracy within the political parties is based on the 
minimalist definition of participatory democracy, which only gives voting rights to party 
members in the decision-making process. The other is the hybrid model of democracy, in which 
party members have a right to attend every stage of decision-making, including policy 
development processes and voting rights at the end. In chapters relating to policy-making, 
leadership selection and candidate selection, this thesis will analyse the subject from the point 
of view of hybrid democracy, in which party members and party officials take part in the 
decision-making process, while the last word remains with party members.  
 Moreover, self-development is a key idea behind participatory democracy. Pateman in 
particular points out the instructional role of the participatory process. She believes that mass 
participation has an educational effect that is an ideal per se. She argues that “the experience of 
participation in some way leaves the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake 
further participation in the future.”34 Thus participation of party members in party decision 
making is also important for cultural development and has long term benefits for the democratic 
consolidation of the country. 
Applicability of the concept of IPD for reforming the TPPL 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the concept of IPD will be analysed in this study 
from the perspectives of policy-making, leadership selection and candidate selection. It is 
                                                 
33 Ingrid van Biezen, ‘How Political Parties Shape Democracy’ (Center for the Study of Democracy, Paper 04’16 
University of California, Irvine, 2004) < http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-16 >.10. 
34 Pateman (n 31) 43-45. 
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argued that all party members should be involved in these three processes directly in some way 
through the requirements of public law. It is not difficult to legislate IPD, but Parliamentary 
legislation must work in practice. Thus this study looks for a realistic conception of IPD that 
will be workable and can be implemented by law. 
 Regarding the candidate selection, for instance, closed primaries typically allow all 
party members to participate in this important party activity. The experiences of the US, some 
other countries and the earlier version of the TPPL demonstrate that states can regulate and 
enforce this area easily. With respect to leadership selection, well-known parties from mature 
democracies such as the British Labour Party, the British Conservative Party, the Canadian 
Conservative Party and the Canadian New Democrat Party use a process that involves all of the 
party members. Although these rules are not enforced by the state and emerge from individual 
party constitutions, it is not difficult to legislate this kind of activity through a national statute. 
With respect to the policy-making process, giving a say to party members in drafting and 
approving party programmes and election manifestos could also be provided for through legal 
reform. The articulation of proposals regarding the regulation of the policy-making process is 
the most challenging part of this study because of the institutional difficulties. I will explore 
this issue in a detailed manner, along with the problems involved in the realisation of this kind 
of regulation. 
Research questions 
 The analysis in the following chapters is guided by a number of assumptions that will 
be summarised here. This thesis presumes that inclusiveness is an important and effective way 
to curb oligarchic tendencies in political parties. Therefore, the provisions of the TPPL should 
be reformed in a way that promotes the participation of ordinary party members in the decision-
making process on important issues. More recently, there has been a gradual implementation 
of more participatory and thus more democratic mechanisms of intra-party decision-making in 
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political parties in established democracies.35 Therefore, it may be beneficial to look at the 
practices in these countries in terms of the methods they use for participation. Some lessons and 
conclusions may be derived from these comparisons in order to help reform the legal framework 
in which parties operate in Turkey. 
 In order to refine the hypotheses, the following research questions are considered. The 
first is in regard to whether the provisions in the party law in Turkey in terms of policy-making, 
candidate selection and leadership selection have provided IPD to Turkish parties or not. The 
concerns identifying the more inclusive IPD methods and determining how might they be 
incorporated into the TPPL. 
Methodology 
 The chapters relating to policy-making, leadership selection and candidate selection will 
begin by examining the theory on these subjects, and will then analyse the existing provisions 
in the TPPL, including consideration of the policy underpinning the existing party law, why it 
was enacted and its defects in practice in two large Turkish parties.  
 In order to test the plausibility of the hypothesis that reform of the TPPL would enhance 
IPD in Turkish parties, the research will be carried out using a mixed methodology. 
Specifically, the approach is interdisciplinary and comprises research into legal reform and 
comparative and case study methods.  
 An interdisciplinary methodology is deployed because the regulation of IPD needs to be 
informed by political as well as legal theories. More specifically, this study uses materials and 
insights from political theory in order to diagnose the substantive problems and formulate better 
legal solutions and to explain the structure and function of political parties and their institutions: 
political theory aids in understanding the lack of IPD in Turkey, while the likely cure for these 
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ailments requires engagement with legal theory. An interdisciplinary approach is also required 
to obtain the different perspectives necessary to understand the nature of IPD because in Turkey 
research on this topic has been conducted by both constitutional lawyers and political scientists, 
but mainly from the different perspectives of their respective disciplines. This thesis makes an 
effort to bring these parallel research paths together in order to enhance the overall 
understanding of the regulations of IPD. 
 It is important to note that the interdisciplinary dimension of the regulation of IPD has 
been lacking in the literature of both political science and constitutional law. Recently, however, 
constitutional lawyers and political scientists have been reading and drawing on one another’s 
research more often and for a wide range of aims. Indeed, “political” and “legal” theories are 
not watertight compartments; they have various connections. For instance, in Turkey, political 
parties are evaluated by the Constitution Court according to their commitment to such terms as 
democracy and secularism, which have highly political, rather than legal, connotations. 
 Research into legal reform simply seeks to outline an existing legal problem, to 
demonstrate how a particular law is not working and to conclude that the current law needs 
amendment or that there is a need for an entirely new law.36 By examining the party laws (the 
TPPL and the Turkish Constitution) together with case studies from Turkish parties, this study 
analyses the relationship between the legal requirements and actual practice with regards to IPD 
in Turkey. The thesis concludes by proposing amendments to the existing law or the contents 
of a new law. Furthermore, for a complete investigation of law reform, it is necessary not only 
to evaluate the current party laws, but also to analyse the reasons behind their adoption, so. the 
party constitutions will also at times be analysed in order to evaluate the approach to IPD 
established therein. Although political scholars are rightly suspicious regarding their actual 
implementation, party constitutions are useful in forming interpretative assessments of the level 
                                                 
36 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns ‘Qualitative Legal research’ in Mike McConville Wing Hond Chui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburg University Press 2010) 20. 
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of IPD.37 The rules produced by political parties are framed considerably differently than 
domestic statutes are. Moreover, although informal rules (cultural values, political ideologies 
etc.) are important factors shaping IPD, as Pippa Norris states, “the informal rules are more 
difficult to study, often requiring a blend of detailed case-studies, representative surveys of the 
mass membership and participant observational studies.”38 
 A comparative approach, then, helps to identify the existing differences and similarities 
in relation to the regulation of IPD among parties and to evaluate the best practices. Dobinson 
and Johns claim that “comparative law has usually been as an extension of the study of national 
law and justified in terms of the benefits it brings to the national legal system.”39 According to 
Tim May, “comparative analysis is worthwhile because in producing findings on the practices 
of other countries, we are better able to see the basis of our own practices.”40 Thus, comparative 
studies provide practical applications and can be used by Turkish legislators as a basis for legal 
reforms. This study focuses on comparing participatory models from mature democracies with 
the less participatory models in Turkey in the three important areas of IPD. Since there are 
countries and parties around the world which have more participatory rules, Turkey could 
reform its own party law using those examples as a source of inspiration for an external 
regulatory framework. The comparative study will be done by means of case studies, which are 
employed in some chapters in order to some light on the current situation in Turkey. According 
to David Collier, the case-study method and the comparative method are closely linked, and 
case studies are the basis of most comparative research.41  
                                                 
37 Benjamin von dem Berge (et al) Measuring Intra-Party Democracy (Springer 2013) 2. 
38 Pippa Norris ‘Building political parties: Reforming legal regulations and internal rules’ (Report commissioned 
by International IDEA 2004) 5. 
39 Mike McConvilleand and Wing Hond Chui (eds) Research Methods for Law (Edinburg University Press 2010) 
8. 
40 Tim May Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (Open University Press 1997) 185. 
41 David Collier ‘The Comparative Method’ in Ada W. Finifter, (ed) Political Science: The State of Discipline II, 
(APSA, 1993) 116. 
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 This study also focuses on the normative desirability of IPD, and sees legal enforcement 
as necessary. While in some mature democracies self-regulation of IPD seems to suffice, this 
study argues that Turkey is not at that level. 
 The thesis involves a review and analysis of primary sources, including national 
constitutions, party laws and political party documents, as well as such secondary sources as 
academic books, journal articles, working papers, reports and newspaper articles. The 
theoretical part is accomplished by examining competing theories from academic literature on 
party law and IPD.  
Case selection 
 Two parties from the United Kingdom and the closed primary system from the United 
States were selected for comparison in this study for a number of practical reasons. First of all, 
the choice was made based on the researcher’s familiarity with the English language. Secondly, 
in terms of the level of democracy, these countries have the longest traditions of democracy and 
established political parties. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 will examine, respectively, the Labour Party, which is the main 
opposition party in Britain, and the ruling Conservative party. The reason for focusing on these 
parties is that ordinary members’ participation in party decision-making processes is on the rise 
in Britain. Since allowing ordinary party members a direct say in party decisions seems to be a 
strategy of the party leaders to empower their positions in the face of party activists in the 
British contexts, it is important to determine whether Turkish parties will face this same 
problem. In Chapter 6, the thesis examines the parties in the US, which regulates candidate 
selection through state law, not from the perspective of an individual party but as system, and 
focusing only on “closed” primaries, in which only registered party members can vote. 
 I will look at the two major Turkish political parties in the Parliament, namely the ruling 
Justice and Development Party and the Republican People’s Party that is the main opposition, 
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in terms of the actual practice of candidate selection, leadership selection and policy-making 
processes. These two parties have been selected for several reasons. First, they have long 
parliamentary traditions and an enormous number of party members representing right and left 
wing ideologies, and have been the government and main opposition parties for almost 13 years. 
Second, in terms of the literature, several studies, documents and articles have been written 
about these parties. Third, these parties represent a broad cross-section of Turkish political life, 
regularly garnering 70-80 per cent of the total votes. While in theory the level of IPD differs 
between ruling and opposition parties, and between right and left wing parties, it will be 
expedient to analyse the effects of party law on these dominant parties. Although they resemble 
one another in several aspects simply because the organisational structures of parties are subject 
to the provisions in the TPPL, their similarities and differences well illustrate the main points 
advanced in this thesis.  
Contribution of the thesis 
 Many scholars have emphasised the lack of IPD and the oligarchic structure of political 
parties in Western democracies since the parties emerged.42 The degree of IPD depends mostly 
on the political culture and organisation of parties along with the legal structure with which the 
political parties must comply. Although democratic culture is necessary and important for 
realisation of IPD, it is not in itself sufficient. That is why political parties from advanced 
democracies that have a long tradition of democratic culture experience similar problems and 
are moving towards a more regulatory approach. This thesis will contribute to the current 
literature and the discussion relating to IPD by showing how legal texts have affected 
democracy within political parties, examine the deficiencies of Turkish IPD from legal 
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perspective and then discuss how it should be reformed in terms of advancing internal 
democracy.  
 Although the Turkish political party system has received significant attention from 
scholars, none of these studies has analysed IPD from the perspective of Western literature. 
Moreover, the institutional design and legal aspects of IPD have been considerably 
underestimated in much of the literature on political parties and democracy, especially in the 
Turkish context. According to Caroline Lancaster, “Turkey has never been home to a textbook 
case of intra-party democracy; its parties almost always suffer from authoritarian leadership, 
generating a political system that revolves around a few key individuals rather than 
ideologies.”43 
 There is no shortage of academic literature on the regulation of political parties, but 
detailed studies of IPD from a legal perspective are rare. Most studies to date of Turkish political 
parties have tended to concentrate on the perspective of external democracy, such as 
dissolutions of parties by the Constitution Court on the basis of non-democratic aims or 
practices, or from the perspectives of freedom of association or of expression rather than that 
of internal democracy. Similarly, none has covered IPD from the perspective of the TPPL in 
any depth.  
 Since the adoption of the TPPL, politics in Turkey has changed enormously. This 
research fills a gap in the understanding of the TPPL from the perspectives of both law and 
IPD. As well as exploring the legal side of IPD, this study also challenges the assumption that 
party congresses are a necessary element of party democracy. Furthermore, the incorporation 
of comparative elements substantially increases the theoretical scope of this study. 
                                                 
43 Lancaster (n 1) 1672, 1678 refers to Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, (eds). Political Parties and 
Democracy in Turkey (IB Tauris & Company Limited, 1991); Aylin S. Görener and Meltem S. Ucal ‘The 
Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy’ [2011] 12 
Turkish Studies 358. 
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Structure of the thesis 
 The thesis is divided into seven chapters, and uses a participatory framework to tie the 
various subjects together. Each chapter begins by situating its subject within a theoretical 
framework, and then reviews the legal and actual situation in Turkey to assess the extent to 
which the components of IPD meet participatory ideals. Finally, each chapter ends with a 
discussion of how these elements can be made more inclusive by way of legal reform. So, for 
instance, Chapter 5 begins by situating leadership selection within a framework of 
inclusiveness; the extent to which the TPPL meets inclusive criteria is then discussed, and the 
chapter ends with a review of proposals for making the system even more inclusive. 
 Chapter 2, which follows this introductory chapter, aims to provide a historical 
framework for the study through a detailed literature review that covers the political parties and 
democracy and their history in Turkey. In particular, it examines whether state level democracy 
and IPD have similarities. The last part of the chapter outlines the provisions for the public 
funding of political parties and the implications of such funding for the realisation of IPD. 
 Chapter 3 provides an overview of arguments regarding IPD in theory and in the 
regulation of political parties. First, different perspectives employed to analyse IPD are 
reviewed, and then the regulation of parties is explored by looking at the general theory and the 
Turkish case. Drawing on insights from the literature on party regulation, an explanation is 
offered for why some countries constitutionalise their parties and why others, like Turkey, adopt 
special party laws. The historical development of Turkish party law will also be surveyed. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 analyse the components of IPD using case studies from inclusive parties 
and comparing them with the situation in Turkey.  Chapter 5 focuses on leadership elections 
in Turkey from the perspective of the TPPL, with the actual practice being provided by two 
case studies. The 2014 leadership elections in the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and 
People’s Republican Party (RRP) will also be analysed. I will first discuss the differences 
between leadership selection in the party congress by party delegates and the leadership 
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selection on a one-member, one-vote basis. I propose a hybrid form of leadership selection 
through a one-member, one-vote system. 
Chapter 6 explores various aspects of the candidate selection contests of political parties. The 
first part of the chapter examines the current legal system and its practice in Turkey in order to 
understand the problems. The second part reviews different perspectives that have been 
employed to analyse the candidate selection methods, as well as literature concerning closed 
primaries. For example, closed primaries in the US are open to registered party members and 
are conducted under the provisions of electoral law, whereas in Turkey candidate selection is 
for the most part an internal matter for the party to determine. Finally, Chapter 7 evaluates how 






DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTIES 
Part 1: Democracy 
Introduction 
In order to penetrate to the core of intra-party democracy, the concept of democracy should 
be scrutinised, along with political parties and their relations with one another. Although the 
primary focus of this study is the reform of the Turkish Political Parties Law from an intra-
party democracy perspective, some basic understanding of democracy and political parties is 
vital to appreciating the arguments presented here.  
 The common consensus of contemporary political thought is that there is a close 
relationship among democracy, political parties and IPD. IPD cannot be divorced from the 
degree of democracy that is practised in a country at large; these two go hand in hand, with the 
latter being directly proportional to the degree of democracy within the parties. For instance, 
the level of IPD in British parties and the level of democracy in Britain, or the level of IPD in 
Turkish parties and the level of democracy in Turkey, are closely related. 
 Furthermore, the organisation of political parties usually parallels the organisation of 
the state. Both have their constitutions, representative organs, voters, executive organs, election 
systems etc. Party congresses resemble national parliaments, with a party leader as a prime 
minister, and party elites as other ministers who are responsible for different aspects of a party’s 
direction, and even dispute resolution committees performing functions similar to a judiciary. 
Thus, theories applicable to state-level democracy and democratic methods such as the popular 
referendums provided for in some national constitutions can be used by political parties for 
IPD; indeed, some parties use intra-party referendums from time to time. However, what 
distinguishes state level democracy from IPD is that the procedural safeguards for state level 
democracy are mostly integrated into the national constitution and have heavy enforcement 
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rules, while IPD works without most of the procedural safeguards of a parliamentary 
democracy. The implementation of party constitutions and party decisions are very loose, and 
there are limited enforcement mechanisms.  
 The necessity of democracy, political parties and IPD has always been the central topic 
of interesting debates in the political science arena. Since the concept of democracy is at the 
core of IPD, its intellectual richness and history of practice can be used as the basis of IPD. The 
lively debate over what democracy is and how it is to be sought is parallel, usable and valid for 
IPD. The basic ideas behind democracy, “the will of the people” and “rule by the people,” are 
very similar to the concepts of “the will of the party members” and “rule by the party members” 
in IPD. The diversity of perspectives surrounding the concept “democracy” over the centuries 
is reflected in disagreements over IPD.  
 Thus, it will be expedient to begin the discussion of IPD by examining democracy in 
general. It is worth stressing that a lengthy academic history and comprehensive review of the 
literature of democracy and political parties is beyond the scope of this study. This part of the 
chapter will only be able to conduct a brief examination of the emergence and definition of 
democracy in order to avoid putting the cart before the horse. This research also holds a limited 
view of democracy narrowed to the participatory and representative democracy theories. In the 
second part, political parties will be examined in the same way as democracy, and their roles in 
democracies will be described.  
Definition of democracy 
 Democracy, at first glance, appears easy to define. Yet despite the attempts by political 
scientists and philosophers throughout history to offer proper definitions, it remains a contested 
concept. It is contested because, broadly speaking, the wealth of literature on democracy 
demonstrates that definitions reflect the values of the various scholars, politicians and citizens, 
their orientations to understanding and interpreting democracy and their backgrounds and hopes 
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for it. As Danny Nicol rightly observes, “democracy means different things to different people 
in different contexts at different times.”1  
Despite this disagreement among scholars over the concept of democracy, it is agreed that 
democracy is the sine qua non for modern times. In order to appreciate the diachronic dimension 
of this contested concept, I will briefly summarise the history of democracy, how it emerged 
and gradually evolved from ancient times until today, touching on ancient Greece, England and 
the United States;2 
Historical development of democracy 
Democracy in ancient times 
 The ancient Greeks, specifically the Athenians, are considered the inventors of 
democracy. The word “democracy” comes from Greek demokratia, and the term has entered 
most major languages, meaning “rule by the people.” Etymologically, it comes from the words 
demos, meaning the citizenry, and kratos, meaning “power.” In those days, democracy was an 
alternative to aristocracy, or rule of the nobles, and oligarchy, or rule of few and, in practice, 
the wealthy. For Aristotle, for example, “a system which does not allow every citizen to share 
[in the exercise of power] is oligarchical and that one which does so is democratic.”3 This 
sentiment can be rephrased in an IPD context as “a party which does not allow ordinary 
members to share is oligarchical and that one which does so is democratic.” 
 Although their conception and practice of democracy differed from modern concepts 
and practices in fundamental ways, ancient Greek ideas continue to form the core of the modern 
approaches, especially in regard to participatory democracy in which citizens are directly 
involved on an individual basis in decision-making, rather than acting through intermediaries.4 
                                                 
1 Danny Nicol ‘Can Justice Dethrone Democracy in the European Union? A Reply to Jürgen Neyer’ [2012] 50 
JCMS 508, 510. 
2 Thus Adam Przeworski observes that, “reading histories of democracy, one quickly discovers that they focus 
predominantly on the experience of a handful of countries: Ancient Greece, England, the United States.” Adam 
Przeworski Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 2. 
3 Aristotle (Politics, IV, 6), quoted by Carl Cohen Democracy (University of Georgia Press, 1971) 3. 
4 David Held Models of Democracy, (Stanford University Press 2006). 
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Full Greek citizens (male, native-born, free) attended regular meetings, discussed the agenda of 
the day, and, once debate concluded, determined policies by popular vote in the ekklesia, or 
assembly. For instance, discussions of serious problems were likely to be attended by about six 
thousand citizens, which was one eighth of the male citizen body in Attica, the region controlled 
by Athens.5 Those who lived in the city centre were more likely to attend the meetings than 
those who lived far away, and attendance naturally increased when vital or controversial issues 
were on the agenda.6 During the period when democratic institutions were vigorous in Athens, 
participation was looked upon as the duty of every eligible citizen; and indeed the English word 
“idiot” derives from ancient Greek idiotes, a term of derision direct at those who were overly 
preoccupied with their own affairs, ta idia.7  
 Although citizens did not form political associations in the modern sense, they did form 
interest groups based on social status, locality, occupation and on occasion charismatic leaders, 
which groups sought to influence decisions, and some scholars cite these groups as precursors 
to political parties. 8  Political authority was often associated with military authority, and 
generals (strategoi) had the advantage of speaking first in order of seniority among private 
citizens, and those over age 50 had priority over younger men.9  
 However, as alluded to above, not all people, but only a small proportion of the 
population, had the full citizen status required to take part in the democracy.10 Women, slaves 
and long-term resident aliens were systematically excluded from nearly every governing 
institution, and theorists of the day did not see this situation as a democratic deficit.11 One socio-
                                                 
5 Sarah B. Pomeroy, Stanley M. Burstein, Walter Donlan and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts Ancient Greece: A 
Political, Social, and Cultural History (Oxford University Press, 1999) 216. 
6 ibid 217. 
7 Mark K. Smith ‘Education for Democracy’ < www.infed.org/biblio/b-dem.htm > accessed 7 October 2013. 
8 Hans Daalder ‘The Rise of Parties in Western Democracies’ in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds), 
Political Parties and Democracy (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) 40; Pomeroy (n 5) 217. 
9 Pomeroy (n 5) 217. 
10 Robert A. Dahl Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989) 21, also see Held David Held Models 
of Democracy, (Stanford University Press 2006) 19. 
11 ibid 21. 
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historical study has estimated that there were 90.000 Athenian citizens while the number of 
people inhabiting Attica was 365,000.12 From this point of view, it can be said that ancient 
Athens was established on an undemocratic basis, and was democratic only in name.  
 This complaint about exclusivity could equally be lodged against modern political 
parties, if not to the same degree. In a similar vein, the elites of a party have discretion regarding 
which citizens may join or to impose disciplinary measures such as expulsion of members who 
do not agree with the party leader or party policies. For instance, the TPPL leaves the terms and 
conditions for the membership registration entirely at the parties’ own discretion. Political 
parties have absolute power to refuse an application for registration without any reason. While 
most of the political parties were established on an undemocratic basis in this context, in Dahl’s 
sense, they do not see this situation as a democratic deficit.  
 It is interesting to note that democracy was not regarded as the best form of government 
among ancient philosophers. Plato rejected Athenian democracy as the best form of governance, 
and proposed a kind of merit-based aristocracy as an alternative.13 Plato considered the mass of 
the people to be a “large and powerful animal” that needs wise rulers, “the philosophers.” He 
believed that political control must be in the hands of philosopher kings, because they possess 
“the expert knowledge of kingship,” whereas ordinary people lack it. 14  Plato feared that 
democracy would lead to tyranny, though as Thom Brooks observed, his views changed over 
time, and he came to endorse a government fusing democracy and monarchy in his last work, 
the Laws, where one of his characters declares that “there are two-mother constitutions, so to 
speak, which you could fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchy is the proper 
name for the first, and democracy for the second….It is absolutely vital for a political system 
to combine them.”15 
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 Aristotle was similarly suspicious of democracy, arguing that, when the people held the 
power in their hands, they would ignore or neglect the limits of the laws and supersede them.16 
The philosopher also criticised oligarchy, on the grounds that aggression by the rich is more 
likely than aggression by the masses, making oligarchies harder to control than democracies.17 
 As will be discussed later, these arguments are also clearly echoed in modern IPD 
debates. Like ancient philosophers, modern party leaders and elites are suspicious of the power 
of the people. But we may be more sympathetic to Aristotle’s idea that regulating the powerful 
is far more difficult than regulating the weak, and note similarities between Plato’s “philosopher 
kings” and professional politicians or the leadership in modern democracies. The experience of 
the ancient Greeks might further suggest that the regulation of political parties is more difficult 
than regulating other associations in the modern era. 
Re-development of Democracy 
 The Greek style of democracy was largely forgotten until being rediscovered by thinkers 
in Early Modern Europe. While giving a precise date is impossible, it is acknowledged that 
democracy re-flowered in the world again in the eighteenth century. The American Revolution 
(1776) and the French Revolution (1789) were historical turning points in the history of 
democracy, and have played a significant role in the foundations of democratic bodies. These 
two revolutions created the opportunity for people to practise the democratic ideas that had been 
tried by the ancient Greeks. 
 Nevertheless, from ancient Greek times until the late nineteenth century, there were 
different opinions about whether democracy was desirable or not, so it was still too early to 
speak of modern democratic understanding without modern political parties and universal 
suffrage. According to Leib Talmon, “what is today considered as an essential concomitant of 
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democracy…was far from being regarded as essential by the eighteenth century fathers of 
democracy.” 18  For instance, in America, the Founding Fathers, similar to some classical 
philosophers, expressed concern that democracy would lead to popular tyranny and constituted 
a threat to the rights of minorities.19 Madison expressed some anti-democratic sentiments; he 
was wary of popular politics and suspicious of majoritarian rule, which he had come to believe 
was endangering the new nation.20 Alexander Hamilton similarly worried that, “give all the 
power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all the power to the few, they will oppress 
the many.”21 Alternatively, American statesmen were impressed by Montesquieu’s famous 
separation of powers idea, which has its roots in Aristotle’s political theories. For them, 
government must depend upon a system of checks and balances, whereby power is divided 
among three main institutions, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and the role of 
each must be enshrined in a document, in America, the Constitution. Early American statesmen 
believed in constitutional government and constitutional pluralism, but not in party government 
or party pluralism.22 This sentiment also demonstrates their suspicion and fear of factions, 
which will be discussed further below. According to Birch, “belief in popular sovereignty and 
frequent elections did not at first lead American theorists and leaders to identify their system of 
government as democratic.”23 This was because they still thought that democracy meant direct 
popular participation in government, as it did for the ancient Greeks.24 Their understanding of 
this government model is today called “constitutional democracy,” which was also defined by 
Robert Dahl in 1956 as “Madisonian democracy.” 25  Since democracy was not seen as a 
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desirable form of government, these thinkers preferred the term “representative republic” with 
a balanced constitution.26  
 Although the citizens of some countries gained a greater say following the eighteenth 
century revolutions, it is difficult to speak of democracy in the modern sense in the absence of 
political parties and universal suffrage. Nonetheless, the debates over the best form of 
government among the ancient Greeks have had a strong influence on modern ideas about 
democracy. The classical democratic concepts and criticism of them by classical thinkers have 
inspired modern political scholars in support of or opposition to the idea of democracy.27  
 In the nineteenth century, a simple definition of democracy is offered in the memorable 
phrase of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, who put people at the core of democracy: 
“Democracy is government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Lincoln, probably 
unconsciously, defined two different democracy theories. The first is direct democracy, 
“government by the people,” and second one is representative democracy, “government for the 
people.” Peter Mair analyses this understanding as follows: 
On the one hand, there is the constitutional component – that which emphasises the need 
for checks and balances across institutions and which entails government for the people; 
on the other hand, there is the popular component – that which emphasises the role of 
the ordinary citizen and popular participation, and which entails government by the 
people.28 
 Indeed, consciously or unconsciously, when Lincoln was defining democracy, his 
intention was most probably guided by a notion of “popular sovereignty,”, which is the basic 
idea of participatory democracy. Popular sovereignty means that people are the highest political 
authority in the government. This notion dates back to the sixteenth century, when George 
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Buchanan stated that “The Law is more powerful than the King, as being the Governor and 
Moderator of his lusts and actions. But the whole Body of the people are more powerful than 
the Law.”29 Popular sovereignty in England is manifested in efforts to limit the authority of the 
king, facilitate the creation of Parliament, expand suffrage and establish civil liberties.30 The 
idea of popular sovereignty also fostered the emergence of mass parties, which were designed 
to promote participatory democracy. However, as will be discussed further below, mass parties 
had never put those ideas into practice, and the organisations quickly assumed an oligarchical 
character.  
 Ancient Greek democracy had a significant influence on modern democracy. The 
various scholars and politicians saw ancient Greek democracy as both an inspirational model 
and also as an example of dangerous excess. After analysing the way in which democracy was 
understood by the ancient Greeks and its re-emergence in the Early Modern era, we can now 
analyse modern democracy. It is important to note that, with regard to institutional design, there 
are two key differences between modern democracy and ancient Greek democracy in terms of 
participation methods and of eligibility. The fact that Greek cities were small in both territory 
and population allowed citizens to govern themselves directly; modern states, by contrast, have 
large territories and populations and are governed by representatives rather than by the people 
themselves. In respect to eligibility for voting, while most of the Greek people were 
disenfranchised, in modern times much larger portions of the citizenry are eligible for voting. 
The modern understanding of democracy has expanded considerably, as will be discussed in 
detail below.  
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Democracy in modern times 
 When it comes to the twentieth century, many scholars tend to equate democracy with 
representative government and free, competitive elections. Schumpeter, for instance, stated that 
“the hallmark of modern day democracy is elections: a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote.”31 Duverger claimed that the simplest and the most realistic definition of democracy is “a 
regime in which those who govern are chosen by those who are governed, by means of free and 
open elections.”32 Rather than offering pithy definitions of democracy, some scholars have 
instead proposed several criteria for what can be accepted as democratic. According to Marlino, 
the definition of democracy suggests that “such a regime has at least: universal, adult suffrage; 
recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one 
source of information.” 33  Robert Dahl suggested five key criteria that are essential for 
democracy and also for IPD, which deserve to be highlighted here since they are closely related 
to core of thesis.34 
Effective participation – Before policy is adopted by an association, all the members must 
have equal and effective opportunities for making their views known to the other members as 
to what the policy should be. 
Voting equality at the decisive stage – When the moment arrives at which the final decision 
about the policy is made, every member must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, 
and all votes must be counted as equal. 
Enlightened understanding – Within reasonable limits as to time, each member must have 
equal and effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their 
likely consequences. 
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Control of the agenda – The members must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how and, 
if they choose, what matters are to be placed on the agenda. Thus the democratic process 
required by the three preceding criteria is never closed. The policies of the association are 
always open to the change by the members, if they so choose. 
Inclusiveness – All, or at any rate most, adult permanent residents should have the full rights 
of citizens that are implied by the first four criteria.  
These criteria are also useful for analysing IPD. This study borrows in particular three 
of them for assessing internally democratic political parties: inclusion, voting equality at the 
decisive stage and effective participation.  
 Thus, before party policies are adopted, all party members must have full rights of 
membership and all the party members must have equal and effective opportunities for making 
their views known to other members. Particularly effective participation and inclusiveness 
criteria are the basis of this thesis. However, when one looks at these conditions, it can easily 
be seen that only a few countries or organisations would meet all these criteria. It can therefore 
be concluded that democracy is a question of degree. Analysis of the extent to which a country 
or political party meets these criteria indicates the degree of democracy. All of these conditions 
are correlated positively with the degree of democracy, which can range from established or 
mature democracy to non-democracy. Established democracies should meet most of these 
conditions and developing democracies some of them, while non-democracies are lacking all 
of them. These criteria are also valid for ranking the level democracy level of political parties 
in the range is mainly between highly oligarchic and somewhat less oligarchic parties. 
 Moreover, the degree of democracy is clearly associated with the number of political 
parties in general elections. The existence of many competing parties in elections is usually 
accepted as an important indicator of a democracy.35 However, although free elections and the 
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number of competing parties are important for democracy, most scholars believe that 
democracy in modern world means more than simply periodic, free elections and a number of 
political parties. Now scholars associate democracy with a wide array of concepts, such as 
human rights, freedom of speech, association and press and the rule of law. This understanding 
is often expressed in terms of “thin” and “thick” definitions of democracy. 36 
 Indeed, it is now widely agreed that there is more to democracy than elections and 
governing. Today's understanding of democracy concentrates on an institutional checklist in 
order to measure the progress of countries toward democracy, such as the election process, 
political party development, civil society empowerment, legislative strengthening, legal and 
judicial reforms and free and independent media development. For example, Richard Katz 
states that: “Once attention shifts from ‘democratic or not?’ to ‘better democracy or not as 
good?’ the near consensus that democracy is what results when multiple political parties 
compete for power in free and fair elections is no longer adequate.”37 In this respect, IPD is one 
of the most important components of a broad definition of democracy and the prerequisites of 
full democracy. 
 It is important to note that there is no single theory of democracy. There are many types 
of democracy discussed in literature, such as direct, representative, liberal democracy, 
participatory, democracy, social and hybrid. The scope of this thesis does not allow for 
discussion of the entire range of theories of democracy and every pertinent fact in detail. It will 
be sufficient to emphasise that, of all the aforementioned labels, probably the most applicable 
to the study of political parties and IPD are the participatory and representative theories. This 
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study will focus on these two conceptions of democracy and argue that participatory democracy 
within political parties is the best form for Turkish IPD. 
Representative democracy 
 Political parties, either in state level politics or within their administration, are at the 
heart of the process of representation. Thus, this study will briefly analyse the study of 
representative democracy. In the first sense, it may be appropriate to begin by considering the 
concept of political representation. As mentioned, in any democracy in the world today, the 
number of citizens is too large and the political issues too complex to have anything like direct 
democracy at the state level in which the people all get together and make their decisions as a 
group. Therefore, almost every democratic country has a system of political representation in 
which the voters select the people who are to represent them in making decisions on their behalf.  
 Dario Castiglione observes that political representation has had two different processes 
throughout history. One is the emergence of the ideas of sovereign and absolute power in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the other is the establishment of modern parliamentary 
institutions and constitutional government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.38 For 
instance, there was political representation from early seventeenth century to the nineteenth 
century in England with the House of Commons. This was, however, as Burke characterised it, 
“virtual representation”: that is, one could speak on behalf of a particular interest without being 
elected by popular vote.39 In fact, Members of Parliament were at the time chosen by a small 
number of leading local people.40 Burke considered the terms “delegates” and “trustees” and 
concluded that representatives should not be delegates, but rather trustees who use their best 
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judgment on behalf of those they represent.41 Richard Katz defines the delegates and trustees 
as follows: 
[T]he delegate serves as the direct agent of his or her constituents, doing what the 
represented want him or her to do, serving as a conduit for their opinions, following 
their direct instructions. The trustee, on the other hand, acts for the represented by using 
his or her own judgement to advance their interest, but not necessarily in accordance 
with their currently expressed opinions.42 
So again, while individual self-government is a democratic ideal, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for all of the adult population to take part in the decision-making process when the 
size of nation states and the complexity of governmental issues in the modern world are given 
due consideration. Even in the Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu stated that: 
As in a country of liberty, every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be his own 
governor; the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. But since 
this is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences, 
it is fit the people should transact by their representatives what they cannot transact by 
themselves.43  
Direct democracy is not however entirely impossible, for modern direct democracies 
use referendums as tools for crafting constitutional amendments and resolving important 
political issues. Scarrow argues that a referendum is an innovation of American “good 
government” reformers and Populists that enables “the people” to bypass the parties.44 In the 
same vein, a European Council report stated that  
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Representation could no longer be the only expression of democracy. Democracy 
needed to be developed beyond representation, through the introduction of more 
sustained forms of interaction between people and authorities in order to include direct 
democratic elements in the decision–making process.45 
Besides, most of the advocates of direct democracy have admitted that direct decision-making 
devices can only modify, but never entirely replace, representative democracy.46 For example, 
Alain de Benoist claimed that it is impossible to escape representative democracy completely 
owing to insurmountable difficulties in modern societies. 47  Today, it is clear that the 
realistically feasible and more practicable democracy model is a representative democracy at a 
state level. While the significance of representative democracy is often taken for granted in 
modern societies, without a doubt representative democracy has weaknesses as well as such 
strengths as simply being more practical.  
 The main criticism of  representative democracy can be summarised as follows. First, 
as the name implies, representative democracy does not allow citizens to participate directly in 
the processes of decision-making; they can only give their power to representatives, and most 
of the electorate has little control over the choice of representative. In many circumstances, 
political parties make a choice that defies the will of their voters. Therefore, some scholars have 
accused representative democracy of undermining citizens’ rights to make their own political 
decisions.48 For example, Hannah Arendt criticised representative democracy on the grounds 
that:  
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[T]he parties, because of their monopoly of nomination, cannot be regarded as popular 
organs, but that they are, on the contrary, the very efficient instruments through which 
the power of the people is curtailed and controlled. That representative government has 
in fact become oligarchic government is true enough, though not in the classical sense 
of rule by the few in the interest of the few; what we today call democracy is a form of 
government where the few rule, at least supposedly, in the interest of the many.49 
 This problem with representative democracy is mostly related to the candidate selection 
procedure of political parties, which could be improved through legal reforms that will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. Alain De Benoist has stated that, “In the representative system, once 
the voter has delegated his political will to his representative by voting, power’s center of 
gravity inevitably resides in the representatives and the political parties that subsume them, and 
no longer in the people.”50 Additionally, he has argued that representatives will no longer act 
according to the will of those who elected them, but according to their own will—in other 
words, each regards himself as authorised by election to do what he judges best.51 David Judge 
describes this phenomenon as the paradox of representative democracy: “parliamentary 
representation serves to include ‘the people’ in decision-making, indirectly and infrequently 
through the process of elections; yet, simultaneously, it serves to exclude them from direct and 
continuous participation in the decision-making process.”52 
 A second problematic issue regarding representative democracy is whether all people 
are represented proportionately in regard to such characteristics as gender, race and age. 
Clearly, the shortcomings of this type of democracy include overrepresentation and 
underrepresentation. Heywood argues that “no system of free and competitive elections can 
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ensure that government is a microcosm of society, and in all such systems certain groups are 
‘over-represented,’ invariably men, whites, the wealthy and the middle-aged or elderly.”53 So 
the statement in the will of John Adams that a representative legislature “should be an exact 
portrait, in miniature, of the people at large”54 seems impossible. For instance, it can be said 
that the Turkish Grand National Assembly, after the 2011 elections, is unrepresentative of the 
Turkish population, since only 14 per cent of MPs are women, while 22 per cent have law 
school backgrounds. 
 The third criticism raised against representative democracy is that, in practice, 
representative democracy means “government by the representatives of the winner of 
competitive elections.” Throughout history, scholars of democracy have dealt with the 
conundrum of the unchecked rule of a minority over the majority. 55  For representative 
democracy, generally with the help of electoral laws, tends to concentrate government power 
in the hands of a few who then can make crucial decisions affecting all citizens. For example, 
electoral statistics for Turkey make it clear that the turnout for national parliamentary elections 
is generally around 80% of the electorate, and governments are formed generally by 30-50 per 
cent of those voting. For instance, although the Justice and Development Party in the 2002 
election received only 34 per cent of the overall vote, the party secured almost two-thirds of the 
parliamentary seats. In this election, in order to validate votes, only 59 per cent of registered 
voters were represented in the party by the two political parties. In terms of eligible voters, the 
number is even lower, at 46 per cent. 
 Different electoral systems such, as first-past-the-post or proportional representation, 
naturally have different consequences for representative democracy. For instance, while the 
first-past-the-post-system supports the development of a two party system, the proportional 
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voting system favours a multi-party system. For Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, it is not the 
object of the first-past-the-post system to produce an elected Parliament that will be a “mirror 
of the nation” in the sense that it accurately represents the different parties; rather this system 
works in favour of single-party government.56 For a proportional representation system, Arend 
Lijphart points out, “the basic aim of proportional representation is to represent both majorities 
and minorities and, instead of over representing or underrepresenting any parties, to translate 
votes into seats proportionally,” and in the first-past-the-post system, “the candidate supported 
by the largest number of voters wins, and all other voters remain unrepresented.”57 Generally, 
large parties prefer the first-past-the-post system in single-member districts, whereas smaller 
parties prefer proportional elections.58 
 Although there is no commonly recognised ideal and best electoral system in practice, 
it has been argued that proportional voting systems are far better than the first-past-the-post 
systems as an accurate measurement of a populace’s views.59 However, as Nicol observes, 
different countries accord different degrees of importance to proportionality as an aspect of 
democracy.60 For instance, he states that a violation of proportionality would not be seen as a 
shocking departure from democratic requirements in some countries, such as the UK.61 Indeed, 
as William Hale rightly argues, an electoral system has to reconcile two conflicting objectives: 
on the one hand, reasonable and fair representation, on the other, to secure stable and firm 
governments.62  
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 Furthermore, an election system is important from the IPD perspective. Pettit claims 
that “Electoral reform can create the environment where intra-party democracy has the potential 
to flourish.” 63  He investigates IPD in the first-past-the-post system in the UK and the 
proportional representation model in Denmark. He concluded that: 
[W]inner takes-all approach means that parties fighting for significant Westminster 
influence are greatly affected by the laws of tactics. They do indeed have to be highly 
efficient fighting machines, which leaves very little scope for intra-party democracy, 
and in consensus model or proportional representation systems in the case of Denmark 
have been shown to better foster IPD.64  
 The fourth problem with democracy is the issue of representation, which is also closely 
related to the second and third problems. There are two separate dimensions, one explicit and 
another implicit, to this problem. The explicit dimension is the threshold election criteria, which 
mostly prevent representation of numerous voters in national Parliaments. Turkey is a good 
example in this respect. A party in Turkey must secure ten per cent of the votes in order to 
qualify for a seat according to the electoral law, which is the highest of all such thresholds 
applied in Europe. Cem Toker summarises the problem as follows:  
This means that a political party collecting as much as 9.9 per cent of the popular votes 
in the general elections, is granted no representation whatsoever in the National 
Assembly even if it acquires 99.9 per cent of the votes in a given provincial election 
district.’65  
Pippa Norris defines this kind of regulation as “cartel regulation.”  
Cartel regulations respect general human rights but nonetheless they limit party 
competition through a variety of restrictive practices designed to benefit established 
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parties in parliament or in government. This includes the requirements for ballot access, 
the regulations governing the allocation of public funding, and the rights to free 
campaign broadcasts and state subsidies. Cartels are designed to skew resources towards 
insiders, with a high effective vote threshold protecting against outside challengers.66 
 The dominant parties lock up political institutions and hinder third parties’ participation 
in the political system, all of which restricts meaningful discussion as a whole in the political 
system.67 In multi-party systems like Turkey, major parties that have long-time recognition 
among voters and a seat in Parliament are establishing an oligopoly in the political system like 
those described in economic theory. Since political parties in parliament have power to regulate 
the whole system, election laws, party laws and other laws related to political parties, they 
design regulations for their own benefit. Thus the voters generally vote for the lesser evil, and 
for the party that has policies to their own views. For instance, in Turkey, it is extremely difficult 
for emerging parties to enter the system, since there are three big obstacles in front of a new 
party’s entrance to the system: a 10 per cent threshold criteria in general elections in order to 
gain a seat in Parliament, a 7 per cent threshold in order to receive public funds and the 
establishment of a party organisation in half of the provinces and two-thirds of sub-provinces 
in order to compete in elections.  
 When it comes to the problem implicit within representation, or the lack thereof, 
sometimes political parties coerce people to vote for the same policies when they might not 
prefer to do so. For instance, normally in two party systems, as Duverger claimed, political 
choice usually takes the form of a choice between two alternatives.68 Not only in two-party 
systems, but also in multi-party systems, political parties are expected to provide a range of 
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choices to the electorate. However, what would happen if all parties support the same politics? 
As Gauja observes, parties are reducing the options available to voters and the diversity across 
the policy spectrum.69 So it is true that current political parties no longer offer sufficiently 
distinctive policies. This phenomenon limits voter choice, and leads to the non-representation 
of some ideas in the political arena. Voters have two options in this situation, either to vote for 
a different party, which is ineffective because other parties also offer same policies, or simply 
to avoid voting. Anthony Downs claimed that when the citizen cannot see any difference 
between parties, in order to escape from this deadlock, they alter the basis of their decision to 
whether or not the officials have done as good a job of governing as did their predecessors in 
office.70 This situation is against the idea of “the will of the people.” According to Katz, “if the 
parties do not take different positions, or any positions at all, on matters of importance to 
citizens, the policy-based rationales for party membership or other party activity are 
diminished.”71 However, party members who have a meaningful way to be heard can help to 
change their party’s policies from within the party. IPD is a good solution for diversifying 
policies among parties. Referring to the work of Peter Mair, Nicol states that “With the policy 
gap between the parties widened by internal democracy, general elections would involve a more 
genuine choice than at present between real alternatives of policy and vision, thereby engaging 
the electorate in a public competition of ideas.” 72  Alan Ware observes that “In terms of 
Hirschman’s analysis, party democracy would provide a ‘voice’ mechanism, to complement 
the ‘exit’ alternative already available to voters, an alternative that by itself does not function 
effectively under oligopoly.”73 For Ware, IPD can prevent oligopolistic collusion between the 
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party elites. Similarly, Saglie and Heider claim that internally democratic parties are less prone 
to cartelization.74 
 There is on-going debate regarding the shortcomings of representative democracy and 
how these shortcomings can be minimised. They can, to some extent, be corrected through the 
implementation of different kinds of democracy. Thus, some countries have found 
complementary solutions to overcome these weaknesses. This study argues that the state is 
capable of fostering democracy through public law, at least to some extent. For instance, 
referendums are one of these supplementary solutions. Supporters of referendums hold that the 
power of political parties must be counterbalanced, and some scholars believe that national 
referendums are the only way to cure the shortcomings of representative democracy.75 Others 
argue that referendums enable smaller parties in particular, which in general elections have little 
chance of winning a seat, to remain influential.76  
 Scholars who oppose referendums claim that the wants of citizens must be channelled 
through the kind of filtering represented by political parties. 77  According to Sartori, 
referendums are a zero-sum mechanism of decision-making in which a majority rules the 
system to the exclusion of the minority.78 It is also argued that “direct democracy attacks 
fundamental processes of representative democracy by constraining the freedom of manoeuvre 
and autonomy of political elites.”79 The key issue regarding referendums is who determines the 
agenda; in practice, actual decisions still remain with political parties as to whether an issue 
will be addressed through a referendum or not. At this point, IPD again comes into play. Party 
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members, in the context of a meaningful decision-making process, can affect the parties’ stands 
on referendums.  
 I believe that, while representative democracy is necessary at a state level together with 
some complementary solutions such as referendums, the case is different when it comes to party 
administration. Various practical difficulties that exist at the state level or in participatory 
democracies could easily be encountered in party administration. Thus, we should reconsider 
the need for classic party congress in political parties. As will be shown in the following 
chapters, Turkish IPD, which is mostly established on the basis of party congresses composed 
of delegates who represent party members, is not working well. Although there is an election 
for the selection of delegates, these latter owe their positions to appointment rather than 
election, and the relationship between the party leader and the delegates is often substantially 
based on clientelism.  
 In addition, the shortcomings of political parties, such as the lack of IPD, are all the 
more shortcomings of representative democracy because they are its only tools. For instance, 
Dalton and Wattenberg suggest that “the failure of parties might imply the failure of modern 
[representative] government.”80 This study holds that IPD is another supplementary solution 
for trying to overcome the shortcomings of representative democracy. Indeed, the solutions 
proposed here to the lack of IPD in the Turkish context are also applicable to the problems with 
Turkish representative democracy in general. Thus an alternative normative framework for IPD 
is proposed in upcoming chapters that can help to counter the shortcomings of Turkish 
representative democracy. 
Participatory democracy 
 In order to establish the importance of party members’ participation in intra-party 
decision making, it is first necessary to clarify what is understood by the term “participatory 
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democracy.” A participatory democracy is a political system in which the citizens directly make 
the policy decisions. More recently, participatory democracy has been attracting the attention 
of a growing number of scholars throughout the world as a means to address directly the 
problems of representative democracy, increasing distrust in political parties, low voter turnouts 
and civic disengagement. For instance, some modern democracy theorists, such as Benjamin 
Barber in Strong Democracy (1984) and Carole Pateman in Participation and Democratic 
Theory (1970), see “representative democracy” as merely a thin theory of democracy.  
 Although this literature mostly focuses on the participation of citizens on state level 
issues, participation in state level democracy via membership in political parties cannot be 
separated from participatory democracy. Advocates of IPD argue that the active participation 
of party members in party businesses has not only great benefits to a party in itself but is also 
necessary for the success of state level democracy. 
As mentioned earlier, classical direct democracy as it was practised in Athens is very difficult 
because of the complexities of the modern world. This is not to suggest that participatory 
democracy is impossible. Most recent literature that analyses IPD emphasizes the fact that that 
the most-used instrument for intra-party democratisation is the enhancement of the participation 
of ordinary party members in policy-making, candidate selection and leadership selection 
procedures. For this reason, participatory democracy methods within the parties are always 
attractive to advocates of IPD.81 According to Seyd, “the plebiscitarian party is likely to be an 
increasingly common feature of the future.” 82  Furthermore, participatory decision-making 
procedures have been seen as an essential feature for political parties in new democracies by 
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democracy promoting organisations.83 In advanced democracies, such as Canada, the UK and 
Germany, there is a tendency towards a universal membership vote in every field of decision-
making.84 Young and Cross emphasize that: 
In theory, a party that has adopted the plebiscitary model would involve members 
directly in a broad range of decisions for the party, including election of the leader and 
determination of party policy and direction. Members would not be aggregated into 
groups and each member’s vote would have equal weight in determining outcomes.85  
 This thesis argues that the lack of internal democracy within the Turkish parties is one 
of the main threats to the consolidation of Turkish democracy. I believe that equipping party 
organisations with participatory democracy tools with the help of public law to facilitate 
democratic means of policy making and selecting party leaders and candidates will make a 
positive difference in Turkish democracy. 
Conclusion 
 Political parties in Turkey have long prided themselves on being grassroots 
organisations committed to participatory democracy. However, as will be seen further in this 
study, this is not true in practice. The democratic ideal is imperfectly realised in existing 
political parties: central party organisation is remote from the ordinary members, who 
participate only indirectly and to a limited extent in party decision-making. I believe that the 
state by way of regulation should facilitate participatory democracy within parties. Thus, the 
weaknesses of representative democracy can be compensated for by IPD, which would accord 
a more active role to the party members. As Paul Clarke puts it, democracy is “unfinished 
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business.”86 and the search must continue for ways of consolidating the democracy on both the 
state level and within political parties. 
Part 2: Political Parties 
Introduction 
 Having completed a brief view of democracy in order to assist in understanding the 
broader context of this study, it is now time to explore political parties themselves. While the 
idea of democracy and democratic government is much older than parties, in contemporary 
democratic theory, democracy has a fundamentally political meaning that generally refers to 
party-based representative democracy. Without political parties, a modern democracy is 
unimaginable. For example, as James Bryce stated, “parties are inevitable. No free large country 
has been without them. No one has yet shown how governments could get on without political 
parties.”87 
 From the beginning of the twentieth century, political scholars have insistently claimed 
that democracy should be based on organisations. Thus Robert Michels declared that 
“Democracy is inconceivable without organisation.”88 These organisations are political parties; 
thus Schattschneider asserted that “political parties created democracy and modern democracy 
is unthinkable save in terms of the political parties.”89 It is true enough that modern democracy, 
especially representative democracy, requires a high degree of party organisation. Today, 
however, in most modern democracies, electoral turnout and party membership have declined, 
and citizens are increasingly doubtful of political parties.90 This decline has not happened 
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equally in each and every country. For example, in a study of public images of political parties, 
Dalton and Weldon found that  
While 80 per cent of Swedes say parties are necessary to make the political system work, 
only 23 per cent believe that parties care what ordinary people think. Similarly, 80 per 
cent of the Germans think parties are necessary, but only 18 per cent of the public believe 
that parties care.91  
 Voters and party members have a growing dissatisfaction with political parties; they 
believe that parties have been failing to fulfil their core functions, that the parties do not care 
what they think and that the parties are not sufficiently responsive to public interests.92 Dalton 
and Farrell claim that parties are imperfect institutions, and that the contemporary public is 
increasingly aware of these imperfections.93 Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther voice similar 
concerns where they claim “no single institution is held in greater disrepute than the political 
party.”94 
 Political corruption is one reason for citizens’ increasing distrust of political parties. In 
an international survey sponsored by Transparency International, it was revealed that, in 17 of 
the 20 Western democracies, political parties were rated as the institution most affected by 
corruption.95 As Down stated, “Each political party is a team of men who seek ofﬁce solely in 
order to enjoy the income, prestige and power that go with running the governing apparatus.”96 
Similarly, Peter Burnell claims that, in both mature and emerging democracies, political parties 
are often held in low esteem because people think that politicians are pursuing their own 
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interests rather than those of the people that they seek to represent.97 For instance, in Turkey, 
recent years have witnessed a series of cases of political corruption which have resulted in 
increasing criticism of the political parties. Although political parties have been falling out of 
favour with voters and party membership has been declining over time, they are still the only 
vehicles for deciding the rulers of government.98 
 Another problem with political parties is the dissatisfaction of party members that they 
do not have sufficient opportunities to take part in internal decision-making procedures.99 This 
study holds that IPD helps party members’ participation in the internal decision-making process 
in a meaningful way and therefore improves the legitimacy of parties and the trust in them. The 
next part of the study presents the basic concepts of parties, what they are, how they emerged 
and the functions that they perform. 
Definition and roles of a political party 
 Etymologically, the word “party” comes from Old French partie, which means “side,” 
“part,” “portion,” “share,” “separation,” or “division.” In a political sense, the term gained its 
current meaning first in early eighteenth centuries.100 Edmund Burke in the eighteenth century 
defined a political party as “a body of men united for promoting the national interest upon some 
particular principle upon which they are agreed.”101  
 It is obvious that Burke’s definition of a “party” bears little resemblance to the modern 
meaning but rather reflects eighteenth-century English ideas. The main difference is that parties 
in the modern era are neither only pursuing the “national interest” nor composed only of men. 
Giovanni Sartori in the twentieth century defined parties as “any political group identified by 
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an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or 
non-free) candidates for public office.”102 More recently, in the European Commission report, 
a political party is defined as “a free association of persons, one of the aims of which is to 
participate in the management of public affairs, including through the presentation of candidates 
to free and democratic elections.”103 Definitions naturally have varied widely over time and 
from country to country and scholar to scholar, and each definition reflects a unique historical 
development, socioeconomic, cultural context and political background. 
 Among these different definitions, three themes remain constant. First, political parties 
are organised bodies; second, they present candidates for elections; and third, they aim at 
capturing or gaining control of the government through elections. According to V.O. Key, the 
last two distinguish political parties from interest groups. For Key, interest groups promote their 
interest by attempting to influence the government rather than by nominating candidates and 
seeking the responsibility for the management of government.104 
 However, some features of political parties are controversial in practice. For instance, 
Muller and Ulrech claim that “in order to live up to the standard political science definition, 
political parties need to run in elections.”105 Although elections are seen as the core activity of 
political parties, many parties register legally that however never stand for elections or have no 
realistic chance of winning elections. For instance, while there are about seventy legitimate 
political parties existing in Turkey today, generally only about twenty of them compete in 
elections, and most of these have almost no hope of winning elections or any seat in Parliament.  
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 However defined, in practice, political parties perform highly important functions that 
no other organisation could.106 In order to find out what makes a political party special, more 
needs to be known about the functions of political parties in modern times generally. The 
essential roles of political parties are increasingly recognised by such supranational 
organisations as the Council of Europe, the European Union and the European Court of Human 
Rights and by national constitutions and their courts around the world. The ECHR states that 
political parties are a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy.107 
In 1961, Turkish Constitution Article 56 was drafted, which stated that “Whether in power or 
in opposition political parties are indispensable entities of democratic political life.”108 
 Political parties are the only means for enabling voters to choose their rulers in nearly 
every democratic country. Moreover, political parties are one of the main channels for 
accountable and responsive governments. With the help of periodic elections, political parties 
know that they have to face the voters from time to time and thus be accountable for their 
failures.109 Most scholars also pay special attention to the crucial role of parties. Political parties 
can ensure that the voice of citizens is heard by government.110 LaPalombara and Weiner claim 
that “Whether in a free society or under a totalitarian regime, the organisation called the party 
is expected to organise public opinion and to communicate demands to the center of 
governmental power and decision.”111 According to Sartori, “they are an instrument, or an 
agency, for representing the people by expressing their demands.”112  
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 Bartolini and Mair suggest five functions of political parties: the integration and 
mobilisation of citizens; the articulation and aggregation of interests; the formulation of public 
policy; the recruitment of political leaders; and the organisation of parliament and 
government.113 Gunther and Diamond identify seven functions for parties more or less similar 
to Bartolini and Mair’s suggestions, adding recruiting and nominating candidates for elective 
offices and representing different social groups; they also argue that political parties recently 
have performed a more limited set of functions, focused principally around elections. 114 
Schmitter wryly explains the roles of parties as follows: “If one is to believe the literature, there 
seems to be almost nothing that political parties have not done, at one time or another.”115 Yet 
in many countries, parties do not play all of these possible roles, nor perform completely all of 
the functions that they do take on.116 
 There are three main functions that this study will focus on: the selection of candidates 
for elections, the recruitment of political leaders and policy-making or laying down a party 
programme for government. As the analysis progresses, the essence of these functions will be 
discussed from the IPD view. 
Emergence and development of parties 
 Before delving into the analysis, a brief historical background of political parties will be 
useful. It is undisputable that the emergence of political parties was closely related to the 
development of democracy. To begin with, the emergence in Western democracies has taken 
place step by step, and this form of government was not welcome at the beginning. The reason 
for referring to “Western democracies” is that most political scholars view Western Europe and 
the United States as the “heartlands” of political parties.  
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 There are different theoretical approaches that can be identified in political science 
literature to the emergence of political parties, but it is mostly explained as the result of such 
factors as the establishment of national Parliaments and responsible governments, the extension 
of the franchise and the rise of urbanisation and industrialisation.117  
 Thus, for instance, Daalder claims that the modern political party can be described as a 
product of the Industrial Revolution.118 LaPalombara and Weiner observe that parties emerge 
when the activities of a political system reach a degree of complexity that requires new political 
developments.119 They also believe that parties often grow out of a crisis situation.120 Several 
reasons are given for the emergence of parties, and there is a disagreement among scholars over 
the date when parties first appear. Rather than giving an exact date, John Hoadley analysed 
parties that were established within the Parliaments and proposed four stages namely; 
factionalism, polarisation, expansion and institutionalisation, to describe development of 
parties.121 
 In the first phase, groups of so called “factions” formed in the parliaments that 
represented similar positions on a variety of issues and personalities. These factions were not 
organised permanently, and lasted only until the issues were settled. In the second phase, 
“polarisation,” these factions began to stabilise into more permanent legislative groups, and 
also began to oppose each other on a broad variety of issues. However, these groups could no 
longer secure legitimacy without the support of the masses. Thus, in the third phase, after the 
extension of suffrage, these groups inside the parliament sought to gain the support of the 
masses and started to extend their ideologies outside the parliament. This stage can also be seen 
as the beginning of the development of parties outside of parliament. In the final stage; they 
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needed a permanent linkage between their groups in the parliament and their electoral 
committees.122 Thus, they created organisations outside the parliament in order to direct and 
coordinate the party activities. Duverger suggested similar ideas to those of Hoadley for the 
origins of parties. He explained this situation as follows: 
The more political assemblies see their functions and independence grow, the more their 
members feel the need to group themselves according to what they have in common, so 
as to act in concert. The more the right to vote is extended and multiplied, the more 
necessary it becomes to organize the electors by means of committees capable of making 
the candidates known and of canalizing the votes in their direction. The rise of parties 
is thus bound up with the rise of parliamentary groups and electoral committees.123 
Similarly, Scarrow claims that the emergence of parties was linked to the two interrelated 
developments: the transfer of political power to legislatures, and the expansion of the 
electorate. 124  As universal suffrage became the rule throughout the Western democracies, 
political parties evolved into highly organised mass establishments.  
 As mentioned above, before political parties, precursor organisations, or “factions,” 
emerged in the United States in the 1780s, and in Britain in the opposition of Tories and 
Whigs.125 In the United States, there were the two political groupings, Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, that had divergent views on the ratification of the Constitution, distribution of 
power and the rights of citizens. While the Federalists assumed that the federal government 
possessed some implied powers that were not laid out in the Constitution, the Anti-Federalists 
claimed that government did not have power to do anything that was not specified in the 
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document. At this first stage of party emergence, there was no strong distinction between party 
and faction.126  
 LaPalombara and Weiner claim that cliques, clubs and small groups of notables that can 
be identified as the antecedents of the modern political party date back to the early seventeenth 
century.127 However, Sartori points out that factions, secret societies, sects, aristocratic cliques, 
political clubs and coalitions of notables should be differentiated from parties by speaking of 
“pre-party” groups.128 Sartori distinguishes the concept of “faction” from that of “party”. As far 
back as 1881, Bolingbroke used these terms separately when he stated that a “party is a political 
evil, and faction is the worst of all parties.”129 For Sartori, there is a slow and tortuous transition 
from faction to party-both in the domain of ideas and in fact.130 He summarises the transition 
from faction to party as a “transition from intolerance to toleration, from toleration to dissent, 
and with dissent, to believing in diversity.” 131  However, only a small group of scholars 
distinguished “parties” from “factions”; scholars and statesmen of the time tended to use 
“faction” as a synonym for “party.”  
 For Duverger, in 1850, no country except the United States knew political parties in the 
modern sense of the word. 132  Like Duverger, Sartori claims that the first modern party 
materialised in the United States under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson from the 1790s to 
the 1820s with the Democratic-Republican Party.133 Another view is that the modern political 
parties were born in the late 1820s and early 1830s in Jacksonian America.134 From a British 
perspective, McKenzie claimed that “at the end of the third decade of the nineteenth century it 
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was still almost impossible to identify within Parliament or outside it anything that resembles 
the modern party system.”135 On the other hand, Sartori argues that, during the eighteenth 
century, the English were practising party government, but this was not in the modern sense; 
rather, this was only a responsible government, which means the responsibility of ministers to 
Parliament.136  
 When the parties first arose, American statesmen were suspicious of them. They did not 
see “factions” or “parties” as a necessary element of government, but rather thought that parties 
divide people and undermine and endanger constitutional government.137 For them, it was 
necessary to devise the system of checks and balances contained in the Constitution in order to 
“break and control violence of faction.”138 As Hofstadter has observed, “the creators of the first 
American party system on both sides, Federalist and Republicans, were men who looked upon 
parties as sores on the body politics.” Thus even Jefferson, one of the founders of the first 
modern political party, did not use party terminology.139 While these early organisations did 
not regard themselves as parties in the modern sense, they were acting in the political arena in 
a manner very similar to that of contemporary parties.140 However, throughout the nineteenth 
century, American statesmen moderated their views on political parties. This was not only the 
case in the United States but also in Europe. Regarding political parties, President Martin Van 
Buren stated: 
Political parties are inseparable from free governments and are highly useful to the 
country. . . Doubtless excesses frequently attend them and produce many evils, but not 
so many as are prevented by the maintenance of the organization and vigilance. The 
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disposition to abuse power, so deeply planted in the human heart, can by no other means 
be more effectually checked; and it has always therefore struck me as more honorable 
and manly . . . to recognize their necessity, to give them the credit they deserve.141 
Thus, the emergence, evolution and development of political parties are best understood within 
the context of the social and historical background of a given country. 
Part 3: Development of Democracy and Political Parties in Turkey 
Introduction 
 Democracy, as experienced in Turkey today, is widely perceived as a party-based 
electoral democracy, which can be characterised as an electoral competition between parties 
with leader-centred politics. Politics are leader-centred when voters typically choose party 
leaders rather than party programmes or a party’s candidates. In Schumpeter’s words, it simply 
means that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule 
them.142 
 Many factors, both foreign and domestic, have assisted in consolidating democracy in 
Turkey, such as the country’s membership in the Council of Europe and the European Court of 
Human Rights and its bid for membership in the European Union. However, political parties 
still remain the major obstacle to democratic consolidation. Ergun Özbudun, a prominent 
Turkish constitutional lawyer, has described Turkish democracy as a second-wave democracy 
similar to those in Latin American, the characteristics of which include a highly personal style 
of leadership, weak political institutions and a lack of horizontal accountability.143 The state 
apparatuses – namely, the military with frequent coups d’état, and the Judiciary with the 
dissolution of political parties by the Constitutional Court – have obstructed the development 
of powerful and enduring parties in Turkey. Moreover, from 1961 to 2002, Turkey’s civil 
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government primarily consisted of coalitions, which can be seen as a source of political 
instability. Additionally, misuse of public resources for party and personal enrichment is widely 
acknowledged as a reality within Turkey. 
 Historical developments, traditions, class struggles, conflicts among social groups and 
other circumstances unique to each country play a role in shaping the party system of that 
state.144 To explain the current situation of legal regulation and IPD within Turkey, and to 
propose reforms for it, not only is a legal and political analysis of political parties required, but 
also a historical analysis of the context within which political parties emerged and how they 
developed. Therefore, before analysing Turkish party law and IPD, a short summary of Turkish 
political history will serve to deepen understanding of some core features of Turkish political 
parties and shed light on the IPD debates which will be examined in the following chapters. 
Although current political parties in Turkey – with the exception of the Republican People’s 
Party (RPP) – are only several decades old and are thus relatively young compared with political 
parties in mature Western democracies, Turkey has had a long history with parliamentary 
participation and political parties. 
 It is important to note that there has been some disagreement regarding the origins of 
the Turkish party system. Some date the development of Turkish political parties to the late 
Ottoman Empire, while others trace it to the foundation of the Turkish Republic. In the 
transition from Ottoman Empire to Republic, political life in Turkey experienced a radical 
transformation, and there is an on-going debate among scholars as to whether political culture 
simply continued or changed qualitatively in the Republic period. Although there were some 
monumental transitions concerning the constitution of the state, such as from monarchy to 
republic, or from Sharia law to secularism, the founding fathers of the Republic belonged to 
cadres who were raised in a period of constitutional monarchy. As a result, most of their ideas 
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were inherited from the late Ottoman times, so it will be useful to look at the Ottoman period 
first. 
The Ottoman period 
 The introduction of several reforms by Ottoman Sultan Abdulmecid in 1839 represents 
a point of departure for the development of democracy in Turkey. The edicts of Tanzimat in 
1839 and Islahat in 1856 granted the Ottoman state a charter of personal liberties for its citizens. 
This charter was equivalent to the Magna Carta of England and similarly provided judicial 
guarantees for minorities.145  
 Three years after the announcement of Islahat in 1856, a secret organisation, allegedly 
called the “Society of Self-Sacrifice,” was founded and was accepted as the first political 
organisation in Turkish political history. This society was established by religious scholars as 
a reaction to the Westernisation policies of Sultan Abdulmecid. Their aim was to unseat the 
Sultan in a coup, since they felt that the acceptance of equal citizenship between Muslims and 
non-Muslims would lead to unacceptable discrimination in favour of the latter. Then in 1865 a 
group of young bureaucrats along with some members of the army formed another secret 
organisation called the “Young Ottomans.” Its purpose was to be a defender of the principles 
of Tanzimat and Westernisation. For Payaslıoğlu, it is not the Society of Self-Sacrifice but 
rather the Young Ottomans that represents the first political organisation. The latter group was 
established by 250 members as a secret political organisation with the aim of bringing about a 
constitutional monarchy. 146  For Payaslıoğlu, this movement played an important role in 
Ottoman political history for three reasons: first, it was the original political organisation; 
second,, it was the first group that intended to incite a dramatic change within civic institutions 
throughout the Empire; and lastly,, the Young Ottomans pointed towards the future in their 
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belief that Western ethics and politics should be embraced in order to respond to European 
dominance.147 
 As a result of these reforms and the efforts of the Young Ottomans in 1876, the first 
Ottoman constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) was announced. Although promulgation of Kanun-i Esasi 
was more the Sultan’s condescension than a social contract, it can be regarded as a milestone 
in the transition to a democracy inclusive of a legislative assembly – one which was at least 
partly elected by the people. Some Islamic scholars were opposed to the ideas of democracy, 
liberty and equality. Midhat Pasha, who was the founder of the Constitution, used a Qur’anic 
surah to show that democracy and Islam are compatible. For example, he spoke of al-Shûrâ 
[42]:38, which states, “Better and more enduring is God’s reward to those who…conduct their 
affairs by mutual consent.” 
  The Parliament, or “General Assembly,” was established as a bicameral system with a 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The Senate consisted of 30 male members who were to be 
appointed by the Sultan for life. The Chamber of Deputies consisted of 120 men who were to 
be elected by the people through a system of limited suffrage.148 Although the initial plan was 
to have popular elections for the Chamber of Deputies, time was limited and the deputies were 
instead chosen by a handful of electors in each district.149 The constitution also stated that 
elections were to be held every four years in order to keep the parliament accountable to the 
people. Throughout the period of this democratic “experiment,” six parliamentary elections 
were held in the Ottoman Empire.150 On February 14, 1878, the first democracy of the Ottomans 
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came to an end when the Sultan prorogued both Houses of Parliament after a war with Russia 
broke out. 
 In July 1908, under pressure and threats from the so-called “Young Turks” – who were 
officially known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) – Abdulhamid II was forced 
to restore the Constitution of 1877 and convene Parliament. In November 1908, the CUP 
secretly decided to organise themselves within the Parliament as a political party. They also 
jointly defined the terms of “party” and “committee.” When the Committee referred to a 
“party,” it was understood that this was meant to be the organisation within the Parliament, and 
when it was referred to as a “committee,” this was understood to be the party on the ground. As 
a result of the pressure exerted by the Young Turks, the freedoms of assembly and association 
were incorporated into the Constitution. The subsequent term, which started with the 
establishment of the second constitution, can also be accepted as the point of emergence for 
formal political parties. In December of 1908, two political parties ran in the elections for the 
Chamber of Deputies. The CUP party ended up winning about 60 of the 288 seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Although CUP did not have an absolute majority, it did have the highest 
number of independent Members of Parliament (MPs). Therefore, since it was the largest party 
in the Chamber, the whole period between 1908-1918 was dominated by the CUP.  
In 1912, the second general election was held. According to Kayalı, the 1912 election 
was the first true two-party contestation with an empire-wide election campaign. 151 
Intimidation was the cornerstone of the CUP policy throughout the campaign. In addition to 
intimidation, many cases of electoral fraud and violence were reported.152 Due to the highly 
authoritarian nature of the party, dissent rose within the party, and many left to establish their 
own parties.153  
                                                 
151 Kayalı (n 150) 281. 
152 ibid 276. 
153 Payaslıoğlu (n 146) 416. 
73 
 
 In 1913, one party described the entire association of political parties as consisting of 
three aspects: a central office (Parliamentary Group), which was similar to what literature had 
defined as the public office; a central organisation, which consisted of a general council and 
central committee; and local organisations, which are known in the literature as the party “on 
the ground.” However, this second constitutional period did not last long and was quickly 
transformed into a dictatorship by the CUP.154 Emre Kongar has noted the irony that, despite 
the democratic promises by the party, and gaining power by promising the end of the absolutism 
of the Sultan, the CUP quickly turned into an autocracy once it obtained political dominance.155 
The multi-party period in the Ottoman era was only active between 1908 and 1913, after which 
the CUP governed the country as one party until 1918. 
 In 1918, the CUP dissolved itself. Parliament remained in effect until the occupation of 
Istanbul by the Allied forces in 1920. The same year of the CUP’s dissolution, two regional 
associations were established in the Ottoman State, the Association for the Defence Rights of 
Anatolia and one in Rumelia the Association for the Defence Rights of Rumelia. In 1919, these 
two associations merged under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, from which the first Turkish 
Party – the RPP – was born.156 
The RPP inherited one particular approach from the CUP, which was to silence the 
opposition by whatever means available. When the CUP took power from the Sultan, it did not 
bring a democratic form of government to Turkey, but instead suppressed any form of 
opposition against itself and implemented restrictions on a range of freedoms. 
Republican period 
 When it comes to the Turkish Republic, there is a difference between the one-party 
political era and the multi-party era. Turkish political parties emerged from within the non-
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democratic conditions after World War I. In December 1922, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk declared 
that his group in the National Assembly would be organised as a national political party.157 
According to Payaslıoğlu, “This organization, first created within the National Assembly during 
the War of Independence, was initially a parliamentary group designed to assure Kemal a 
majority in the face of opposition from reactionaries, conservatives and personal rivals.”158 
Atatürk called it a People’s Party upon its official foundation in 1923. His political ideology 
can be summed up in his own words: 
The nation has already suffered much from clashes between political parties. In other 
lands parties are formed to safeguard class interests. The bitter after-taste which we are 
experiencing is the direct result of the formation of parties here which emanated from 
the preconceived idea that we too were divided into classes. In speaking of the People’s 
Party we must understand a party embracing the whole nation . . . the interests of all, 
whatever their professions and trades, combine in one perfect harmony and it is 
impossible to establish class distinctions among the citizens, since all come from the 
people.159 
 For the most part, Atatürk established the party with the aim of national unity. In 1924, 
the party’s name was changed to the RPP. At that time, the party was a state party, and Atatürk 
was the leader of both the Party and the Turkish Republic. This meant that one party, the RPP, 
controlled all of the administration, elections, candidates, newspapers and even the courts.160 
Further, in 1923, party inspection units were established and incorporated into party 
constitutions. These party inspectors were tasked with controlling local parties to ensure their 
loyalty to the central party. 161  Weiner and Lapalombara claimed that “some one-party 
                                                 
157 Sarah P. McCally ‘Party Government in Turkey’ [1956] 18 The Journal of Politics 297, 304.  
158 Payaslıoğlu (n 146) 418. 
159 McCally (n 157) 305, referringto ‘The (London) Times, Turkish Number,’ (August 9, 1938, p. v.) 
160 İbid. 298. 
161 Murat Yanık ‘Parti İçi Demokrasi’ (PhD Thesis Istanbul University 2002) 124. 
75 
 
governments may use the party as an instrument of political recruitment as well as a device for 
the management of the public.”162 Atatürk’s party would appear to fit this definition very well. 
In a similar vein, Frederick Frey stated that “the party was commonly considered to be, and to 
a considerable extent actually was, a vital instrument of social control, wielded by the party 
leader and his chief lieutenants.”163 For instance, on June 18, 1936, Prime Minister and Vice 
Leader of the RPP İsmet İnönü (Atatürk was President and Party leader) sent a circular to the 
all-state organs and the RPP organisation which, in essence, stated: 
In order to provide harmony between government and party organisation, after this date 
Interior Minister was appointed as Party General Secretariat, provincial party leaders 
appointed as provincial governors, inspectors who are working for government will also 
work as party inspectors.164 
 Frey defined Turkey’s situation as an ultimate amalgamation of party and government 
in which the leading officials of party organisations and the government are the same people.165 
Furthermore, during those times, being a People’s Party member had a declarative-symbolic 
nature, and appointment of public jobs became dependent upon party loyalty.166 
 At the 1927 Party Convention, Atatürk was made the permanent leader of the Party.167 
According to McCally, since he appointed and controlled both the Vice President and the 
General Secretary – who, together, make up the Presidential Council – Atatürk’s decisions were 
binding on all Party members. Additionally, both the electoral candidates and their twelve 
associated Party inspectors were chosen by the Council.168 With the permission of Atatürk, two 
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other parties were founded in opposition to the People’s Party in an effort to establish a 
democratic system. According to Gülek, while the formation of political parties was not 
forbidden, it took courage to oppose Atatürk. 169  For while Atatürk permitted, and even 
encouraged, the foundation of an opposition party, he did so very carefully, keeping the 
opposition party within his prescribed limits so that it hardly amounted to a democratic 
opposition. Instead, it can be called a “controlled opposition.” The main reason for not 
introducing this main democratic principle was that the country was steeped in autocratic and 
theocratic Ottoman traditions; thus, if free opposition were permitted, the result might have 
been social conflict. 
 Although Atatürk wanted to be seen as a democratic leader, he decided to make 
fundamental changes in the social and political life of Turkey first before permitting opposition 
parties. Frey described Atatürk’s revolution strategy as top-down rather than bottom-up: he saw 
political parties as a “mechanism for social control from above.” According to Frey, traditional 
Kemalists saw the party’s duty not as being a policy centre, but rather a nominal implementer 
of policy, throughout this specifically “single-party” system.170 
 The first opposition party was the Republican Progressive Party, which was dissolved 
after a revolt of Kurdish tribes in the eastern provinces in 1925. Again in 1930, Atatürk 
considered the creation of a second party as an opposition. The Free Republican Party was 
founded by Fethi Okyar, a former prime minister, with the approval of Atatürk, to serve as the 
loyal opposition. The Free Party was later also dissolved by the regime on the grounds that the 
Turkish people were not ready to govern themselves.171 However, Acemoğlu and Robinson 
explain the real reason: “Two previous half-hearted experiments with controlled multi-party 
democracy were cut short by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, when the loyal opposition turned out to 
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attract much more support than could be tolerated.172 Similarly, Halide Edip claimed that not 
only were the majority of voters in favour of the Progressive Party, but most of the members of 
the People’s Party promised to join it as well.173 
 It is difficult to speak of both state level democracy and IPD when referring to the 
Atatürk era. For instance, in 1948, Walter Livingstone described Atatürk and the People’s Party 
thusly:  
As a head of the People’s Party he selected personally every one of its candidates for 
the Assembly; as President of the Republic he appointed the officials who operated the 
governmental machinery in a way to make sure that the Party’s candidates would be 
elected; and the Assembly repeatedly re-elected him to the presidency.174  
 After his death in 1938, Atatürk was declared the “eternal leader,” and İnönü, his 
successor, was declared the “National unchangeable leader” of the Party.175 Until the 1950s, 
the RPP governed without regular elections for the leadership position. It is therefore difficult 
to speak of competitive politics in Turkey prior to 1946, since until then the RPP had enjoyed 
a monopoly, and the government did not allow a rival party to be formed and govern the country 
as a state party.  
 However, in 1946, a change was made, and the government allowed the establishment 
of opposition parties after succumbing to internal pressure for competitive politics. Hofmeister 
and Grabow insightfully observe that the existence of one party in pre-democratic times has 
provoked the emergence of at least one other party.176 Since all the members of the Assembly 
belonged to the same party – the RPP – in 1946 the Democrat Party (DP) was established inside 
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the Parliament by four members of the RPP. Three of the members had been dismissed from 
the RPP and one had been forced to resign because of opposition to many of the party’s policies. 
Since the demands of these four deputies were not taken into consideration and they were 
dismissed from the main party, establishing an opposition party seemed the only way to express 
their differing views.177 This is a common feature of the Turkish political system. Due to the 
lack of IPD, rebellions are often initiated within parties by whoever is unhappy with party 
policies, and the rebels usually attempt to establish a new, opposing party. According to İlter 
Turan, intolerance and impatience against intra-party opposition within Turkish political parties 
today have been inherited from the single-party period. For him, the real reason behind the birth 
of a new party is the vehement opposition to the new ideas within the party.178 Turan argues 
that,  
The insufficiencies of intra-party democracy and difficulties associated with leadership 
change, on the other hand, weaken parties. One typical outcome of the absence of intra-
party democracy in the past fragmentation of parties. Groups who have failed to make 
their voice heard or their demands be given consideration, as well as those aspiring to 
party leadership, have left their party to establish others, a phenomenon which was 
frequent from 1970-2000, and contributed in a major way to the destabilization of 
political life.179 
 With the help of this opposition, İnönü started to reform the Party. He changed his 
position from “permanent leader” of the RPP to leader of the RPP with a four-year elected 
position.180 The roles of political parties in Turkey increased under the multi-party system after 
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this transition. In the 1946 elections, the DP gained a number of members in Parliament, and 
formed quite an effective opposition. However, it is widely accepted that this election was not 
free and fair, since the government used a secret counting system and, at the end of counting, 
the ballot papers were burned.181  
 Nevertheless, with the victory of the DP, Turkey had transformed into a multi-party 
electoral democracy, even if intra-party autocracy still went on within the DP. Although the DP 
crafted a very democratic party constitution and held its first party congress in a democratic 
way, it morphed into an oligarchy within a short amount of time. Between the first and second 
party congresses, some MPs were dismissed from the party because of their intra-party 
opposition, and three new parties were established by the dismissed MPs.182 According to Ödül 
Celep,  
The institutional structure the DP inherited from the [RPP] back in the 1950s was still 
authoritarian. In fact, the DP’s White Revolution erased the one-man regime of [the 
RPP] with İsmet İnönü and brought a new one-man regime of the DP this time with 
Adnan Menderes as the DP’s prime minister.183 
The party system in Turkey 
 Turkish political parties might be expected to fall into the mass political party model. 
However, most scholars suggest that they are essentially hybrid parties, containing elements of 
mass, catch all, cartel and elite cadre parties. For instance, while the TPPL seems to have a mass 
membership, it also resembles elite cadre parties in which power is reserved for a small party 
elite or even just the leader. In addition, there is a large number of parties, and the main reason 
for this is the lack of IPD. Most of the small parties are established as a result of intra-party 
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conflict: important figures are dismissed from parties easily, and they try their hands at 
establishing new party.  
 The Turkish party system has changed too much and too often since the beginning of 
the Turkish Republic. Every decade or so in Turkey has witnessed a different party system, 
from a single-party system to a two-party system, from a moderate multi-party system to an 
extreme multi-party and dominant multi-party system. The main reason for this has been the 
mechanical effect of the electoral laws. As Duverger saw, the electoral system of each country 
largely shapes the country’s party system. 184  For him, the numbers of parties are mostly 
dependent on “mechanical: factors that are a function of electoral law. He also noted certain 
“psychological” effects of the electoral law, such as voters’ realisation that they waste their 
votes if they vote for a small party, that are important for the number of parties.185 In this regard, 
the 10 per cent vote threshold in particular has had a very strong mechanical effect on the system 
and psychological effect on Turkish voters. Pippa Norris, in her recent study examining more 
than thirty countries, confirms that Duverger’s main proposition is valid for most of them.186  
 While the Turkish party system hardly conforms any existing party paradigms, in the 
most recent decade it has resembled a multi-party system with a dominant party in Jean 
Blondel’s definition, where one party obtains about 40 per cent of the vote, which represents 
about twice as many votes as the second-place party.187 Certain conditions have to be met for a 
system to merit description as a “dominant party system”: a plurality of legislative seats in 
parliamentary systems, longevity of the government, winning three or four consecutive 
elections188 and weak opposition parties.189 It has been said that in dominant party systems the 
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difference between the party in power and the state becomes increasingly indistinct.190 Thus, 
despite the proportional representation electoral formula, the last three Turkish elections 
resulted in absolute parliamentary majorities for a single party (the JDP) with the help of the 10 
per cent threshold criteria. It is for these reasons that some scholars claim that Turkey is moving 
toward a dominant party system.191 
Party organisation and party congresses in Turkey 
 According to Duverger, a political party is “a community with a particular structure and 
modern parties are characterized primarily by their anatomy.”192 Similarly, Lars Bille claims 
that the organisation of a political party is a reflection of the character and function of a 
democratic regime: if the organisational structure does not involve participatory citizenship in 
the decision-making process, then it is unlikely that the regime functions as a democracy.193 
Therefore, the organisational character of political parties reflects the level of IPD in Turkish 
parties. Party organisations in Turkey are regulated by the TPPL in a detailed manner. This 
study will therefore focus on party organisations by relying mostly on the relevant provisions 
of the TPPL. According to this law, every party must consist of a party congress as the highest 
decision making body and a central governing body with a minimum of 15 members and 
disciplinary organs. The members of these bodies are selected by the party congress and parties 
can give special names to this organ in their own constitutions. For instance, while the JDP calls 
its governing body the Central Decision and Administrative Committee, the RPP refers to its 
as the Party Council. Similarly, while the JDP uses the term “Party Congress” in a manner 
similar to the TPPL, the RPP uses the term “Party Convention.” Under the TPPL, the central 
governing body is responsible for the management of the party between two party congress 
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periods under the framework of its party constitution and party programme. According to 
Article 36 of the TPPL, parties without a parliamentary group must establish their organisations 
in at least half of the provinces as well as at least one third of the sub-provinces within these 
provinces. They must also hold a national congress at least six months prior to elections in order 
to be entitled to take part. Parties must also submit a full list of candidates in at least half of the 
provinces to the High Election Board before elections.  
The delegatory democracy principle for parties was first established by the Party Law 
of 1965, and since then party congresses have functioned as the main channels for political 
participation. Democracy is the most powerful of modern legitimating device; however, as 
Harlow points out, within the concept of democracy itself there are several variables, from 
representative and deliberative to popular and participatory democracy, each of which considers 
its own case as a “benchmark of legitimacy.”194 Delegatory democracy in a political party is a 
function of party congresses, with established rules and a network of local sub-units from which 
representatives can be selected.195 The literature on parties assumes that party congresses are 
the main source of democratic legitimacy for political parties in which members elect delegates. 
For instance, Robin Pettitt claims that, although party congresses are not what they once were, 
they still serve a major role in the propagation of IPD as a concept.196 Similarly to the situation 
in most democracies around the world, party congresses that stand out as the symbol of mass 
parties and powers traditionally held by delegates are seen as the main mechanism for IPD for 
party members as well as outsiders in Turkey. However, as Faucher-King and Eric Treille 
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argue, “As parties have moved away from the mass party to an electoral-professional 
organization or a cartel party, conferences stand out as the remnants of an old era.”197 
 Benjamin von dem Berge holds the congress as the central decision-making body 
responsible not just for the statutory issues, party programmes and the party line, but also for 
the election of members to party organs at the organisational level and delegates to the congress 
of the next organisational level as well.198 Turkish parties have very similar organisational 
characteristics that are imposed upon them by the TPPL. Party organs at all levels of the party 
structure are elected by their respective congresses, which are composed of delegates elected 
by all registered members of that level of the party. There are three kinds of party congresses 
mentioned in the law, of which these congresses are the highest organ of any given party level. 
The three kinds of party congresses in which delegation takes place are national, provincial and 
sub-provincial party congresses. The chain of delegation in party congresses is characterised by 
at least three steps: from ordinary members to sub-provincial delegates, from sub-provincial 
delegates to provincial delegates and from provincial delegates to national delegates. The 
methods of delegate selection to the party congress are prescribed respectively in Articles 14, 
19 and 20 in a detailed manner. The prime unit of local organisation is the municipality (Belde) 
organisation. The law does not permit party organisation below the municipality level. The 
registered members of the municipality organisation elect delegates to represent them at the 
sub-provincial congress. The total number of delegates to be elected for the sub-provincial 
congress cannot exceed 400. The elected delegates in the sub-provincial (İlçe) congresses elect 
delegates to be sent to the provincial congress. These delegates would, in their own turn, elect 
the delegates for the national party congress.  
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 Internal elections serve two purposes, to select the local party leader and the executive 
committees at each level and to elect delegates to the upper level party congress. The executive 
organs at all levels of the parties are elected by and legally accountable to the given party 
congress. According to Maraval, “internal elections to the organs that monitor party leaders and 
enforce sanctions are important not only for party democracy but also for the responsiveness of 
the government.”199  
 Delegatory democracy within the parties in Turkey is under criticism both from within 
the parties and from scholars. According to Yanık, the biggest obstacle to the realisation of IPD 
in Turkey is the delegate system.200 According to Tarhan Erdem, the party congress in Turkey 
is a meeting in which the party leader announces who his/her aides will be in next period.201 
This is a problem in Turkish politics that still exists today. Analysing the RPP party congress 
in the single party era (1923-1946), Metin Toker states that, “the party congress, composed of 
provincial party leaders, was convening only for the sake of expressing the party strength and 
praising the work of the central party organization.”202 
 However, although the party congress system can be described as an institutional device 
designed to keep party elites, and particularly party leaders, accountable to the party congress, 
in practice, party congresses in Turkey cannot perform this important task of accountability and 
responsiveness. Rather they work to protect the incumbent leader against intra-party opposition. 
According to Hannah Arendt, political parties are “very efficient instruments through which the 
power of the people is curtailed and controlled”203; in a similar vein, party congresses have 
similar function where the powers of party members are curtailed and controlled. 
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 In Turkey, delegates at party congresses are assumed to be middle-level elites who are 
elected from amongst the local party notables. They always pursue their own interests and try 
to protect their own future electability. The complex organisational structure established by the 
TPPL means that “those who know and control the structural apparatus have substantial control 
over both the policy orientation and administration of the party.”204 In this respect, parties suffer 
from what may be called a representative or democratic deficit, with local party offices 
operating under the direct, top-down authority of the party hierarchy.205 This feature of Turkish 
parties gives us an idea of the level of centralization and power of the leadership and of the 
central party organisation. 
Composition of party congresses 
One of the main reasons why the Turkish party congress cannot be called democratic bodies is 
their composition. The nature of membership participation in the party congress offers 
important clues about the level of IPD. Participation in the party congress does not satisfy the 
criterion of inclusiveness. In Turkey, the central party has full control over local organisations 
and membership registration. Consequently, the central party can easily control the composition 
of the local party congress.  
 The national party congresses are composed of elected and permanent members 
regulated by law. Almost one third of the delegates in the national party congress are ad hoc 
members. The number of elected members cannot be more than 1,100 under the current party 
law. The number of delegates who will represent each province at the national congress is 
determined in each party’s own constitution. The size of these congresses varies, but generally 
ranges between one and two thousand members. For instance, in the JDP, 550 delegates (which 
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is the half of the total number of delegates who are required to be elected), are allocated to the 
provincial organisation, in proportion to the number of MPs to be elected from each city. The 
remaining 550 delegates allocated to provinces are proportionate to the total number of votes 
won by the party during the last general parliamentary elections.  
 A significant portion of delegates at a party congress is reserved for the central party 
office as permanent members by law. The party leader, MPs and ministers, members of the 
central executive committee and members of the central disciplinary committee are 
automatically given delegate status at the party congress. Furthermore, the founders of parties 
are permanent members of the congress. However, the number of this kind of membership 
cannot exceed 15 per cent of the elected members. This means that, if a party has a maximum 
of 1,100 elected members, it may have an additional 165 permanent members from the party 
founders’ quota. For instance, the ruling party now has 1,490 delegates, approximately 400 of 
whom are permanent. There is no doubt that this provision of the TPPL is a violation of the 
equality principle among party members, which is envisaged in Article 68 of the Constitution. 
The earliest version of the TPPL stated that founding members can only attend the first congress 
without being elected. With the amendment of 1987, the founding members gained a permanent 
member status for all party congresses. 
 The basic idea of membership equality is that the voices of all party members in a 
political party should be equally taken into account in any decision-making process, such as 
policy-making, candidate selection or leadership selection. Equality of party members is 
accepted as the basic prerequisite for IPD.206 However, in reality, elected members of the party 
such as party leaders, members of executive organs and party delegates have more power than 
other members. While the Turkish Constitution states that party members are equal and have 
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equal rights, party delegates are in privileged positions, being the highest authorities who 
approve the party constitution and party programme. Thus, in delegative democracy, equality 
among party members disappears after the election of delegates who receive superior positions. 
 Another important point is that members of the central executive committee constitute 
the permanent members in the party congress. Article 16 of the TPPL states that the number of 
this committee cannot be less than fifteen, though there is no upper limit. If, for example, a 
party has fifty members on this committee, this will constitute an important portion of all 
delegates. In the party congress, decisions are taken by a simple majority of attending members. 
Political parties could write larger majority requirements into their constitutions. Furthermore, 
there is no proportionate representation of the party members among delegates. In practice, this 
means that a local party with 100 members in a province may have a single delegate while in 
other provinces a local party with 1,000 members also has a single delegate. Thus a delegate 
elected by a 100-member vote has the same influence as one elected by a 1000-member vote. 
Fehim Üçışık criticises the number of members who have a right to attend the party congress. 
He argues that the number 1,100 is inadequate in light of the Law of Associations and the Law 
of Unions. He claims that this provision must not be compulsory and that this issue must be left 
to each party’s own constitution.207  
 It is important to mention the Law of the Unions here. In the 1983 Law of the Unions, 
it was stated that, if the members of a union number less than 1,000, then the general assembly 
is composed of all members, but if the number is more than 1,000, the delegation system is 
compulsory.208 However, according to the 2012 Law of the Unions, unions have a choice 
whether to implement grass root democracy or delegatory democracy.209 The general assembly 
can be composed of all members or of delegates. There is, though, no similar discretion for 
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political parties in the TPPL. Similarly in the Law of Associations, the general assembly is to 
be composed of all members without delegates.210 
 There are also legal measures to tackle electoral fraud and irregularities during delegate 
selection. According to Article 112 of the TPPL, anyone found guilty of fraud in party primaries 
or in the congress election at any level of a party shall be punished with up to three years’ 
imprisonment. Although the TPPL prescribes the method of delegate selection, which falls 
under the supervision of the Judiciary, in reality, the selection of party delegates mostly depends 
on proximity to the central office or party leader. Judicially controlled delegate selections 
mostly take place as a rubber stamp event in order to fulfil the legal requirements after the 
delegates’ appointment by the central office. Thus, the real issue is not the provincial form of 
organisation or judicially controlled delegate selection, but rather the authoritarian rules of the 
party centre with regard to local organisation. Though there is an election for the selection of 
congress delegates, most are appointed by the party central office on the basis of their loyalty 
to the incumbent leadership and then elected at the constituency congress. 
 More recently, Pelin Ayan has observed that the delegate selection practices within the 
four big parties in Turkey demonstrate that the formal election process of the local party chairs 
takes place only after they have been appointed to their positions by the central party office or 
by a party leader, rather than being elected in the local congress. She also states that “first, the 
appointment from above takes place in the party; second, in order to show congruence with the 
legal provisions, the local leaders get elected in local conventions.”211 For instance, after the 
return of Deniz Baykal to the leadership of the RPP, 65 per cent (52 out of 80) of all the RPP 
provincial leaders were appointed by the central office after than elected in party congress in 
order to fulfil legal requirements.212 
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 Furthermore, thanks to a closed list system, executive membership selection is organised 
to ensure that only certain candidates can be elected. Although the TPPL binds parties to a set 
of democratically elected executive committees, a closed list for elections prevents the 
delegates from choosing their own committee members. Candidates for the executive 
committee are being asked to “take it or leave it” by the leader, with party delegates being 
forced either to accept the list offer or not to vote. What may be seen as democratic in the 
selection process is that, in some parties, party leaders offer candidates more names than can 
normally be elected, so delegates can cross some candidates’ names off of the list. 
 While Turkish political parties are organised on the basis as explained above, the local 
party organisations are largely dependent on the party or on the central office. In reality, within 
most Turkish parties, the leadership and executive committees exercise strong control over the 
agenda of the party congress and the selection of delegates. Delegate selection meetings at the 
provincial level are often controversial, with local party bosses recruiting a substantial number 
of new members who will vote for the delegates put forward by the party central office. 
According to Yanık, in Turkey one of the important tasks of the party leader and his close circle 
is to control the party congress in order to prevent the emergence of opposition groups, which 
he does by intervening in delegate selection at all levels.213 In order to do so, party leaders 
support the candidates (delegate) who will be loyal to them in the party congress and vote for 
the incumbent leadership. It is true that delegates at the party congress can adopt a different 
policy than the one proposed by the party leader. According to Yanık, the delegate system 
ensures that the leadership has control over internal policy-making by controlling a small 
number of delegates.214 For him, the delegate system should be abolished and in its place more 
inclusive methods adopted that give every member a right.215  
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 Considering that the party congresses along with the delegate system lack any major 
decision-making role, there is a prevailing observation that they should be reformed. Indeed, 
most of the local delegate elections of the parties are only organised in order to meet the legal 
requirements set out in the TPPL. Party leaders become the party bosses with unquestioned 
authority over the party congress and therefore over party policies and decisions. As a result 
the party congresses are left as a rubber stamp, the delegates reduced to nothing more than well-
disciplined “yes-men.” Since the parties use a collusive appointment system, the patterns of 
voting in delegate selection will be same. The main problem here is that party delegates do not 
reflect the ideas of party members but those of party leaders. 
 This much can be observed in the Party Congress Agenda from 2005, the events of 
which are described below. The agenda clearly indicates the significance of the leadership 
selection for the party. Although some other commissions are established, they can be viewed 
as merely a response to the legal requirements. Mostly, in these commissions, neither do the 
delegates offer resolutions nor can their concerns be considered.  
Party Congress Agenda216 
14 MAY 2005, Saturday 10.00 
01. Registry and Opening 
02. Election of Party Congress Presidency Council (1 President, 4 Vice President, 8 Secretary 
Members) 
03. One minute's Silence for Atatürk and the Martyrs  
04. Determination of members who will visit Atatürk's mausoleum (one member from each 
province) 
05. Establishment of Congress Commission  
a. Party Constitution Commission  
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b. State Policy Commission 
c. Budget Commission  
d. Wishes and Request Reviewing Commission  
06. Speech of Party Leader 
07. Preparations for Party Leader Selection (Candidates Application to Congress Presidency 
Council) 
08. Reading of Party Executive Board report, Income and Expense Report, negotiations and 
voting on reports  
09. Reading of commission report, negotiation and voting 
10. Leadership Selection 
 
15 May 2005, Sunday 10.00 
01. Political Speeches  
02. Wishes and Request 
03. Elections of Party Executive Organs and Disciplinary Committee members. 
04. Closing 
Party membership in Turkey 
 Before proceeding with the main issues, consideration of the party membership and the 
roles of party members in a specifically Turkish context will facilitate a more complete 
understanding of the parties and of IPD process. Party members constitute the party’s “demos”; 
thus, according to Duverger, without members, the party would be like a teacher without 
pupils,217 and party membership is one of the major forms of political participation in Turkey. 
In keeping with the notion of party organisation put forward by Richard Katz and Peter Mair, 
the party as a membership organisation (the party on the ground) constitutes one facet of the 
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party organisation, the other facets being the party as a governing organisation (the party in 
public office) and as a bureaucratic organisation (the central office).218 In theory, a critical mass 
of members in a party is accepted as a prerequisite for effective IPD.219  
 The important question of why people join political parties in the first place may usefully 
be approached from the perspective of the members and that of the parties with regard to both 
participation and recruitment. From the perspective of the members, membership is a way of 
actively participating in political life for individuals who a more active role in politics than 
merely voting in general elections. One might also join a party in order to express explicit 
support for and indeed commitment to its ideals and policies.220 A further motivation is that 
membership constitutes a first step towards being a professional politician, since most 
politicians are nurtured by a party and stand for election only after lengthy party membership. 
In this regard, a political party can be viewed as a school: increased participation in party affairs 
leads to a better understanding of politics and can be expected to lead to promotion within the 
ranks. There is also the fact that, in most countries, party membership is a prerequisite for 
political candidacy. Thus in Turkey, almost every party limits the candidate selection process 
for national or local elections to its own members. Finally, it must also be observed that party 
members often enjoy material rewards and patronage, for which reason people tend to join 
parties in power in order to benefit from state resources and to avoid potential problems with 
public administration. These material incentives can include receiving a government job or 
being awarded a public contract.221 So it is that, in Turkey, appointment to the semi-public 
companies that are established under private law (in which only the top positions are under 
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governmental control) and success in bidding for government-funded public contracts are both 
highly dependent on being a member of a ruling party, while the positions in local 
municipalities are equally dominated by party politics. Such material considerations seem to 
motivate many, even most party members in Turkey, and this is especially true for a ruling 
party.  
 From the perspective of the party, on the other hand, membership is viewed as a measure 
of democratic legitimacy. Therefore, since the beginning of the mass-party period, parties with 
few exceptions have generally encouraged citizens to participate, and have been praised for 
being open to participants from all levels of society.222 Katz and Mair claim that “membership 
may not be valued very highly, but a membership oriented tradition cannot easily be 
dismissed.”223 For them, a party in public office cannot ignore the existence of the party on the 
ground because of the strong tradition of mass membership in which the legacy of the mass 
party model continues to influence current conceptions of organisational style and 
legitimacy.224 According to Patrick Seyd, “members may be a small minority of the general 
public but, by involving them directly in decision making, leaders are demonstrating a 
commitment to openness and participation which might help to restore the political legitimacy 
of parties.”225 According to Scarrow, “party leaders and organizers have viewed members as a 
resource for bolstering party legitimacy, instead of merely as a source of funds or of campaign 
volunteers.”226 However, a large membership does not contribute to spreading the message of 
a more democratic party if the members are powerless. 
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 Rather than for purposes of legitimacy, parties are continuing to recruit members for 
such traditional reasons as having them serve as window dressing in order to attract more 
support from voters and to enhance their public image and reputation.227 Parties may also recruit 
members as manpower during political campaigns for door-to-door canvassing or delivering 
leaflets.228  
 Party membership has always been problematic in Turkey, and has been seen as 
hampering IPD. Tarhan Erdem, for example, claims that one of the biggest obstacles to IPD in 
Turkey is the current membership registration system. For him, since none of the parties makes 
its processes public, regulating membership registration must be the first priority for realisation 
of IPD.229 From a membership perspective, the Turkish parties resemble the mass parties that 
try to recruit as many members as they can. According to the TPPL, political parties have the 
right to set the terms and conditions under which citizens may become members within a legal 
framework. They have the discretion whether to accept or reject membership without providing 
any reason.230 So while the parties have discretion to recruit members, party leaders at all levels 
of party organisation seek members who support themselves and their cadres in the party in 
order to ensure their own leadership positions. 
 Although in mature democracies participation in parties and their activities is decreasing 
and many individuals hold themselves aloof from political parties, this is not the case in Turkey. 
According to official reports, Turkey had 10 million party members in 2014, which means that 
nearly 20 per cent of all registered voters were registered with a political party (the party 
membership registers are kept by the Prosecutor General of the Court of Cassation, which 
provide reliable numbers). This percentage is much higher than is the case in most mature 
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democracies. However, most party members are inactive, especially since the parties demand 
little from them apart from the occasional vote to select delegates for party congress and 
attendance at party rallies at election times. Writing on the JDP party organisation, Hale and 
Özbudun observe,  
Party officials state that about 300,000 of them perform some active party duty, such as 
being deputies, mayors, city councillors, members of the provincial general assemblies, 
members of the executive committees at the central, provincial, sub-provincial and 
municipal levels; village, neighbourhood and polling district representatives; members 
of the executive committees of women’s and youth organisations at all levels, etc. This 
figure indicates a highly active and vibrant party life, and it does not include ordinary 
militants who have no official public or party positions.231 
 Although they have legal rights, most party members have not attended such party 
events as party delegate selections, and some members do not even vote for their party in 
elections. As Özbudun states “the loose link between the party and the member suggests that 
what is meant by party ‘member’ in Turkey is often little more than a party ‘supporter’.”232 
Indeed this opinion holds true for other established democracies. Lisa Young claims that, in 
recent years, “the boundary between party member and supporter has blurred, with supporters 
performing many of the traditional functions of members.” 233  So in Turkey there is no 
significant distinction between party members and party voters with regard to policy 
expectations once their own party comes to power. Another important consideration regarding 
party membership and its relationship to IPD is its composition. Party membership naturally 
reflects the electoral base, and in this respect at least it can be said that Turkish party members 
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represent the party voters, so that their preferences on policies are not different from or more 
extreme than those of the electorate.  
 Also, in some democracies where state funding for parties is limited, ordinary members 
are responsible for financing party activities; conversely, parties do not see their members as a 
source of income when they are mostly dependent on public funding. According to İlter Turan, 
party “membership is a vague concept [in Turkey]. There are no proper membership lists, 
membership dues are not paid regularly and members are not registered in proper fashion. Who 
is a member and who is not, is not certain.”234 Müge Aknur states that  
…local party organizations arbitrarily decide on membership registration, so it may be 
the case that applicants are not getting registered as members when the local officials 
try to ensure a certain number of members for the selection of specific delegates. 
Fictitious members are not uncommon and new members are recruited mostly on the 
eve of party conventions enabling particular people to be selected as delegates. Some 
party members are registered along with five or six people from the same family; yet 
family members remain inactive and unattached.235 
William Hale and Ergun Özbudun make a similar argument: 
A third factor is the efforts by the local party officials to register their friends and 
members of families to augment their delegate base. But, perhaps, a more convincing 
explanation is that most Turkish party members do not clearly distinguish between being 
a party member and being a mere supporter. Party membership in Turkey entails certain 
rights, but almost no obligations to the party, including paying membership dues.236 
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 Regarding the fictitious members, under the old version of the TPPL, if someone in a 
party registers an eligible citizen as a member without submitting an application, the registrar 
may be punished with imprisonment for from one year to three years, though in 2014 the law 
was amended and the length of imprisonment reduced to one to three months. 
 The main reason that parties fail to give power to their members is the disproportionate 
influence that elites have over their establishment and organisation processes. Because these 
elites tend to be senior bureaucrats, wealthy businessmen and other military and civilian leaders, 
they tend to be uninterested in members’ views on policy and to view the rank and file as 
nothing more than raw votes in internal and general elections. As a consequence, the ordinary 
citizens have played a very small part in the establishment and organisation of the parties, while 
elites have treated their parties as their own property, have been reluctant to share their power 
and have from the start sought to register only those who would not oppose their views.237 
According to Yanık, party members have only two options in Turkey: to obey party leaders 
unconditionally, or to be forced out.238 Altan Oymen, former leader of the RPP, related that 
after he had been elected as a leader he first reformed the membership registration: “we call all 
our 1.8 million members to renew their membership, we want them a 3 photograph, birth 
certificate, and 3 TL (equal to 2£ in those times) and give a very long time for renewal and then 
membership numbers dropped to 149.000.”239 
 It can therefore be seen that party membership in Turkey is seldom motivated by a desire 
to take part in decision-making processes. Although plenty of individuals participate in politics 
more frequently than in general elections, it is difficult to determine what if anything they are 
offered or what opportunities they may take part in. It may then be asked why members remain 
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within a party that disregards them and affords them little influence over party affairs other than 
electing local or sub-local delegates. In Turkey, the link between parties and members is not 
primarily ideological but instead is substantially clientelistic. In the words of Aknur, “the major 
motivation for being a party member is to gain material and other kinds of favours from the 
parties through a clientelistic relationship.”240 The unearned income increment is very common 
in Turkish society, and the best way to secure one is to be closely associated with a political 
party. According to Hale and Özbudun, “A majority of party members see their membership as 
a means to obtain personal, sometimes quite small, sometimes highly substantial, benefits from 
their parties, particularly when they happen to be in the government.”241 Patronage, which is 
extensive and widely distributed in Turkish parties, is one important reason for the lack of IPD. 
According to Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman, “political patronage became the basic strategy of 
obtaining votes, in which religion was frequently used for political purposes.”242 For Suavi 
Tuncay, so long as membership is based on patronage rather than ideology, parties will easily 
be dominated by an oligarchy.243 
 This does not mean that ideology cannot play a role in party membership. Canan Akman 
claims that “Personalism and leadership hegemony substituted the ideological weakness of the 
parties, and instead created bonds of identification with the leaders for the electorate.”244 Party 
membership tends to be hereditary and to be monolithic within families. Most members regard 
the party leader primarily from a broadly ideological perspective as a way to express their core 
beliefs, rather than identifying with their party’s programme or policies. Many citizens 
participate in whichever party is consistent with their own broad philosophy rather than one 
that offers them a significant role in making policy and decisions. Members tend to accept a 
                                                 
240 Aslan-Akman (n 235) 143,161. 
241 Hale and Özbudun (n 230) 47. 
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243 Suavi Tuncay, Parti İçi Demokrasi ve Türkiye, (Gündoğan Yayınları 1996) 110-113. 
244 Aslan-Akman (n 235) 159. 
99 
 
ready-made party programme and election manifestos, or even join in the belief that their party 
will implement policies that they will like even if they do not take part in decision-making. 
However, when a party fails to implement its programme, members tend not to look for the 
kinds of solutions that would make the party more to their liking and would thus provide the 
impetus for the development of IPD. For although party membership may be sought for 
ideological reasons, patronage quickly becomes the primary consideration. In this regard, 
Wauters observed that “people who become members because of the ideology or the 
programme of a party are those most likely to be interested in guiding policy and, as a 
consequence, more likely to participate in internal elections.”245 So it can be argued that, so 
long as their impetus to join a party is primarily ideological, members will wish to participate 
in decision-making processes, while conversely members who are induced by material 
enticements to join will be less eager to participate in decision-making processes, and more 
likely to support whatever policy their party promotes or adopts provided that they continue to 
receive material incentives from the party. According to Herbert Kitschelt, “The inducements 
to join mass parties often had little to do with the entrants’ purposive-programmatic incentives 
and aspirations, but with material incentives and socio-cultural reinforcement within a social 
network.”246 
 Yet despite the fact that so many members of Turkish political parties are motivated by 
material rewards, it is likely that most, if asked, would still express a desire to play a more 
substantive role in shaping the party’s policies and agenda. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, 
currently, neither the parties’ laws nor their constitutions offer members meaningful ways to 
become involved in the decision-making process.  
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 This brief overview of democracy and political parties has been intended mainly to 
introduce IPD in Turkey, as has been already widely discussed in the literature. While it is 
undeniable that political parties continue to play a major role in Turkish democracy, it seems 
that they all suffer from lack of IPD. In conclusion, it can be said that democratisation of Turkey 





INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY, PARTY REGULATION AND PARITY FUNDING 
 
Part 1: Intra-Party Democracy 
Introduction 
 From a theoretical perspective, although IPD can be traced back to the origins of 
political parties, and in the scholarly literature to the classic works of Moisei Ostrogorski1 and 
Robert Michels2 in the early twentieth century, the concept was particularly influential in the 
aftermath of World War II with the emergence of mass party ideas, and has again been receiving 
attention from academics over recent years owing to eroding trust in parties as indicated by 
declining party membership and voter loyalty. In the early days of representative assemblies, 
when the institutions of party organisation and membership were just beginning to develop, 
legislators tended to remain “answerable only to their individual consciences or constituencies, 
or to the nation as a whole, rather than to their parties.”3 
 Democracy is widely viewed as the most potent legitimation device in human societies, 
which is to say that the legitimacy, and general soundness, of an organisation is often considered 
to be directly proportional to the extent to which the organisation can be described as 
“democratic.”4 Just as democratic elections are regarded as a fundamental feature of legitimate 
governments, IPD enhances the legitimacy of the parties: like democracy in general, IPD tends 
                                                 
1 Moisei Ostrogorski Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties (MacMillan 1902). 
2 Robert Michels Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy 
(London, The Free Press, 1962). 
3 Richard S. Katz, ‘Democracy and the Legal Regulation of Political Parties,’ paper prepared for the USAID 
conference on ‘Changes in Political Parties: United States Agency for International Development,’ Washington, 
D.C., October 1, 2004, 8. 
4 Carol Harlow ‘The Concepts and Methods of Reasoning of the New Public Law: Legitimacy’ LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Papers 19/2010 <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2010-19_Harlow.pdf 
> 13. accessed 21 September 2013. 
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to be treated as positive in and of itself, especially by those who emphasize the participatory 
aspects of democracy.5  
 Despite, or perhaps because of, the recent proliferation of literature on the subject, 
scholars have yet to settle on a precise definition for the concept of IPD, or a delineation of the 
steps whereby it is implemented. IPD means different things to different people, whether 
academics or politicians. And indeed, any definition would need to be sufficiently flexible to 
account for the unique circumstances of individual countries and parties.  
 Susan Scarrow has formulated one of the most-cited definitions of IPD as “a wide range 
of methods for including party members in intra-party deliberation and decision making.”6 In 
the more detailed definition of Kenneth Janda, “Intra-party democracy is manifested in internal 
party procedures that extend, if not maximize, the participation of the party rank and- file in 
decisions of public policy and party practice.”7 On the other hand, some scholars approach the 
term from a parliamentarian perspective, and hold that IPD requires “independent deputies” 
who speak their mind, do not automatically approve party policies, and remain accountable to 
the public.8 Nevertheless, the prevailing view of the concept stresses the participatory aspect of 
democracy, equating IPD directly with the amount of influence exercised by rank-and-file 
members.  
 So it is that, as mentioned already, rather than defining IPD, some scholars and 
international organisations focus on measuring the level of IPD, in keeping with Dahl’s 
                                                 
5 Susan E. Scarrow, Paul Webb and David M. Farrell ‘From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The 
Channging Distribution of Power within the Political Parties’ in Dalton, Russell J., and Martin P. Wattenberg, 
(eds) Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford University Press 
2000) 130. 
6 Susan E. Scarrow Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Implementing 
Intra-Party Democracy (Washington, DC: NDI) 3 < www.ndi.org/files/1951_polpart_scarrow_110105.pdf >. 
accessed 19 November 2012. 
7 Kenneth Janda, “Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Adopting Party  
Law” (NDI 2005) < http://www.ndi.org/files/1948_polpart_janda_110105.pdf > accessed 10 December 2012 23. 
8 Taha Akyol ‘Parti içi Demokrasi’ Milliyet Gazetesi 01.04.2010, referring to Andre Siegfried France, A Study 
in Nationality (Oxford University Press 1930). 
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suggested five criteria 9  for a genuinely democratic system. For example, the Netherlands 
Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD) asks the following questions in order to measure 
the level of IPD:10 
a) Is the party functioning according to established rules and procedures? 
b) Is decision-making democratic and based on party statutes and current laws? 
c) Is there meaningful decentralisation of the party’s economic resources? 
d) Can the rank-and-file exercise oversight over the party leadership? 
 The extent and nature of IPD also depends on other factors, such as a country’s political 
culture and socio-economic institutions, the education levels of party members, the type of 
electoral system, any legislation on political parties, the nature of party leadership, the system 
of government, the dominant political ideologies, the number of competitive parties, the amount 
of state funding that parties receive, and of course whether a party is in government or in 
opposition. Thus, for example, Robin Pettitt argues that the age, origin, ideology, style of 
democracy and goals of the government are important factors in order to understand IPD.11  
 A country’s political culture plays an especially important role in shaping IPD. Thus 
Saime Müjde Önal argues that, among the various factors influencing the degree of IPD in 
Turkey, elements of political culture inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the early and 
extended dominance of one party at the foundation of the Turkish Republic carry the greatest 
significance.12 Therefore, although factors that have impeded IPD in Turkey are in the main 
attributable to behavioural particularities rather than legal or institutional problems, this study 
will for the most part analyse it from this latter point of view.  
                                                 
9 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press 1998) has suggested five criteria, namely inclusion, 
political equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and effective participation. 
10 Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy- NIMD ‘A Framework for Democratic Party-Building’ (The 
Hague: IMD 2004) p.22. <www.nimd.org/upload/publications/2004/imd_institutional_development_handbook-
a4.pdf > accessed 10 February 2013. 
11 Robin T. Pettitt ‘Exploring Variations in Intra-party Democracy: A Comparative Study of the British Labour 
Party and the Danish Centre-Left’ [2012] 14 BJPIR 630–650. 
12 Saime Müjde Önal ‘Türkiye’de Parti İçi Demokrasi: CHP ve AKP Örneği’ (Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal 
Bilimler Enstitüsü Yüksek Lisans Tezi 2007) iv. 
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 This is perhaps why political parties in mature democracies such as the U.K, though not 
regulated by the government, maintain a higher level of IPD than Turkey. However, it is 
important to note that, once a system for IPD takes shape, it will over time become normalised 
to the larger political culture. Thus, IPD is not a function of the political culture alone: there 
must also be an appropriate legal framework and an effective institutional structure, especially 
in relatively less democratic countries. In addition, the extent of IPD varies greatly within a 
country over time as well as from one party to another, let alone from one country to another. 
As Ostrogorski observed, “the life of the parties and their organization do not everywhere 
exhibit the same fullness and the same regularity.”13 
 Some scholars have also approached IPD in ideological terms. Thus, for example, 
Richard Katz as argues that 
...from the perspective of ‘Socialist democracy’ intra-party democracy is essential in 
order for the party to be able to speak as the authentic voice of the social segment it 
represents, and this in turn both legitimizes the dominance of the party on the ground 
over the party in public office and privileges the party manifesto over the individual 
judgement or consciences of elected officials… from the perspective of the new left, 
internal democracy allows ordinary party members to become actively involved as 
participants in policy-making for the party members, and thus in true self-governance 
as citizens. Finally, all advocates of internal party democracy see it as essential as a way 
to hold party leaders accountable, or, in the terms of principal agent models, internal 
democracy is seen as a way of enforcing the control of party members as the principals 
over both party officials elected under the party’s banner as their agents.14  
                                                 
13 Ostrogorski (n 1) iii. 
14 Richard Katz ‘Party in Democratic Theory’ in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds), Handbook of Party 
Politics (SAGE 2006) 35-36. 
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 Katz’s exploration of IPD from an ideological point of view suggests that parties of the 
right can be less meticulous on matters of IPD than those on the left, and Robert Pettit has 
argued in the same vein that the potential for IPD is much higher in the left-wing than right-
wing parties.15 Moreover, while this area of study has not received much empirical analysis, 
one empirical study of Spanish parties has demonstrated that there is greater support for IPD in 
parties of the left and among party members with leftist ideology.16 
 In sum, while IPD remains a contested concept, it will for the purposes of this study be 
defined simply as rule by the party members over significant aspects of the party, all of whom, 
from the party leader to the rank and file, are given an equal say in important decisions. IPD is 
conceptualised here on the basis of three criteria: who determines party policies, how the 
leadership is chosen and how candidates are selected. 
 
Why IPD? 
 For those who view IPD as a central principle of party politics, the health and character 
of the parties are among the most important determinants of the health and character of the 
democracy in which they are found.17 One of the mysteries that will be explored in this study 
is why a political party within a democracy would fail to elaborate an internally democratic 
organisation, and yet be expected to champion and promote democracy. Yigal Mersel claims 
that “it is arguable that a party that is not internally democratic cannot really be externally 
democratic.”18 Viewed this way, political parties could contribute to state level democracy 
positively with their internal democratic practices. Thus Augustine Magolowondo states that 
“if parties are building blocks of democracy, they cannot afford not to be democratic themselves 
                                                 
15 (n 11) 647. 
16 Baras, Montserrat, Oscar Barberà, Juan Rodríguez-Teruel, and Astrid Barrio. ‘Intra-party democracy and 
middle-level elites in Spain.’ (IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo 2012). 
17 Katz (n 3) 2. 
18 Yigal Mersel ‘The Dissolution of Political Parties: The Problem of Internal Democracy’ [2006] 4 IJCL 84, 97. 
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for to do so is a contradiction both in terms and in values.”19  For Michels, if parties are 
themselves undemocratic in their internal structure, the effort to democratise society completely 
is doomed to failure.20 Anika Gauja points out that the weakening of political parties is felt to 
weaken democracies in turn.21  
 IPD naturally provides opportunities for participation in politics and attracts new 
members to parties. It has also been argued that improved IPD would assist in relinking the 
party organisation with its supporters. 22  According to Caroline Lancaster, “intra-party 
democracy is seen as a vital aspect of modern democracy and is integral to emerging 
democracies, for it helps to instil a respectful attitude towards the democratic process.”23 It 
bears repeating here that membership in most parties has been declining over the past few 
decades. Parties may therefore respond to such declines by promoting institutional reforms for 
IPD, introducing new procedures to give ordinary members a greater say in their internal 
workings in order to recruit new members. 24  Otherwise, they may seek state funding, as 
happens  in most countries, in order to compensate for diminished membership. 
 Moreover, many parties give special attention to the education and training of their 
members and citizens with respect to democracy. According to Amy Guttman, “Political 
education prepares citizens to participate in consciously reproducing their society, and 
conscious social reproduction is the ideal not only of democratic education but also of 
democratic politics.”25 Thus a party that seeks to instil democratic principles in its members 
                                                 
19 Augustine Titani Magolowondo ‘Understanding Intra-party Democracy in Africa: Issues and Questions’ < 
www.nimd.org/documents/I/intra-party_democracy-_challenges_and_implications-augustine_magolowondo.pdf. 
> accessed 25 June 2013. 
20 Michels (n 2) 16. 
21 Anika Gauja ‘Book review: Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political 
Consequences’ [2012 ] 65 Parliamentary Affairs 478, 478. 
22 Florence Faucher-King and Eric Treille ‘Managing Intra-party Democracy: Comparing the French Socialist 
and British Labour Party Conferences’ [2003] 1 French Politics 61, 62. 
23 Caroline Lancaster ‘The iron law of Erdogan: the decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule’ 
[2014] 35 Third World Quarterly 1672, 1673. 
24 Ruud Koole ‘Promoting Internal Party Democracy: A Selling Point, A Serious Danger, Or A Redundant 
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107 
 
and citizens, must first practise these principles itself. Practising democracy within the party 
will improve the trust that society places in the parties as well as in representative democracy 
generally. Participation in decision-making within the parties has also been cited as a factor that 
can foster a civic orientation in citizens who need experience with micro-democracies in order 
to build a macro-democracy.26 
 
IPD and the “Iron Law of Oligarchy” 
Democracy has encountered obstacles, not merely imposed from without, but 
spontaneously surgent from within. Only to a certain degree, perhaps, can these 
obstacles be surpassed or removed. Robert Michels27 
 It has been widely argued that political parties are by nature oligarchical. However, like 
democracy, oligarchy within parties is a question of degree. While some parties may be strongly 
authoritarian, others may be more democratic. For instance, the Green Parties devised the 
principle of “grassroots democracy” in order to challenge these oligarchic structures. The 
Greens have tried to develop a strict set of institutional rules to prevent the emergence of a 
permanent party elite and to ensure that power is continually delegated to the membership.28  
One of the primary aims of IPD, then, is the limitation of oligarchical tendencies in 
political parties. Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” theory provides useful insight into this 
phenomenon. The iron law of oligarchy is a political theory, first developed by the German 
sociologist Robert Michels in his ground-breaking 1911 work known in English as Political 
Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Michels’ 
book investigated the compatibility of organisation and democracy, and his theory has 
                                                 
26 Jo Saglie abd Knut Heidar ‘Democracy within Norwegian Parties: Complacency or Pressure for Change?’ 
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dominated the study of political parties for nearly a century, including discussions of IPD. 
Michels mainly dealt with the problem of internal democracy, particularly the impact of 
organisations on the democratic political system as a whole.29 
 Michels wrote that political parties, even when they are formed according to an 
internally democratic structure, evolve to become controlled by a relatively small elite: “It is 
organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the 
mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, 
says oligarchy.”30 So, according to Michels, political parties will necessarily be operated by a 
narrow oligarchy that has no need to take into account the opinions of the ordinary members. 
According to Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller, the iron law of oligarchy works as follows: 
First, there is always a rather small number of persons in the organization who actually 
make decisions, even if authority is vested in the body of the membership. ... Second, 
the leaders who have this delegated authority tend to take on more power than the 
members who selected them do. Once in power they tend to remain there for a long time 
and are not influenced by the opinions from below…Third, the leaders gradually 
develop values that are at odds with those of the members.31 
 Some scholars, on the other hand, defend the “iron law of oligarchy” as a prerequisite 
for political parties, and claim that, in order to reach democratic ends, political parties 
themselves must be ruled by oligarchic principles.32 According to William Wright, oligarchic 
rule within parties is necessary “in order to present a united front to opposing parties and the 
public in the interest of electoral and governmental success.”33 Dennis Kavanagh describes such 
                                                 
29 Nikos P. Mouzelis Organisations and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories (2009 paperback 
Routledge 1967) 30. 
30 Michels (n 2) 365. 
31 Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller, The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies (Free Press 1970) 25. 
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thinkers as modern elitist theorists of democracy, for whom IPD is of limited importance 
because the voters have a choice of parties at general elections, and therefore need not be 
concerned about intra-party oligarchies.34  
 Moreover, in analysing Michels’ theory, some scholars point to the importance of IPD 
for state-level democracy. For instance, Jan Teorell states that, “Because the ‘iron law of 
oligarchy’ rendered intra-party democracy a mere chimera, Michels held democracy in the 
political system as a whole to be hopelessly unrealizable.”35 Richard Katz claims that, while 
the iron law is assumed to mean that large-scale democracy is usually impossible, political 
parties, as crucial institutions of large-scale democracy, are part of the problem.36 This thesis 
will argue that improvement in party regulations in terms of IPD criteria can contribute to the 
suppression of rigid oligarchical tendencies inside the party. From this perspective, IPD 
functions to disperse power and thereby to lessen opportunities for its abuse. 
 
Power sharing conflict 
 One of the main obstacles to IPD is, obviously, party leaders’ reluctance to share power 
with ordinary party members. 37  Indeed, the party hierarchy, leadership, members of the 
executive board, party delegates and local party officials all tend to seek to increase or at least 
maintain their power, this being especially true for party leaders. In this climate, demands for 
increased democracy are viewed as a threat by those who hold power. 
 It has been argued with respect to relations among ordinary members, activists and party 
leaders that intra-party plebiscites diminish the power of the delegates at party congresses when 
they are the ones who constitute the more active and organised layer of the party on the ground 
                                                 
34 Dennis Kavanagh ‘Party Democracy and Political Marketing: No Place for Amateurs’ < 
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35 Teorell (n 32) 363. 
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and are able to challenge the wishes of the party elites.38 Stephen Driver claims, for instance, 
that the British Labour Party, by granting ordinary members influence over the decision-making 
process, has “reinforced the power of the leadership and allowed it to exert even greater control 
over the party.”39 Richard Katz and Peter Mair similarly argue that enfranchising and thereby 
empowering the ordinary members within the party in the name of IPD erodes the position of 
party activists and militant critics, which plays into the hands of party leaders.40 Mair defines 
this situation as the “paradoxical role of party members” theory, according to which 
democratising the party on the one hand, and increasing the autonomy and power of the leaders 
on the other hand, are two apparently contradictory aims that are pursued at the same time.41 
According to Mair, the empowerment of party members in practice serves the interest of the 
leadership and that of party members who hold office because the rank and file membership 
under these circumstances is more likely to approve initiatives that originate with the leadership 
and those who are in the government.42 In this context it again bears repeating that IPD has 
different meanings for different people at different times. For instance, Florence Faucher-King 
and Eric Treille have observed that, in the 1970s and early 1980s, IPD often correlated with 
activists’ influence in party decisions.43 At that time, if activists had a say in policy-making, 
this meant that the party was internally democratic. Currently, however, IPD is defined in terms 
of the inclusion of ordinary party members, rather than of activists, in the party decision-making 
process. 
 According to Scarrow, the empowerment of activists in a party congress might result in 
more ideologically-oriented decisions, whereas the transfer of decisions from the party congress 
                                                 
38 Klaus Detterbeck ‘The Rare Event of Choice: Party Primaries in German Land Parties’ [2013] 22 German 
Politics, 270, 271. 
39 Stephen Driver Understanding British Party Politics, (Polity 2011) 103. 
40 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair ‘The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party organizational Change in 
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41 Peter Mair Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford University Press 1997) 149.  
42 ibid 149. 
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to the direct participation of members might shift power toward less ideologically committed 
“ordinary” members, whose views tend to resemble those of the party’s target voters.44 So it 
can be said that powerful activists may impact the party’s electoral chances negatively, because 
they may drive voters away by enacting policies that are more ideologically extreme than those 
supported by ordinary members. An APSA report, however, rejected this kind of argument on 
the grounds that “the activist would learn to modify their own demands and would take account 
of the wider interest of the society.”45 
 
Arguments about IPD 
 As mentioned above, scholars disagree as to whether IPD is desirable or not. To be more 
precise, IPD sounds attractive to most of them, but some believe that it is unimportant in the 
pursuit of the larger goal of state-level democracy, good examples being the process-orientated 
approach to democracy applied by some scholars to IPD and the result-orientated approach 
applied by others. 46  In the former, the process-orientated approach, the most significant 
consideration is how political party activities are actually carried out, so that, from an IPD 
perspective, any action taken in the furtherance of state level democracy must itself involve the 
active participation of party members. The result-orientated approach to democracy, on the 
other hand, emphasizes party effectiveness, the efficient and effective achievement of the 
envisioned political goals. 
 Other scholars, working outside the process- and result-orientated theoretical 
framework, have focused their debates on the relative merits of economic and deliberative 
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45 Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, ‘Toward a More Responsible 
Two-Party System’ [1950)] XLIV American Political Science Review 66. 
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models of democracy supporters.47 As Rahat, Hazan and Katz explain, these kinds of arguments 
are centred on such questions as whether competition among parties and the participation of 
citizens in general elections is sufficient for effective democracy, and whether competition, 
widespread participation and inclusive representation within the individual parties are required 
as well for IPD.48 In sum, approaches to IPD usually focus on three complex and interdependent 
issues: the trade-off between electoral efficiency and IPD, whether political parties will be 
responsive and accountable to the general electorate or to their party members, and the 
cohesiveness and efficiency of the party in government and in parliament. 
 To begin with, some sceptics argue that IPD is incompatible with parliamentary 
government, since it could lead to a conflict between the internal and external accountability of 
party leaders.49 Within any parliamentary democracy, the fundamental objective is to maintain 
the accountability of the government to the legislature; thus Robert McKenzie pointed to the 
importance of representative linkage and argued that government is accountable to parliament 
as parliament is accountable to the electorate, and accountability to party members would 
disturb this chain of accountability.50 More recently, Paul Pennings and Reuven Hazan claim 
that a high level of IPD is likely to distort party cohesiveness and as a result to weaken the 
quality of representative democracy. 51  The analogous point may be made as to whether 
individual MPs remain accountable to party members who they select them as candidates, or to 
party leaders or to the voters. 
 With regard to governmental efficiency, sceptics claim that IPD brings about an 
undesirable weakening of the party. 52  After analysing the effect of intra-party politics on 
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government, Hanna Bäck concluded that “A high level of intra-party democracy could also 
affect a party’s bargaining efficiency, since leaders in highly democratic parties may have to 
spend a significant amount of time and effort during bargaining seeking their members’ 
approval before making important bargaining deals,”53 though here it may be noted that this 
effect might not be so pronounced in the case of winner-take-all elections. She also claims that 
IPD has negative effects on a party’s chance of getting into government. Furthermore, IPD may 
impair the party’s ability to work efficiently, not only in government but also in Parliament. 
Scarrow makes a similar point:  
Party cohesiveness in legislatures contributes to efficient government, and politicians 
within the same party tend to be more responsible to one another than they otherwise 
would be, because of the shared electoral fate of those voted in on the strength of a 
shared party label.54  
 Maurice Duverger agreed that IPD is beneficial in principle: “democracy remains the 
dominant doctrine of the contemporary age, that which determines the legitimacy of power,” 
so “parties must in consequence take the greatest care to provide themselves with leadership 
that is democratic in appearance.” However, he concluded that internal democracy weakens 
authority, so that internally democratic parties are not well armed for the struggles of politics.55 
According to Jan Teorell, the reason for this belief is that party cohesion is the most important 
factor for success in a competitive electoral race.56 For Duverger, IPD is meaningful only if all 
parties are organised with a uniform, internally democratic, structure; should one of the parties 
be organised in an oligarchical manner, the others would be in a position of inferiority.57 For 
Seisselberg, extensive participation by members in the decision-making process and personal 
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selection would be counter-productive, as it diminishes the efficacy and flexibility of a party’s 
organisation.58 However, it is important to note that, as James Campbell argues, though IPD 
may be a factor in the weakening of parties, it does not necessarily weaken each party equally.59  
 With regard to accountability, it has been argued that political parties must be 
responsible both to the public and to their members.60 There is an on-going debate among 
scholars as to whether party leaders and MPs should represent party members, party electorates 
or the nation as a whole, as well as to which groups they should give precedence, to whom they 
will be responsive and accountable, and how these conflicting loyalties might be balanced.61 
IPD provides a complementary solution for holding party leaders accountable, since they will 
feel responsible for implementing the party programme in a manner consistent with the 
decisions made by the party members. A report dating back to 1950 in the United States found 
that a sense of responsibility toward the party members could enforce the party’s responsibility 
to the electorates.62 According to Alan Ware, “it was assumed that, unless the party leaders 
were accountable to their membership, there was no guarantee that the clarity of electoral choice 
needed to make the electoral mechanism effective would be forthcoming from leadership.”63 In 
the same vein, for Teorell, IPD should be seen as an instrument to supplement general elections 
in making the legislature responsive to public opinion.64 However, it is important to note that, 
as Cross and Katz point out, while democracy is multidimensional, some of its components are 
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rendered more efficient by the internal workings of political parties and others through general 
elections.65  
 It is to be expected that political parties will reflect both the wishes of their members 
and voters and the concerns of those within parliament. There is a natural tendency to blur the 
distinction between members and voters, and at the same time debate continues as to whether 
political parties should follow the preferences of voters or those of the members. According to 
John May’s “law of curvilinear disparity,” the ideological stances of voters, party members and 
activists will often differ sharply because voters and party leaders will take a more moderate 
stand than party members at large or activists who, almost by definition, maintain the most 
ideologically extreme stances. 66  For this reason, McKenzie argues, the leader of a 
democratically organised party would be more motivated to respond to activists or party 
members than to the more moderate voters.67 Similarly, Gijs Schumacher, Catherine E. de Vries 
and Barbara Vis argue that activist-dominated parties are relatively more responsive to active 
party supporters, while leader-dominated parties, by contrast, are relatively more responsive to 
the average voter, and therefore better positioned to win elections.68 May’s theory has attracted 
scholarly attention, including the criticism that it can only be counted as one of a number of 
possible explanations for the real-world relationship between ideological polarization within 
parties and success at the polls.69 Thus Scarrow, by contrast, argues that empowering activists 
reduces a party’s electoral appeal because the more moderate views that that they eschew have 
greater appeal to the electorate:  
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...moving from elite control to procedures that empower activists in party conventions 
might produce more ideologically charged decisions, whereas moving decisions from 
party conventions to postal ballots from the entire membership might shift power from 
the most ideologically engaged to less active ‘ordinary’ members, whose views are more 
likely to resemble those of the party’s target electorate.70  
 Mair, on the other hand, views the empowerment of ordinary party members as a 
strategy used by party leaders in order to gain needed autonomy, in which case the 
“empowerment of ordinary members” serves as a kind of Trojan horse. This means that the 
power of the ordinary members is inversely proportional to the power of the activists, while the 
activists have the potential to present serious challenges to the leadership, a state of affairs that 
would naturally foster cooperation between the leadership and the rank-and-file membership at 
the expense of the activists. Nick Anstead argues that, “while recent reforms of British parties 
might seem to indicate an increased level of democratisation, it in fact seems more appropriate 
to characterise these changes as the modern manifestation of the party’s oligarchic tendencies, 
as they actually increase the freedom of action of the leadership.”71And indeed, British party 
leaders may see intra-party democratisation as a way to weaken party activists; Turkish party 
leaders, however, may see it as a threat to their own power.  
 The Rational-Efficient Party Model Theory advocated by Anthony Downs, James 
Wilson and Leon Epstein deserves mention here since it focuses exclusively on the parties’ 
electoral function (vote-seeking). 72  (The contribution of Anthony Downs is especially 
important here because of his reputation as one of the first to apply the logic of marketing to 
politics and democracy.73) According to this model, political parties in a democracy formulate 
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their policies strictly as a means of maximizing electoral support in order to win elections, while 
elected officials are allowed to do as they wish once elected, provided that their activities help 
to win the next election.74 Viewed this way, since political parties compete for voters, they 
should remain accountable to those voters in preference to their membership; and under these 
circumstances, IPD would be of limited utility.75  According to the rational efficient party 
model, in other words, parties need not be internally democratic, and IPD is incompatible with 
external cohesion;76 as Teorell stated, this model is based on the idea that political parties should 
compete for voters just as businesses compete for customers.77 Alan Ware, to the contrary, 
argues that vote-seeking is neither the only nor necessarily the most important objective for a 
party in a liberal democracy, since the party may alternatively be preoccupied with creating 
policies that can be implemented once it is in government.78 Thus, although democratisation of 
the parties may be desirable for its own sake, it is not achieved without significant costs.79 
 
Conclusion 
 Statesmen and scholars were naturally quite sceptical about democracy and political 
parties when these institutions were first being elaborated in Turkey. A century later, we can no 
longer dispute their desirability. The wealth of scholarship discussed above testifies to the 
increasing focus on the relationship between democracy as it is exercised within political parties 
and within the polity of which the parties form a crucial part. In the chapters that follow, it will 
be argued that the inevitable triumph of democracy and the political parties from which it is 
inseparable over other forms of government will demonstrate the inevitability, or at least 
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desirability, of IPD. Democratisation is not an event but rather an on-going process, both within 
and without political parties. The differences of opinion highlighted in this chapter make clear 
that, just as every argument about democracy generates a counter-argument, so it is with IPD, 
which also remains a highly subjective and contestable concept, and therefore one difficult to 
quantify and evaluate. IPD certainly remains an imperfect response to system-level democracy. 
Nevertheless, one of the major aims of this study is to build a strong case that IPD can in fact 
be fostered—and so of course also impeded—by means of governmental regulations. Political 
parties are now more subject to the law than ever before, but a carefully considered regulatory 
regime can lead to desirable outcomes for IPD. In preparation for this argumentation, a first 
step will be a directed examination of the regulation of political parties in general. 
 
Part 2: Regulation of Political Parties 
Introduction 
 In what follows, I will first provide a brief overview of the nature of the relationship 
between political parties and the state, and look in particular at the regulation of political parties 
by public law. I will then discuss these observations in the context of the Turkish political 
system and conclude by analysing Turkish party law generally. 
 While the concept of the “state” is a very broad and ambiguous, it is important to 
describe what this study means by a “state” at the outset of this discussion. First, when we refer 
to a state, we are not speaking only about a government that is carrying out the day-to-day 
business of the state and has a short-term life. Rather, we refer here to a more broad meaning 
of the state, more than the government, such as “the notion of an authority higher than the 
government of the day.”80 Second, the state is here defined as encompassing a wide range of 
institutions such as a legislature, a treasury, a court, a regulatory authority and a police force 
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for the implementation of regulations.81 With respect to the term “regulation,” while wider 
connotations attach to word “regulation” in the literature of law, the term as used in this study 
refers to statutory law, such as the constitution and special party law. 
 As much as political parties are regarded as an essential element of a modern democracy, 
they are also the most important components of a modern state. A central function of the state 
is to set up the rules by which the game is to be played. For, example, Lew Rockwell described 
political parties as quasi-official agencies within the fabric of the state.82 In the same vein, 
Epstein used the term “public utility” as a term for parties, and claimed that political parties are 
quasi-governmental agencies.83 For him, while being a public utility provides particular legally 
conferred privileges, these privileges also result in heavy regulation of political parties.84 With 
the categorisation of parties as a public utility, the regulation of IPD can be seen as a 
normatively desirable thing to do.85 In a report addressed to the regulation of political parties, 
the Venice Commission stated that “it is commonly accepted for states to regulate their 
functioning insofar as is necessary to ensure effective, representative, and fair democratic 
governance.”86 
 While political scientists and public lawyers have devoted considerable attention to the 
regulation of political parties, they largely neglect the regulation of political parties from an 
IPD perspective. Democracy, at least from one perspective, is also a matter of mind and heart 
which cannot be regulated with laws. Supporters of IPD legislation claim that using public law 
instruments, such as the national constitution or special party laws, is much more effective than 
leaving it to parties themselves, whose leaderships have personal motivations. 87  Before 
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outlining the regulation of political parties by public law, it will be instructive to consider 
“public utility” term in brief. 
 
Public utility 
 In the literature on political parties, there is no clear definition as to exactly what is 
meant by the term “public utility.” it is generally used in order to emphasise the close relation 
between the state and the party. Political parties are frequently described as constituting a link 
between the state and civil society. This is also the basic idea behind the mass-party model, 
where a party is characterised as being a link between civil society and the state through mass 
membership. However, there is a long-running debate over whether, with the passing of the 
mass-party era, this linkage was weakened, if not completely destroyed. Van Biezen and 
Kopecky portray the modern state-party linkage as follows: 
[P]arties have traditionally been understood in terms of their permanent linkage with 
society and their temporal linkage with the state… parties are now perhaps best 
understood in terms of their temporal linkage with society and their more permanent 
linkage with the state.88 
Similarly, Lisa Young claims that political parties evolve from membership based 
participatory organisations into state-supported bodies. 89  The primary reasons behind the 
weakening of the linkage between civil society and political parties can be briefly explained as 
the increasing decline in party membership, growing mistrust of politics and increasing level of 
state funds. The close relation between the state and political parties has also brought about a 
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new type of party model. Richard Katz and Peter Mair’s “cartel part” theory is a product of this 
relation. In their words: 
[T]he state, which is invaded by the parties, and the rules of which are determined by 
the parties, becomes a fount of resources through which these parties not only help to 
ensure their own survival, but through which they can also enhance their capacity to 
resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives.90 
 According to the cartel party model, in the second half of the century, with the passing 
of a golden age for the mass parties, Western European political parties adapted to declining 
levels of participation and involvement in party activities by strengthening their state linkages 
in a collusive manner for their own support.91 While political parties have conflicting issues 
among their policies, they also have co-operative goals such as getting funds from the state and 
staying in parliament in any position in government or in opposition. So major parties, 
especially the ruling party and the main opposition party, cooperate closely when it comes to 
state funding and party regulation. Also, they do not want to share these opportunities with new 
entering parties. Deborah L. Norden claims that “in practice, collusive party relations often act 
to prevent new party access and, especially, new party rule.”92 However, it remains unclear to 
what extent this trend of becoming closer to the state has really affected the relationship between 
political parties and civil society. Depending on the state must not lead to the assumption that 
political parties are completely dissociated from civil society.  
 One of the most important indicators of being a public utility is being funded by the 
state. However, I will defer discussion of this issue until the latter part of this chapter. Beyond 
financial considerations, political parties are now more regulated by the state, which is the 
second indicator of being a “public utility.” The increased involvement of the state in internal 
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party affairs, with public law, contributed to a transformation of political parties from voluntary 
private associations to a public utility.93 Therefore, party laws are seen as the most direct way 
of state intervention in the party system.94 
 The development of parties as a part of the state institution contributed to the regulation 
of parties both at the constitutional level and the ordinary level. It is now commonplace in most 
of the democracies to regulate political parties by public law. With this in mind, I will now 
focus on the regulation of political parties in a theoretical way, and then analyse the Turkish 
case. 
 
Major problems of party regulations 
 In the case of political party regulation, the interests of parties are often decisive in 
shaping laws in which they have a straightforward interest. Law and political parties have a 
strong relationship when the legislative bodies are comprised of representatives of political 
parties. Investigating the relationship between “representative democracy” and “the Law,” 
Andrew Geddis claimed that “it is now commonplace that a legal rule - or, more broadly, ‘the 
Law’ - must be traceable back to some democratic source if it is to be regarded as a legitimate 
legal rule.”95  However, when it comes to the laws relating to political parties, there is a 
legitimacy problem, since players of the game establish the rules. The “closeness” between the 
regulatory (legislature) and regulated body (political parties) encourages cooperative 
arrangements, and capture can ensue.96  
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 According to Tabatha Abu El-haj, legislators are problematic as regulators when it 
comes to the rules governing themselves: they are self-interested and are regularly tempted to 
use legal rules to entrench themselves.97 Likewise, Pippa Norris claims that the law-making 
process relating to political parties is not neutral or free from partisan bias, since incumbents 
holding elected office have the power to shape the legal and constitutional rules of the game, 
along with the courts and judiciary.98 Karvonen also argues that “it is the parties who pass the 
legislation that have already gained representation; they are not likely to introduce reforms that 
hurt their vital interests.”99 Muller and Ulrich state that “it is the parties that breathe life into 
the formal institutions of government and hence make rules for themselves.”100 However, it is 
difficult to escape from this problem in a larger sense.  
 The second problem with the regulation of political parties is the question of who should 
enforce and review the implementation of regulations. As mentioned above, not only is the 
adoption of party law absent individual motives important, but clear provisions are also required 
for the implementation of such laws. For instance, these powers are given to the courts in 
Turkey. However, as Dan Avnon observes, making a law in a certain area means that you grant 
a power to the judiciary to interpret this law. He also states that a judiciary which consists of a 
small number of unelected and unaccountable judges thereby acquires a right to solve conflicts 
in a democratic body, namely a political party.101 It may thus be wondered whether judicial 
review is compatible with democracy, and whether political sovereignty can override legal 
sovereignty. However, the answer to such questions is as elusive as that to “which twin is the 
elder?”102 and is beyond the scope of the present study. With regard to IPD, the implementation 
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and the substance of party laws must be considered in tandem. The implementation of party 
laws is a difficult mission, and requires an organisation with significant powers. As Clyde 
Wilcox states, “Vigorous enforcement of flawed laws may do little good and even perhaps do 
harm and the best laws will do little good if enforcement is lax.”103 
 In sum, as a solution to these problems, this thesis argues that IPD increases the 
legitimacy of political parties by fostering increased democracy in such procedures as candidate 
selection, and it mitigates the alleged legitimacy problem in legislatures. Moreover, selection 
of the party leadership by all party members would improve the accountability of leaders, which 
would in turn facilitate the process of implementing regulations on political parties. 
 
Regulation of political parties 
 These considerations raise still more questions, such as whether the internal activities 
of political parties should be based on mutual trust between a party’s leaders and its members, 
or instead on public rules governing their internal activities, whether parties’ own constitutions 
are sufficient to control them and why some countries regulate the internal affairs of political 
parties and others do not. 
 In a comparative study of the special legislation on political parties in 39 countries, Lauri 
Karvonen determined that the aim of the legislation differs depending on the democratic status 
of each. For him, in non-democratic states, party laws are adopted in order to restrict the 
freedom of a party’s opponents, while democratising regimes use the law to reduce oligarchic 
tendencies, and in mature democracies the party laws are primarily adopted for regulation of 
the financing of political parties.104 
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 As was stated in the first part of this chapter, political parties were not accepted as 
necessary and beneficial institutions until the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In those 
days, parties were voluntarily organised, and operated outside of state regulation or they under 
the rules governing private associations just like other non-governmental organisations that 
freely determine their own activities. In this regard, the recognition of political parties as good 
and essential and the first attempts to regulate them arise in the same periods.  
 In addition, some countries were suspicious and reluctant to regulate political parties on 
the grounds that doing so might impede the right of association or the freedom of political 
expression.105 However, after the Second World War, it was understood that political power 
may be abused by parties or by lawless leaders and that this had led to disastrous results. In 
Germany and in Italy, democratic systems were destroyed by anti-democratic parties that won 
democratic elections. Hitler, for instance, came to power through democratic methods, and his 
regime then evolved into an elected dictatorship. Karl Leowenstein claimed that sometimes the 
mechanism of democracy is a Trojan horse by which the enemy enters the city. 106  This 
judgment can also be found in one of the EU reports:  
Germany and Italy, with their fascist, undemocratic and authoritarian (in the German 
case: totalitarian) regimes, gave themselves new constitutions after the Second World 
War, which were intended to represent a response to the undemocratic past and provide 
for a democratic and pluralist political order with political parties as its components.107  
 According to Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller, “democracy may require good 
citizens as well as good politicians, but neither of these conditions, separately or jointly, can 
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guarantee that democracy will actually work.”108 Consequently, after the war, legislating on 
parties was started to be perceived as a necessary tool to strengthen the deficits of the political 
system.109 A growing number of countries took the German and Italian pattern as a negative 
example for regulating political parties, and started to revise their constitutions and to enact 
special laws governing the conduct of political parties.  
 Furthermore, the growing importance of the roles and tasks performed by parties for the 
proper functioning of modern democracies has accelerated their regulation. According to 
Avnon, “the creation of a legal framework regulating the activities of political parties may be 
perceived as a necessary means to strengthen the democratic underpinnings of the political 
system.”110 Van Biezen has a different idea for the emergence of party regulation; for her, many 
of party regulations were first introduced or were substantially extended in the wake of the 
introduction of public funding for parties.111 
 Recently, legal academics and political scientists have been acknowledging the 
complementary regulatory role of the state over political parties, with regard to both 
constitutional texts and special party laws. As Casal-Bértoa and others observe, “The liberal 
principle of non-intervention in political parties’ internal matters that prevailed across the 
European continent since the very emergence of political parties as organizations seems no 
longer to be the dominant paradigm.”112 Moreover, in most modern democracies, states are in 
favour of the rules prescribed by their constitutions and special party laws in order to ensure 
the healthy functioning of political parties. This motive is often portrayed by both national 
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legislators and supra-national organisations as a way to restore public confidence in political 
parties and strengthen their legitimacy within the political system.113 Richard Katz explains that 
“with the spreading acceptance of the general principle that important institutions should be 
governed by explicitly tailored legislation, party laws increasingly can be seen as part of the 
‘normal’ corpus of legislation, something that every self-respecting country ought to have.”114 
Parties have been regulated differently across countries, according to their historical 
experiences, political philosophies and social attitudes towards the normative role that political 
parties should play in representative democracies.115 
 With regard to the regulation of IPD, while there is a noticeable trend towards the 
regulation of various aspects of political parties, IPD is still not one of these aspects in most of 
the countries. It has been claimed that external regulatory intervention into political parties will 
harm their free functioning with respect to decision- and policy-making processes. Piccio and 
van Biezen claim that a considerable number of party laws in European democracies do not 
prescribe every detail of IPD and leave responsibility to the political parties so as not to infringe 
their autonomy and freedom of association.116 However, this study advocates the idea that the 
state must not leave the organisation and activities of political parties completely to their own 
discretion, in particular with regard to IPD, and should instead adopt rules that would make 
them more democratic. 
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Degree of regulation 
 The central issue regarding the regulation of political parties is the degree of regulation. 
In practice, regulation by the state can take a variety of forms. Some countries approach political 
parties in a more liberal way, and do not interfere with their substantive aims and activities, 
while some have regulated political parties strictly for the sake of preserving democracy in 
terms of their organisation, aims and activities. Striking a working balance between these 
tendencies is not easy, and mostly depends on a given country’s past experience and its 
understanding of democracy. Scholars are overwhelmingly positive about legislation that 
balances the tendencies toward heavy regulation and non-regulation.  
 According to Kenneth Janda, if governments have no rules stating what parties can do, 
they risk the onset of ruthless politics with little or no public accountability.117 Party laws 
essentially sap the autonomy and flexibility of political parties, as well as tying the hands of 
party leader. So the countries need to set viable regulations in order to get efficient results from 
party regulation. Yet countries have a choice of approaches as regards the degree of regulation. 
The classification of Plasser and Plasser on political campaigning regulation is applicable to all 
kind of party regulations; they distinguish regulation levels as “strictly regulated,” “moderately 
regulated” and “minimally regulated.”118 For instance, while British parties are subject to little 
regulation, Turkish parties are subject to a great deal. Hence, one goal of this thesis is to 
determine how much regulation is good for IPD. Janda, for example, claims that both ‘“too 
much” and “too little” party law may lead to problems of functioning efficiently.119 But how 
much regulation is too much or too little? The important point is that party regulation should 
not be out of balance and place unreasonable burdens on political parties. The choice of 
alternative ways to regulate parties is a technical matter that can be decided only after defining 
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the problems and needs of political systems. Muller and Ulrech have similar ideas when they 
state that “systems with a long democratic tradition have seen little need to formally 
acknowledge the important role of political parties in a comprehensive form and mention them 
only as need occurs in electoral and party finance laws.”120 It should also be emphasised that, 
as the regulations have important effects on the functions of parties, party regulation should 
take into account the ever-changing climate of political parties as adaptive organisations and be 
responsive and flexible enough to deal with emerging issues.121 For instance, Anika Gauja 
argues that “the changes in party organisation (from cadre, to mass, to catch-all and cartel) over 
the last century consequently alter the nature of what it is that the laws are seeking to 
regulate.”122 
 Although the exact degree of party regulation that is desirable for IPD is subject to 
debate, this thesis defends more participatory methods on candidate selection, leadership 
selection and policy-making processes, and argues that these methods should be supported by 
the external regulation of political parties. However, I also believe that regulating more 
participatory methods with party law does not infringe on the freedom of association, equality 
or rights of party members or on leadership autonomy, but rather strengthens the equality and 
rights of party members, and in some cases the autonomy of the leadership. 
National constitutions 
 National constitutions have a distinct place among the instruments of party regulation. 
They are often used in comparative studies as evidence of a country’s approach to political 
parties. Furthermore, it has been said that democracy begins with a country’s constitution.123 
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Thus, in order to understand the significance of the regulations of parties, it is necessary to first 
examine their status in national constitutions or laws commonly referred to as the constitution. 
 Constitutions are basic documents which provide the important rules of the state that are 
in some sense more fundamental than others. They often include the regulation of high profile 
issues such as the rights and duties of citizens, the judiciary, the governmental system and the 
relations of the state organs to one another, constitutional reform procedures, constitutional 
review of ordinary laws and the relationship between citizens and the state. Each country 
evaluates and decides for itself what subjects are necessary for inclusion in the constitution.  
 While political parties have a long tradition in the life of democratic countries, they have 
gained constitutional status only since the 1940s. Constitutionalising political parties started 
with the restoration of democracy after World War II, in Italy in 1947, and in Germany in 1949. 
Earlier than in Europe, the Brazilian Constitution mentioned political parties in 1946. 124 
According to van Biezen, the “process of democratization and state formation in post-war 
Europe always went accompanied by the incorporation of parties in the newly written 
constitutions.”125 Most countries then adopted special constitutional provisions concerning the 
importance and essential points on political parties. Janda refers to a 1976 survey of 142 
constitutions, where it was found that at least two-thirds mention political parties.126 Another 
study analysing 52 liberal democracies (22 established and 30 new democracies), revealed that 
over three-quarters of these countries have a special article regarding political parties in their 
constitutions.127 In addition, within the constitutions of the EU members, only four do not 
mention political parties (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands).128  
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 The reason that political parties are note mentioned in the constitutions of some 
countries, such as the United States, is that when they first adopted their constitutions, political 
parties had yet to develop. According to Gauja, there are four main reasons for not mentioning 
political parties in a constitution: the infancy of political parties as organisations when 
constitutions were drafted, negative social attitudes towards parties, the need to maintain 
flexibility in constitutional arrangements and the dominance of independent attitudes towards 
parliamentary representation.129Before political parties took their place in constitutions, or 
where there is no article in specific constitutions, apart from a special article, protection for the 
freedom of association, assembly and expression is included, which rights constitute a legal 
basis for political parties.  
 There are many aspects of granting constitutional status to political parties. First, 
recognition of political parties in national constitutions legitimises them and indicates their 
importance for democracy, and in this regard has important symbolic status and declaratory 
value. Therefore, constitutional provisions for political parties are excellent indicators of the 
importance of parties for a given country. Constitutionalising of political parties distinguishes 
them from other ordinary associations, and grants them rights and privileges that give them a 
unique position.130 Generally speaking, national constitutions not only refer to political parties, 
but also emphasise the importance of political parties for democracy in the same provisions. 
 Second, some constitutional provisions related to political parties assign to the national 
legislature the task of regulating political parties with a special law. Most of the countries use 
the constitution as a foundation for law-making, and without this special provision, the courts 
can annul legislation on the grounds that it does not have a constitutional basis. For instance, in 
Turkey, IPD is a constitutional requirement, and the articles of the TPPL are subject to judicial 
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scrutiny by the Constitutional Court on these terms. Moreover, political parties are also subject 
to judicial scrutiny on the basis of the right to freedom of association, so there must be balance 
between IPD requirements and a party’s right of free association. This balance means that 
political parties can neither enjoy an unlimited degree of constitutional protection nor direct 
their IPD matters free from state intrusion. 
 Third, constitutions are more neutral documents that require more difficult amendment 
or adoption procedures in which political parties do not have as much control as in the normal 
law-making process. For instance, in Turkey a referendum is required in some cases; if not, the 
support of 2/3 of the MPs is required. As mentioned above, regulating a neutral party law is 
extremely difficult because the political parties control the legislatures. 
 Fourth, the codification of political parties in national constitutions is one of the displays 
of the relationship between parties and the state. A close relationship between the state and the 
parties in modern democracies can be discernible through the incorporation of political parties 
into the national constitutions.  
 
Special party laws 
 It is explicit that the constitution does not give all the answers to questions about 
political parties. The codification of political parties in constitutions is only one aspect of the 
legal regulation of political parties, on that relates mainly to their importance for the democratic 
order in a given country. In the absence of a special party law, most of the issues related to 
political parties will remain uncertain. Hence, in addition to constitutional provisions, most 
countries have enacted special laws devoted to political parties.  
 Although there are other laws focused on other aspects of political parties, such as party 
finance law or election law, this study will mostly focus on special party laws, which are 
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“specifically designed to regulate the life of party organization,”131 or, to put it differently, 
regulations concerning the policy-making processes, the selection of party leaders and 
candidate selection methods for general elections within the party.  
 As van Biezen and Piccio point out, special party laws inevitably contain a much greater 
amount of detail on the internal life of political parties than national constitutions.132 Such laws 
are a necessity in the case of some constitutions that require political parties to be regulated 
exclusively by laws. Turkey is a good example of this kind of special party law, in which 
political parties are subjected to highly detailed regulation. It is important to note that the 
absence of an explicit law comparable to the “Turkish Political Parties Law” does not mean that 
parties are unregulated in other countries. In the absence of special laws, political parties were 
generally regulated under general laws related to associations, or other laws that contain 
provisions regarding political parties. 
 These laws were generally legislated in the period just after the constitutional 
recognition of political parties following the Second World War.133  The first instances of 
special legislation on political parties date back to the 1960s. According to one study, the first 
party laws were the Venezuelan Ley de Partidos Políticos, Reuniones Públicas and 
Manifestaciones (1964) and the Turkish Siyasî Partiler Kanunu (1965).134  
 It might be argued that these kind of special laws are the product of party scepticism and 
have expanded gradually. Indeed, these laws consist of procedures to reduce anti-democratic 
tendencies, or to address lessons learned from past mistakes in order to guide the design of 
democratic procedures. Dan Avnon has analysed the countries that were the pioneers of party 
laws, and explains that all of them experienced the fall of a democratic government and its 
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replacement by an authoritarian regime, concluding that “It seems that parties laws are an 
element in a democratic regime's attempt to safeguard its existence in the face of internal 
threat.”135 In the same vein, Cross and Katz argue that these laws were established based on the 
idea that political parties are powerful actors in politics and potentially subject to capture or 
perversion by their nominal leaders. 136  True enough, the TPPL was a product of party 
scepticism and designed to limit the power of elites within parties and provide democratic 
governance, at least at the beginning. However, political parties introduced subsequent 
amendments in favour of party elites. 
 This study examines the kind of party law that provides fertile ground for IPD in Turkey 
by analysing the details of the TPPL and asking whether it provides a fertile ground for the IPD 
and what kind of reforms are necessary. It has been widely acknowledged that the TPPL does 
not satisfy modern democratic requirements, so it will require reforming in the light of the 
changing conditions of political parties. 
 
Party regulation in Turkey 
 Since this study investigates the reform of the TPPL from the perspective of IPD with 
the help of various positive examples from different countries for the purpose of guiding the 
application of Turkish party regulation, and since the law determines the extent to which party 
members can participate in intra party business, it will be useful first to examine Turkish party 
law. This examination will be followed by a presentation of Turkish Constitution and the TPPL 
to demonstrate the legal measures and institutions that are envisaged to protect parties from 
oligarchic tendencies.  
 Parties in Turkey function according to the rules contained in the Constitution, the 
TPPL, the election law and their own statutes under the observance of the Constitution Court, 
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civil courts and the High Election Board. Disputes about reforming the party law in Turkey 
have especially occurred over the past three decades. The quality of Turkish party law has been 
criticised by many academic commentators, who have argued that there is a need for the 
introduction of a comprehensive legal reform both in the Constitution and in the TPPL. 
According to Gençkaya “The Party Law also reflects the general characteristics of Turkish 
political/administrative culture, such as hierarchical party organization, centralization and an 
exclusive nomination process.”137 Indeed, the real issue in Turkish party law is not about the 
amount of regulation; rather, it is about democratic quality and content. Turkish party law will 
accordingly be analysed, with an emphasis on provisions related to IPD in particular being taken 
up in later chapters. 
 The incorporation of political parties into the constitution and the enacting of special 
laws in Turkey was mostly a consequence of the widespread distrust towards parties among the 
military elites. The development of party law in Turkey did not occur as a political consensus 
among parties; rather it was born suddenly following the regime breakdowns in 1960 and 1980. 
In contrast to mature democracies that have regulated political parties after they had matured 
and with the parties’ participation,138 in Turkey, political parties were regulated by the military 
regime when they were still in their infancy and without their participation. For the military 
regime, regulating political parties by public law was regarded as an essential way to control 
anti-democratic tendencies in political parties. However, this should not be understood as 
indicating that the military regime was solicitous of democracy. It merely referred the issue to 
scholars from law schools and political science departments of the two prominent Turkish 
Universities at that time and adopted their consensual proposal quickly. According to İlter 
Turan 
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The major policy tools available to the military leadership in the structuring of political 
parties and the party system were legal in nature. In devising new Constitution and 
electoral laws, party problems received much attention. As had also been the case after 
the 1960-1961 intervention, a new law specifically dealing with political parties was 
enacted. A prominent characteristic of these laws is that they are highly detailed, 
containing similar provisions, often repetitive in nature, reflecting the excessive concern 
of the leadership that the pre-1980 politics not be restored.139 
Katz claims that “if there is a problem with democracy in a country, something about the parties 
is most likely a cause and/or some reform of the parties is most likely a cure, and thus that 
adopting or reforming party laws is an appropriate means to the end of improved democracy.”140 
Here I will only analyse the Turkish Constitution and the TPPL in general terms; the specific 
provisions of the TPPL related to the candidate selection procedure, party leadership selection 
will each be the subject of a later chapter. The more we know about the Turkish legal 
frameworks under which parties operate, the better our understanding will be of how to reform 
IPD. 
 
Why should political parties be regulated by statute in Turkey? 
 In young, less-mature democracies like Turkey, there is always a dominant party that 
controls and manipulates the state apparatus, which results in inter-party relations becoming 
largely collusive, so that self-regulation becomes even less effective in regards to IPD. For 
instance, Panebianco is sceptical about party constitutions; to him, the party constitution is 
subject to interpretation, manipulation and unpredictable patterns of enforcement. The general 
efficacy of party constitutions in providing insight into the actual practices of political parties 
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is highly questionable.141 Similarly, Smith and Gauja argue that “Party constitutions must be 
treated with caution when describing the actual operation of party, as discrete documents….”142 
 For instance, the ruling party of Turkey, the JDP, has codified intra-party referendums 
in the party’s constitution; however, they have never used such measures. Article 155 of the 
JDP constitution states as follows: 
If a decision is to be made which involves a significant political choice, then an intra-
party referendum may be held in a wide-range through participation of the Party’s 
members, or in a narrow-range through participation of only those members who are in 
charge of organizations. The Central Decision and Administrative Committee has the 
authorization to determine the methods and principles of intra-party referendums, and 
to decide to hold intra-party referendums.143 
 
The Turkish Constitution 
 In order to gain a more complete picture of Turkish party law, it is worthwhile looking 
at the Turkish Constitution first. According to van Biezen and Kopecky: 
[T]he constitutionalization of parties constitutes a key element of the party–state 
relationship, because it attests to a conception of democracy in which parties are seen 
as necessary institutions, and signals that the state is assuming an increasing role in the 
management of parties as an essential public good for democracy.144  
 One of the unique features of the Turkish Constitutions (both from 1961 and 1982) is 
the attention given to IPD. The Turkish Constitution is especially important for political parties 
in that it contains the core rules on their behaviour in considerable detail. Like most other 
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countries, Turkey has a tradition of written constitutions, in this case dating from the 1876 
Ottoman Constitution, which represents the country’s supreme law with which other laws may 
not be in conflict. Under the constitutional arrangements, political parties are an indispensable 
part of democratic life in Turkey. Although Turkey has had five constitutions (in 1876, 1921, 
1924, 1961 and 1982) and the origins of Turkish parties date back to as early as 1865, only the 
1961 and the 1982 Constitutions recognised political parties as a separate constitutional element 
and thus granted them constitutional status. Before the 1961 constitution, although parties had 
of course been mentioned in various legal documents and in secondary legislation, they hardly 
existed as constitutional entities and they were operating under an article governing freedom of 
association. For example, in the 1924 constitution, it was stated that: “Inviolability of person; 
freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of the press; freedom of travel and of contract; 
freedom of labour; freedom of private property, of assembly, of association; freedom of 
incorporation, are among the natural rights of Turks.”145 
 With the adoption of the 1961 constitution, the status of the parties in Turkey changed 
from exclusively private association to public entities. The reason why political parties were 
not mentioned in previous constitutions is perhaps associated with the fact that there were only 
two parties established on the political scene until the 1961 Constitution, and they had not yet 
matured. 
 There can be no true understanding of the Turkish Constitution without mentioning its 
framers. Both the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions were shaped by military regimes, and remained 
influential even after the resumption of normal democratic life. The framers’ distrust of political 
parties is evident in the texts of both constitutions. According to Ali Çarkoğlu, the military 
regimes often targeted political parties, which they saw as a major reason for country’s 
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problems.146  Turkey’s Constitutions were designed, in a way to force their will upon the 
political parties. Their reasoning was based on the view that political parties can harm the 
unitary and secular system of the country. Their aim, in other words, was solely to protect the 
status quo. For instance, separatist and religious parties were frequently targets of the military 
regime and the constitutional court and were excluded from the electoral arena. 
 Another point to pay attention to while reviewing the constitutions in terms of the 
recognition of parties is that there are differences and similarities among states and across time. 
For instance, the Turkish Constitution has reflected the German style with regard to political 
parties. Western practices often have served as examples in the Turkish legal system. For 
instance, among the drafters of the 1876 Constitution, Midhat Pasha spoke before the adoption 
of first Ottoman Constitution as follows:  
The Ottoman state being a part of the European community, it has to follow the same 
methods that they use in order to be on an equal footing with its neighbours in the way 
of progress; and since a constitutional system is one of the basic conditions of the 
advancement of nations, I hereby proclaim the adoption of this system of government 
within the framework of religious law (şeriah) and our national customs.147  
 It is worth noting that IPD was one of the central topics in the drafting of the 1961 
Constitution. Throughout this process, there were heated debates with regard to the inclusion 
of IPD in the constitutional text. While one group of scholars thought that control of political 
parties through the Constitution would in any event be ineffective, and so should be left to 
individual party constitutions, another group argued that the Constitution must ensure that 
political parties be democratically governed and/or effectively disciplined.148 In the end, the 
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Turkish Constitution made it the duty of political parties to conform to democratic procedures 
in their internal organisation, and it clearly requires the drafting of secondary legislation on 
political parties. Article 57 of the 1961 Constitution states: 
The statutes, programs and activities of political parties shall conform to the principles 
of a democratic and secular republic,….Parties failing to conform to these provisions 
shall be permanently dissolved….The internal affairs and activities of political parties, 
…shall be regulated by law in accordance with democratic principles. 
 Turkey adopted its current Constitution in 1982 following the military coup in 1980. 
The 1982 Constitution, like most of its European counterparts, also mentioned political parties 
explicitly. Again, it is worth noting that both the present Constitution and the 1961 Constitution 
were drafted during periods of military rule, in this case during the period from September 1980 
to November 1983. According to Kınıklıoğlu 
The absence of intra-party democracy in Turkey is by and large due to the absence of 
democracy in our daily lives, in other words due to the non-development of “democratic 
culture”. It is for very reasons that intra-party democracy should be valued and 
safeguarded by constitutional means.149 
 A crucial point closely related to this thesis is that there is again a direct reference to 
IPD in the Constitution. While the Turkish Constitution says a great deal about political parties, 
I only refer to the parts related to IPD. One part of Article 67 of the Turkish Constitution read:  
Political parties are indispensable elements of democratic political life. Political parties 
can be formed without prior permission and shall pursue their activities in accordance 
with the provisions set forth in the Constitution and law. The statutes and programmes, 
as well as the activities of political parties shall not be in conflict with …the principles 
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of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or 
group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime. 
 Other than the general expression of democracy in Article 67, the importance attributed 
to the norm of IPD in Turkey also finds expression in Article 69. In Turkey, it is a constitutional 
requirement that political parties be internally organised according to democratic principles, 
though precisely what this means was left undefined. The first paragraph of the Article 69/1 (as 
amended on July 23, 1995) of the Turkish Constitution reads as follows: “The activities, 
internal regulations and operation of political parties shall be in line with democratic 
principles. The application of these principles is regulated by law.” 
 The attempt to bring about the democratisation of the internal activities of political 
parties is expressed in the Constitution by saying that the “internal regulations and operation” 
of political parties “shall be in line with democratic principles.” 
 Before the 1995 amendment, this article read: “The activities and decisions within the 
political parties shall not be contrary to the democratic principles.” The aim of this 
amendment was to move away from a repressive mind-set. No doubt this provision is interesting 
and highly significant for the implementation of IPD for the Turkish political parties. The 
question is whether the article on Turkish constitution is purely declaratory or is rather 
mandatory. 
 Besides considering the pure text of the Constitution, it is also important to look at the 
preamble of the article in which policy objectives and aspirations are expressed in a different 
text. In the preamble of this amendment (Article 69/1), it was stated that “to incorporate a 
sentence indicates that political parties shall conform to intra-party democracy is necessary.”  
Furthermore, while Article 67 of the Constitution emphasises the external face of democracy, 
Article 69 deals explicitly with internal democracy. As can be seen, the Turkish Constitution 
goes somewhat further by demanding that not only the activities and operations of parties, but 
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also their internal regulations, must be democratic. The particular reason behind the 
introduction of this passage is of central importance for IPD in Turkey. It should be noted that 
this passage was deliberately added to prevent parties from developing oligarchic tendencies. 
And with the last sentence, the Constitution requires the state to take reasonable legislative 
measures to achieve IPD. This article reflects the deep concerns of the drafters about the 
working of democracy within the political parties; perhaps this was even their chief concern. 
However, the constitutional articles that require IPD do little good without definition and 
consistent enforcement. As can be seen from the above article, the Turkish Constitution not 
only grants a special constitutional status to political parties, but also mandates obligations and 
restrictions regarding them. Thus, political parties should be required to operate in accordance 
with this article. 
The Turkish Constitution Court and IPD 
 To date, from an IPD perspective, the Turkish Constitutional Court has undertaken very 
few statutory and judicial interventions. Since its establishment in 1961, the Turkish 
Constitution Court has been the only authority on party closure cases. A total of 45 lawsuits has 
been filed with the Court demanding the banning of a variety of political parties since 1961, of 
which the Court has thus far banned 27. According to Articles 68 and 69, the statutes and 
programs as well as the activities of political parties cannot be in conflict with the independence 
of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, principles of 
equality and rule of law, national sovereignty or the principles of a democratic and secular 
republic. Parties which violate these articles have been permanently banned and dissolved.  
 Moreover, the two most common reasons for banning a political party relate to 
violations of secularism laws and territorial integrity in the offending party’s constitutions and 
programmes.150  However, the Constitution and the TPPL cite concerns about violation of 
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democratic republic principles in the offending party’s constitutions and programmes as 
justification for party closures. Theoretically, the assumption that the Constitution Court cites 
other reasons as justification for closing parties beyond the lack of IDP allows experts to bring 
up a broad range of possible interpretations; the Court could use lack of IPD as a basis for 
closing a party, at least by a very broad interpretation.  
 Rather, the TPPL has established admonition processes in regard to party investigations. 
According to law, if a party is in violation of the TPPL (which does not threaten immediate 
closure), then the Public Prosecution Officer can enter an application to the TCC demanding 
admonition of the offending party. If the Constitution Court discovers truth in the alleged 
violations, it sends notices to the offending party demanding correction of the violations.151 If 
the offending party fails to comply with the Court’s decisions regarding the admonition, the 
Court can decide to deprive it of state funds. If courts decide for deprivation of state funds, the 
leadership of the offending party can be subject to punishment ranging from 3 to 6 months of 
imprisonment.  
 For instance, in 2002 the Public Prosecution Office asked the TCC to admonish the RPP, 
claiming that Article 55 of the party constitution was in violation of the principles of IPD which 
are provided for in Articles 4, 16 and 93 of the TPPL. The Prosecution Office gave a two-month 
notice to the RPP on May 5, 2003 for that the party constitution must be brought into conformity 
with Article 55 so that it would be in compliance with the TPPL. The RPP chose to ignore the 
notice, so the Prosecution Office applied to the TCC to admonish the RPP.  
 According to Article 14 of the TPPL, the members of a party’s executive committee 
must be elected to the party congress by delegates through secret and equal voting (the 
Executive Committee of the RPP is referred to as the Party Council in its own constitution). In 
Article 55/11 of the party constitution, it was stated that 12 members of party council were to 
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be elected from among 18 candidates who are presented by the party leader to the party 
congress. 
 The Constitutional Court first stressed the importance of IPD in the face of harmful 
oligarchic tendencies inside the party. However, it held that there were no violations of IPD 
principles in the offending party’s constitution. The court stated that 12 of 72 members in the 
party council is a small proportion and that the system implemented democracy when delegates 
elected 12 representatives out of 18 candidates; the rationale behind this ruling may have been 
to encourage further participation by under-represented groups because of their social and 
economic conditions. Although the Court did not say so in its verdict, the general intention was 
clearly to promote participation of women and minorities. 
 
Turkish Political Parties Law 
 The mere existence of provisions regarding political parties in the Constitution is not 
sufficient to understand the principles of IPD in Turkish parties. All political parties are also 
regulated by a specific law on political parties (the TPPL). The framework of action for the 
political parties was developed and passed as the TPPL in 1983.  
 Since the adoption of Party laws in 1965, Turkish Party laws have not only defined the 
framework within which political parties have to function, but they also coerce political parties 
to organise in a specific form and behave in the same manner. Thus all Turkish political parties 
have a uniform organisational model as a result of the special party laws, and they also have 
more or less the same party constitution. While it may seem contrary to the principle of freedom 
of association to force parties into conformity with uniform rules governed by public law, this 
is necessary for a country like Turkey, where political leaders are known to exploit internal 
party rules to their personal advantage. The goal here is to analyse and evaluate organisational 
obligations and IPD rules separately. In IPD, the principle objective is democracy, equality and 
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promoting rights of the members. Thus it can be considered acceptable for the state to adopt 
external rules in order to improve IPD. 
 As Janda observes, comprehensive and detailed party laws can prevent political 
entrepreneurs from starting, building and growing parties.152 He also points out that “Political 
parties are necessary for democratic government, and there is a need for legal frameworks to 
facilitate the emergence and growth of strong, competitive political parties.”153  From this 
perspective, the TPPL has failed to facilitate the emergence and growth of strong, competitive 
political parties; rather, it fosters and promotes the current large and influential parties. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that reforms are required in the TPPL from an organisational 
point of view. According to Cem Toker, “Clauses of the current political party law make it 
virtually impossible for a newly established political party to emerge, expand and become a 
nationwide viable alternative in the political system.”154 
 Our aim here is to improve our understanding of how the TPPL operates in regard to 
IPD and what position it takes in facilitating further improvements in the IPD system. 
Moreover, without proper understanding of the TPPL’s current position on IPD, we cannot 
determine whether the current law is sufficient for uninterrupted and corruption-free growth in 
IPD, or whether more effective legislation is required to satisfy decent IPD standards. As Janda 
argues, special party laws provide more nimble vehicles than the party constitution for 
accomplishing the needed regulations.155 In the general preamble to the TPPL, it is easy to see 
that the main objective of lawmakers with special party laws was to provide the necessary 
framework for IPD. The preamble begins by referring to the studies of Ostrogorski (1903) and 
Michels (1908), insisting on a true assessment on the oligarchic tendencies of political parties. 
The preamble of the 1983 TPPL states that, after adoption of first TPPL (648) in 1965, political 
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parties had continued their oligarchic tendencies, violating the equality principle among party 
members.156 
 However, before further exploring facts on the relations between IPD and the Party 
Laws, it will be useful first to consider Turkish legislation regarding parties in general. The 
relationship between the Turkish legal system and political parties resolves naturally into two 
historical stages, the less regulated era before the 1960’s and the more regulated era afterward.  
 Before the adoption of special laws regarding them, the Turkish political parties were 
viewed mostly as private and voluntary associations and were subjected to laws governing 
associations. For instance, in the last few decades of the Ottoman state, parties often associated 
freely according to the 1909 Ottoman Law on Non-Profit Associations. At that time, political 
parties were treated as if their status was akin to the Red Crescent or similar welfare 
associations. Moreover, a provision for the right to Freedom of Association was inserted into 
the text of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution in 1909 in order to allow and protect political 
parties.157  However, following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the legal status of 
associations changed with the amendment of the Non-Profit Associations Law in 1923 and the 
adoption of the new Constitution in 1924. While citizens had the legal right to establish a 
political party, this right was mostly restricted until 1945. Moreover, in 1938, a new Law of 
Association was adopted that, for the first time, explicitly mentioned political parties, in its 
Article 15.  
 According to this article, “Associations, except political parties, shall not pursue more 
than one goal.” The first official recognition of parties as political organisations, rather than 
associations, happened in 1947, just after the transition to the multi-party system, with the 
amendment of The Rules of Procedure of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, often 
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regarded the country’s most important step toward regulation of its political parties. 158 
However, Turkey lacked any sort of special legislation regarding political parties until 1965. 
The first party law was enacted in that year with the intention of regulating the foundations of 
present and new political parties within the framework of the 1961 Constitution. When Turkey 
regulated political parties for the first time, the biggest issue turned out to be IPD; as C. H. 
Dodd observed, “It is doubtful if the new legislation will much hinder the operation of the ‘iron 
law of oligarchy’; and the tradition of centralization that is long established in Turkish political 
parties.”159  
 The current law on political parties was legislated in 1983 by the military government 
after the 1980 coup d’état based on Articles 67 and 69 of the 1982 Constitution. The most 
obvious feature of the 1983 TPPL is that it was adopted by the military regime, similar to the 
1982 Turkish Constitution. The law thoroughly reflects the attitudes and concerns of the 
military leadership towards political parties. The TPPL was drafted by the Privy Council, which 
comprised 160 members appointed by the military regime itself. From an outside perspective, 
it is observable that the TPPL was not enacted by self-interested political actors, a favourable 
situation for any sort of legislation. Indeed, from an IPD perspective, the original version of the 
TPPL enacted by the military was much better than the current civilian modified version. In 
order to understand the concerns of involved drafters more fully, it is necessary first to 
understand general preamble of the TPPL, which reads as follows: 
In the past, activities of political parties were regulated by the Law on Political Parties 
(13.07.1965 date 648 number) in accordance with 1961 Constitution. The constitution 
required political parties to function within undefined democratic principles. However, 
it has been observed during the law’s implementation that the equality principle, which 
formed the basis of democracy, was violated. Party members who had little or no 
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connection to party oligarchs were relegated to secondary importance. We do not 
believe that new regulations are specifically designed to hinder oligarchic tendencies. 
Our intention is only to remind party leaders of democratic realities, those political 
leaders who are establishing oligarchic structures in their political parties, such 
structures are thoroughly incompatible with democracy. We are attempting to enact 
stronger legislation which incorporates offensive sanctions more effectively than 
previous incarnations. However, the actual realisation of these desired objectives is 
highly dependent on the attitude of the individuals who are charged with implementing 
the law. If party leaders become more respectful towards members of their party, then 
our aims of facilitating democratic values are accomplished; otherwise, stronger 
solutions will be sought.160  
 It is sufficient to say that the genuine purpose of the current TPPL is, like that of the 
previous one, to regulate the Turkish parties in an internally democratic manner. IPD is also 
legally mandated by Article 4/2 of the TPPL. Article 4 reads as follows: “Establishment of 
political parties, the elections of party organs, functions, activities and decisions shall not be 
contrary to the principles of democracy with the qualifications specified in the Constitution.” 
In the preamble to Article 4, it was stated that the aim is to prevent oligarchical tendencies 
within the political parties.161 Article 93 of the TPPL is also very interesting with regards to 
IPD. The heading of the article is “The obligation of the democracy principle of internal 
working of parties.” The article reads as follows: 
The activities of political parties, party administration, auditing of the party, elections 
for party organs and decisions and the actions taken by the head of the party, the party 
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headquarters bodies and party groups shall not be contrary to party statute, the principles 
of democracy or the principle of equality between the members of the party. 
 These two articles are similar. In Article 93, the principle of equality is added, and in 
Article 4, the definition of democracy is limited to that provided in the Constitution. While the 
first form of the TPPL was designed to secure IPD with some safeguards, such as compulsory 
primaries and limited consecutive party leadership, these measures were amended 
subsequently, resulting in a more structure more favourable to oligarchy.  
Nevertheless, though the TPPL in principle requires political parties to be democratic, it 
actually leaves the mandate of interpreting democratic values to the political parties themselves. 
The terms of the law are vague and generally open to interpretation, making it difficult to 
enforce and regulate legally. Writing about the TPPL, Kınıklıoğlu states that “although it tries 
to promote internal democracy within political parties, its implementation actually served the 
exact opposite purpose”; for him, the main reason for this is that political parties are rarely held 
accountable for their breach of the TPPL.162 And it is certainly true that, based on some of its 
articles, the TPPL plays a prominent role in protecting the vested interests of the party elites 
and oligarchs rather than serving all of the party members. 
The TPPL also imposes other requirements on political parties and their members, such 
as registration, being a Turkish citizen or such public funding requirements as receiving at least 
seven per cent of the votes in the most recent general elections. Similar to the majority of party 
laws in other countries, the TPPL requires the registration of political parties with the Ministry 
of Interior. There is also a need when registering a political party for a minimum of at least 30 
signatures of founding members; this seems a reasonable number, but less reasonable is the 
requirement that the centre of a party must be in the capital city. Further, while the minimum 
membership threshold for the registration of new parties is low, the threshold minimum required 
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for running in the elections and receiving public funds is extremely high. The TPPL also 
requires that certain positions at the party level be only be decided through regular internal party 
elections held at party conventions or congresses. The national party congress is the supreme 
decision-making body of a political party organisation.163 
 
Conclusion 
 After this brief examination of the Turkish Constitution and the TPPL, it can be 
concluded that public law plays a very important role in defining the policies and characteristics 
of Turkish political parties. However, since it was introduced in 1983, the TPPL has never come 
close to fulﬁlling its constitutional goal of enacting fair IPD. One of the core problems with the 
TPPL is that, while political parties openly criticize it in strong words, they only do so when 
they are in opposition; parties in government seem to be complacent about current TPPL 
policies. I believe that a new level of regulation and legislation is required for improving IPD. 
The core focus of this research is concerned with three fundamental points of IPD, and 
in the following chapters we take a detailed look at the Turkish Party Law and focus on possible 
ways to improve IPD, considering such important topics as the importance of competent policy-
making, leadership selection and candidate selection policies and identifying other weak aspects 
of the legislation that require supplement or further strengthening in regard of IPD. 
In later chapters, the focus goes beyond formal mechanisms, and the actual situation 
inside political parties is examined. More participatory parties and systems in mature 
democracies will also be examined as other visions of participatory democracy. 
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Part 3: Funding of Political Parties and Intra-Party Democracy 
Introduction 
 No assessment of Turkish political parties is complete without conclusive analysis of 
the funding behind them. Funding of political parties represents an important factor in party 
regulation. According to Poguntke, “The most important aspect of the party law has been the 
regulation of public subsidies for political parties; ever since, it has also been the most 
problematic.”164 He also claims that public subsidies “are likely to strengthen the central office 
and the party in public office, but may further weaken the party on the ground.”165 
Funding is a crucial requirement for political parties, as parties require money to carry 
out their ordinary functions in name of democracy. Richard Katz has stated that “Because 
political parties gradually came to be seen as a sine qua non of a modern democracy, the state 
would assume a legitimate role in supporting the provision of parties as an essential public good 
by directly furnishing them with financial support.”166 On the other hand, this money and those 
who donate it are widely seen as problematic, even as a threat to democracy.167 According to 
Elise Massicard and Nicole Watts, “Money is another, invisible, illegitimate, and informal 
dimension of party politics, playing a key role in creating dependence on particular individuals 
within the party and therefore in shaping power relations.”168 Therefore, regulations and IPD 
are fundamental from the perspective of party finance. This is why Van Biezen claims that party 
financing paved the way for the legitimation of direct state involvement in the internal and 
external affairs of political parties.169  
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 Traditionally, political parties have depended on private contributions to finance their 
activities. However, in the post-war period, party funding has increased dramatically across the 
democracies of Western Europe.170 The reason behind the increase is that political parties seek 
state funds to finance their own activities whenever they run low on private contributions. This 
is a desirable situation for party leaders, since state funds allow greater manoeuvrability in 
political issues in comparison to privately collected funds. For instance, Bartolini and Mair 
assert that “the shift of parties from society to the state can also be interpreted as a strategy of 
survival.”171  
 Van Biezen offers three reasons as to why the state allows political parties to utilise 
public funds. First, political activities have become far too expensive to sustain through private 
contributions alone. Second, public funding ensures healthy electoral competition because most 
small parties receive very little private funding, and a well-funded campaign is a pre-requisite 
to winning elections. Third, private contributions to political parties are often associated with 
corruption, so allocation of state funds gives the state greater influence over the budgets of 
political parties while limiting corruption that could distort the principles of fair democracy.172 
 It is widely acknowledged that the governing parties in developing countries often 
withhold state funds from small, new or opposition parties in an effort to preserve the status 
quo. It is important to consider that the populace of developing countries often distrusts political 
parties, and this biased approach may help to preserve their popularity in the short term, but 
may also erode their legitimacy in long term.173  
 Furthermore, allocation of state funds to political parties increases the gap between party 
members and party elites. According to Mair, “as the party leaderships increasingly turn 
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towards the state for their resources, the relevance of linkage which are based on trust, 
accountability and above all, representation, tends to become eroded, both inside and outside 
the parties.”174 He also argues that 
Indeed, this increased dependence of parties on the state can also be interpreted as the 
increased dependence of parties on themselves, since it is the parties themselves which, 
to all intents and purposes, are the state, or, at least, are those who devise the rules and 
regulations promulgated by the state, and who inevitably privilege their own position.175 
 
Turkey and state funding of political parties 
 The principle of state funding was introduced in Article 74 of the first Political Parties 
Law in 1965. The article stated that a party which secured more than five per cent of the vote 
in general elections was entitled to receive state funding. This law was later annulled by the 
Turkish Constitution Court in 1969 because of concerns from smaller opposition parties. The 
reason provided for the annulment was that, while allocation of state funds to political parties 
was constitutional, all parties should be entitled to state funds without any electoral 
requirements. The Court also declared that state funds allowed ruling parties to modify the 
political system to their advantage owing to the fact that ruling party could pass any law easily 
in Parliament. 
 In 1970, the Turkish parliament passed another similar law. The new law maintained 
the former requirement of five per cent of the popular vote in the most recent elections to be 
eligible for state funding. Furthermore, this new legislation provided for proportionality in 
funding allocation, unlike the former incarnation. However, in an unprecedented turn of events, 
the Court once again annulled the law, on the grounds that allocation of state funds was 
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unconstitutional and that political parties should depend only on private contributions (such as 
membership fees) to sustain their campaigns and activities. Furthermore, political parties were 
held not to be public interest associations; thus permitting them state funds could not be 
considered as public expenditure for which taxes can be raised. 176  In 1974, the Turkish 
Parliament passed a bill that amended the Constitution by inserting a clause that made it legal 
for political parties to receive state funds, and an identical clause was added to the Turkish Party 
Law, solving the issue entirely. 177 
 Both the original TPPL of 1983 and the Constitution of 1982 had lacked provisions for 
public funding, but it was made possible when the Parliament passed an amendment bill in 1984 
for the TPPL and constitutional amendment bill in 1995. The constitution amendment of 1995, 
more specifically Article 68, states that “the State shall grant political parties sufficient and 
equitable funding.” Furthermore, the law bestowed authority on the TPPL to regulate the 
allocation of public funds to political parties.  
 Article 69 of the Constitution explicitly bans the involvement of political parties in any 
commercial activity. The article requires the income and expenditure of political parties to be 
consistent with their objectives. To ensure compliance with this article, regular audits of 
political parties’ fundraising, revenue and expenditure are held and passed through the Court of 
Accounts and the Constitution Court, which ascertain whether a party is functioning according 
to law; in cases of where violations are found, sanctions are prescribed by the law. The 
judgments rendered by the Constitution Court regarding the audits are final. Moreover, political 
parties that accept contributions from foreign states, international institutions and persons or 
corporate bodies of non-Turkish nationality are subject to being dissolved permanently. 
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 The TPPL states that political parties represented in the Parliament are to receive state 
funds in proportion to the number of seats they hold. Political parties that obtain at least seven 
per cent of the votes cast in the preceding election but that are not represented in Parliament 
because of the ten per cent threshold are also entitled to these funds. Political parties below the 
threshold are not eligible to receive any public funds. According to Cem Toker, this kind of 
state funding clearly violates the “fair elections” clause of the Constitution, and creates a lop-
sided situation in which state funds play a decisive role in the outcome of elections.178 
 The overall amount of funding allocated to political parties is equivalent to 0.04 per cent 
of “B” section of the state budget, which is essentially the total income of Turkey in a given 
year. According to the law, the allocation percentage is subject to being doubled in years when 
local elections are held and tripled in years when general elections are held. 
 Today, Turkish political parties rarely make the effort to collect membership fees from 
their members; instead they are dependent on state funding to sustain the cost of their activities. 
As very few memberships are paid for, they do not constitute a significant portion of party 
income.179 If there are no membership fees, then intra-party business does not represent a major 
concern to party members, as they consider themselves mere supporters, which makes it 
substantially more difficult for their parties to represent them on IPD. William Hale and Ergun 
Özbudun argue that “Party membership in Turkey entails certain rights, but almost no 
obligations to the party, including paying membership dues. Thus, in all Turkish parties, only 
a very small portion of party income comes from membership dues.”180 
 Though the TPPL does not entertain full state funding of political parties, anyone who 
observes the income of political parties will certainly notice that state funding amounts to a 
                                                 
178 Toker (n 154) 28. 
179 Ergun Özbudun ‘The Institutional Decline of Parties in Turkey’ in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds), 
Political Parties and Democracy (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) 245. 
180 William Hale and Ergun Özbudun Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP 
(Routledge, 2009) 47.  
156 
 
significant portion. The lack of revenue from membership fees and over-reliance on state 
funding plays a key role in diminishing intra-party relations that ultimately hampers IPD. 
Turkish party leaders, especially leaders of parties that are entitled to considerable public funds 
to be used for election purposes, operate free from the members’ control and as if they have no 
particular obligation to the party members.  
 The current regulatory procedures concerning the allocation of state funding are actually 
designed to protect large and established political parties. Parties that hold government offices 
legislate the regulation procedures to meet their own interests and to deter smaller parties from 
receiving significant state funding. It can be concluded that the current state funding laws 
effectively bar new or small parties from entering the electoral competition. Thus new parties 
are incapable of securing the seven per cent popular vote to receive state funding, since they 
need the state funding to secure the required popular vote in the first place. Although public 
funding has not affected the number of parties on the ballot, its availability increases the success 
of parties.  
 Thus, the lack of financial contributions from ordinary members weakens their 
influence. According to İlter Turan 
Ostensibly serving to prevent the domination of political parties by private interests, 
these grants [of state funding] render parties less dependent on fundraising from 
supporters, free the national leadership from relying on local party organizations for 
financial assistance, and also make the latter dependent upon national organs as a source 
of funds.181 
 Similarly, Gençkaya argues that “unequal and unfair public funding system...naturally 
and/or intentionally support[s] the bigger and more central parties vis a vis small parties and 
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independent candidates.”182 He further argues that “the state aid to political parties increases 
the leadership domination and cartelization in the party system. This leads to a less competitive, 
less pluralist and less representative party system.”183 According to Aengus Collins  
Parties that have had recent electoral success are rewarded with funding that makes it 
easier for them to sustain their success in the future. Conversely, parties that fall below 
the 7 per cent threshold—new parties, too—are set at a financial disadvantage that 
makes it relatively harder for them to cross either the funding or parliamentary 
thresholds in subsequent elections.184 
 Furthermore, control over state resources often leads to the overgrowth of political 
power by clienteles and a tendency towards patronage. According to İlter Turan, “the new 
parties do not possess as extensive a body of sympathizers as the old parties. Hence, their 
reliance on the distribution of patronage is greater than the old, established parties in achieving 
internal cohesion to ensuring further growth.” 185  In Turkey, contractors with which the 
government does business are a significant source of income for ruling parties. However, 
mature democracies are very strict on party finance issues. For instance, the UK Electoral 
Commission, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 states that: 
A person authorised in writing by the Commission may, for the purposes of the carrying 
out by the Commission of their functions, enter at any reasonable time premises 
occupied by a supervised organisation or individual and having entered any such 
premises may- (a) inspect any books, documents or other records relating to the income 
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and expenditure of the organisation or individual, and (b) make copies of, or records of 
any information contained in, any such books, documents or other records. 
 According to Keith Ewing, the police lack such strong authority even for murder 
investigations. Only the most robust independent bodies can exercise these powers while taking 
caution against their abuse.186 
 Political corruption is one of Turkey’s most insistent and seemingly entrenched 
problems. Similar to other developing countries, one of the main explanations of distrust 
towards political parties is the frequent misuse of public resources by power-seeking party elites 
who are fuelled by goals of personal enrichment and an ideology of establishing themselves 
among the privileged class in society. As Jean Blondel defined, shady dealings and corrupt 
practices are common in Turkey; parties can extract advantages from the state as “jobs for the 
boys” or contracts for businessmen willing (and obliged) to give funds to parties.187 Therefore, 
state funding has become sort of a remedy against political corruption in Turkish politics. 
 
Alternative methods 
 It can be concluded that the current political funding system renders IPD unviable. 
According to Yanık, some sort of state funding to political parties is a prerequisite for realisation 
of IPD because parties which depend on private contribution and membership fees cannot 
afford the procedures required for IPD elections.188 He argues that, if parties do not receive 
funding from the state, they will look towards other, more questionable sources of funding, but 
that this issue can be solved through effective legislation. The choice of the appropriate party-
funding regime is a technical matter that can be decided only after giving participatory rights 
                                                 
186 Keith D. Ewing, The Cost of Democracy (Hart Publishing 2007). 
187 Jean Blondel ‘Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe’ in (eds) Richard Gunther, 
José Ramón Montero and Juan J. Linz Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges (Oxford Scholarship 
Online 2002) 235. 
188 Murat Yanık, Parti İçi Demokrasi, (Beta Yayınları, 2002) 110-111. 
159 
 
to party members on decision-making processes. Furthermore, introducing limits on state 
funding may encourage parties to collect membership fees from party members, ultimately 
leading the members to demand decentralization of power away from party elites.  
 A possible alternative is to legislate a proportional method for funding political parties. 
The new legislation would provide incentives for encouraging membership participation by 
providing state funding for half the expenditure on internal ballots. 
 The funding of European Union parties is an interesting example. According to EU 
rules, “each party must fund at least 25 per cent of its annual budget from its own resources to 
avoid over reliance upon public finance. 15 per cent of the annual amount is to be distributed 
in equal shares among the parties that satisfy the conditions and make a request. The remaining 
85 per cent is to be distributed in proportion to the number of members elected to the European 
Parliament.”189 Furthermore the 25 per cent “own resources” rule was drafted to ensure that the 
political business of the parties would not be funded solely by the state.190 Although party 
members in Turkey do not pay membership fees, they finance their parties as taxpayers. Thus, 
if they are made aware that the party functions on their contributions, they might become more 
interested in participation in IPD. 
 Recently, some political parties elsewhere in the world have managed to secure 
significant funding through private contributions. In October 2011, nearly 2.8 million French 
citizens elected the French Socialist Party’s presidential candidate by voting for the nominees 
and paying €1 or more for their vote, securing a considerable amount of contributions to be 
used in the party campaign.191 Similarly, during the 2015 UK election season, the Labour Party 
invited its registered supporters to take part in the nomination of the party’s candidate. 
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Registered supports of the labour party paid a fee of £3 to be eligible to vote in the candidate 
selection procedure.192 So also the Italian Union Party charged its supporters €1 to vote in its 
2005 leadership selection. These contributions may appear to be insignificant at an individual 
level, but when millions of them quickly add up to a significant amount.193 
Conclusion 
 This thesis argues that all members of political parties should be entitled to vote in intra-
party voting, while also being subject to paying membership fees. Clear rules and punishments 
should be incorporated in the TPPL to ban the payment of membership fees on behalf of others 
who would otherwise be unwilling to pay for their own subscriptions. This issue can be solved 
by forming an independent body dedicated to collecting membership fees from party members 
and then transferring those funds directly to the party’s finance committee. 
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THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
Introduction 
 One of the key functions of political parties is to develop policy proposals through their 
internal processes. That is why Maurice Duverger defined political parties as vast popular 
organisations that help to shape public opinion in modern democracies.1 In democratic political 
parties, it is expected that party members will have a say in the formulation and approval of 
party policies. The extent to which the membership decides these policies in a given party is 
therefore an indication of the extent to which the party is administrated democratically. While 
it may be argued that modern political parties worldwide have traditionally been reluctant to 
give any real power to their members in the policy-making (PM) process, it has been seen in 
earlier chapters that more recently parties around the world, but especially those in established 
democracies, have been expanding opportunities for their members to have a say in policy 
formulation. For instance, the “Your Britain” campaign launched by the UK Labour Party, and 
the “Have Your Say” campaign launched by the Liberal Party of Canada have called on their 
party members to contribute to PM either directly or indirectly. This kind of participatory 
democracy seems to be a response to the perception that political parties are governed by a 
narrow class of party elites. Moreover, there is a common belief that greater participation means 
more democracy, which in turn bolsters the legitimacy of political parties. At the same time, 
democracy-promoting organisations such as the National Democratic Institute have put forward 
the idea that participatory decision-making procedures are a crucial feature of political parties 
in new democracies.2 
                                                 
1 Maurice Duverger Political Parties (Methuen & Co. 1961) 13.  
2 Susan Scarrow ‘Internal Democracy: Important for Whom?’ (22nd ECPR Standing Group Summer School 
“Political Parties in Modern Democracies” Brussels 10 – 21 September 2012). 
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 The purpose of this chapter is to explore a set of interconnected issues regarding the 
proper roles and mechanisms for the participation of members in PM within political parties, 
and more specifically the efficacy of the Turkish Political Parties Law (TPPL) as currently 
formulated in promoting this kind of participation.  
 I will be arguing that all party members must be granted the opportunity to play a 
significant role in the PM process if IPD is to be a meaningful concept, and that the law should 
ensure that appropriate and workable procedures are enacted by the parties in order to protect 
this fundamental right of party members to have a say in party policy.  
 
Part 1 
Definition of the policy-making process 
 For Michael Hill, PM consists of three elements: a party’s political commitments or 
programmes, its bargaining with pressure groups and the activity of civil servants in providing 
data, drafting legislation and/or interfacing among members of the party in power within and 
outside the government. He emphasises that these elements intermingle in varying 
combinations at various stages of the process.3 Building on Hill’s insights, this study will be 
using the term “policy-making” to denote, first, the setting of a party programme, second, the 
drafting of election manifestos for the government and third, communication or consultation 
with party members through alternative methods regarding important issues that are not 
addressed in party programmes or in election manifestos.  
 The importance of these latter documents from the perspective of IPD has received 
significant attention from various organisations and scholars. For instance, the APSA report 
cited in earlier chapters states that “Those who suggest that elections should deal with 
personalities but not with programmes suggest at the same time that party membership should 
                                                 
3 Michael Hill The Policy Process in the Modern State (3rd edn Pearson 1997), Chapter 5. 
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mean nothing at all.”4 Similarly, Hans-Dieter Klingemann is just one of the scholars who 
locates the heart of the representative democracy in what parties say (promise) and what 
governments do (performance).5  
 In theory, it is to expected that political parties will make clear their policies to their 
electorates, by means of party programmes and election manifestos that are produced internally, 
and will implement these policies, should they come to power, and thereby satisfy the 
expectations of individuals, families, firms, associations, movements and any other 
constituencies.6 Through programmes and election manifestos, parties articulate stances on a 
range of domestic, foreign, economic, social and judicial issues for which the fundamental 
positions of the party are known. By capitalizing on the legitimacy of elections, the political 
parties expect to convert their party programmes and election manifestos into state policies 
through legislation.  
 Party programmes and election manifestos are also significant as ways to explore 
different policy alternatives that may be presented to voters by the various parties and may be 
greeted by the voters with greater or lesser enthusiasm. As the APSA report puts it, “The proper 
function of the parties is to develop and define policy alternatives on matters likely to be of 
interest to the whole country, on issues related to the responsibility of the parties for the conduct 
of either the government or the opposition.”7 
 Party programmes and election manifestos provide what is from the perspective of the 
electorate an “external responsibility,” and from the perspective of party members an “internal 
responsibility”. Through these accountability mechanisms, ordinary party members should in 
                                                 
4 APSA ‘Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties’ [1950] 
44 American Political Science Review 3. 
5 Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard I. Hofferbert, Ian Budge, Hans Keman, Torbjörn Bergman, Francois Petry, 
and Kaare Strom. Parties, Policies, and Democracy (Westview Press 1994) 1. 
6 Philippe C. Schmitter ‘Parties are not what they once were,’ in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds) 
Political Parties and Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press 2001) 73. 
7 APSA (n 4) 20. 
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theory be empowered to hold a party to its programme and election manifesto. Thus, in the 
words of Danny Nicol, “Through mechanisms of accountability, the party grass roots and 
parliamentarians would keep the government to the party programme; the electorate would 
verify whether the party programme remained acceptable to them.” 8  A participatory PM 
process, in other words, makes parties more likely to try to keep their promises. In countries 
like Turkey, however, where a party programme is adopted by delegates in the party congress, 
these delegates alone have the power to assess their own fidelity to the party program. Turning 
again to the APSA report, “Widespread political participation fosters responsibility as well as 
democratic control in the conduct of party affairs and the pursuit of party policies. A more 
responsible party system is intimately linked with the general level as well as the forms of 
political participation.”9 
 Party programmes and election manifestos are also important in terms of the loyalty of 
MPs to the party leaders in a parliament. Although MPs are in practice loyal to party leaders 
rather than to party policies, the boundaries of loyalty remain circumscribed by the party 
policies that were adopted in party programmes and election manifestos that were produced by 
authorised party organs. 
 It is worth noting that party programmes and election manifestos cannot cover those 
issues that arise incidentally on a day-to-day basis, for which the importance of a parliamentary 
party and party leadership cannot be underestimated, since, in politics, matters are subject to 
quick and constant change and a party may need to take a position without consulting its 
members. My argument here is that the parties’ main policies on education, health, security and 
justice and so on need to be spelled out in the party programme and approved by all party 
members if these policies are to be enforceable. Routine business, of course, which can be both 
time-consuming and risky to disclose to ordinary party members, remains the province of the 
                                                 
8 Danny Nicol ‘Professor Tomkins' House of Mavericks’ [2006] Public Law 467, 475. 
9 APSA (n 4) 9. 
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leadership and the parliamentary party. Anika Gauja well assesses these competing pressures: 
“Difficulties include the primacy of the parliamentary party in everyday political decision 
making, and the importance of leadership and strong personalities, which sit uneasily with the 
formal democratic power accorded to the membership.”10 
 While a full accounting of PM would take into consideration setting the agenda, 
formulation and implementation, I will restrict my analysis here to the first two of these stages, 
since implementation has much more to do with the selection of leaders and candidates than it 
does with the actual policies themselves.11 Party members can, at least in theory, control the 
implementation of the approved policies by contesting the leadership, or through candidate 
selection before general elections. 
 
Intra-party democracy and policy-making 
 The participation of members in a party’s PM process is, then, one of three defining 
features of IPD, along with the selection of leaders and of candidates. Thus, for Scarrow, “One 
of the ways to assess the degree of internal democracy in a party is to ask who helps determine 
the content of the party’s electoral promises.”12 In this respect, a political party gains legitimacy 
when it ensures that ordinary party members will be able to voice their opinions about and 
inevitably to decide the fate of the party’s policies, a point that has been made by Fritz Scharpf.13 
Otherwise, as V.O. Key puts it, “Unless mass views have some place in the shaping of policy, 
all the talk about democracy is nonsense.”14 So also Karl Loxbo argues that, while IPD depends 
to some degree on the inclusion of party members in candidate and leadership selection, genuine 
                                                 
10 Anika Gauja ‘The Pitfalls of Participatory Democracy: A Study of the Australian Democrats’ GST’ [2005] 40 
Australian Journal of Political Science 71, 71. 
11 E. James Anderson Cases in Public Policy-Making (Praeger 1974); O. Charles Jones An Introduction to the 
Study of Public Policy (Wadsworth 1970). 
12 Susan Scarrow, ‘Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives, Implementing 
Intra-Party Democracy (NDI 2005) 
< www.ndi.org/files/1951_polpart_scarrow_110105.pdf > accessed 19 November 2012 10. 
13 Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? (Oxford University Press 1999). 
14 V. O. Key The Responsible Electorate (1966 Vintage). 
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empowerment of members from an IPD perspective means giving them the rights to supervise 
and even exercise control in formulating policies.15 Nicol concurs: “with policy initiatives 
filtering from rank and file upwards rather than from top downwards, such parties would 
encapsulate virtues of democracy, solidarity, mass participation and idealism, since policy 
would be made by ‘the many’ at the base of the party and implemented by ‘the few’ at the 
top.”16 International organisations such as the National Democratic Institute have come to the 
same conclusion: “Participatory and inclusive policy development processes have direct, long-
term benefits to political parties and to systems of government. These include more sustainable 
policies and stronger, more competitive political organizations.”17 
 The reason that many scholarly discussions of IPD have directed less attention to PM 
than to leadership and candidate selection is in part attributable to the sheer difficulty of 
democratising the PM process. Thus, in reference to the work of Michels and McKenzie, Anika 
Gauja claims that “the theory behind party government and policy linkage is not so 
straightforward when put into practice and numerous authors have argued that ‘democratic’ 
policy-making, based on the principles of participation and representation, is impossible to 
achieve in reality.”18 Likewise, Katz and Mair argue that, in contemporary party organisations, 
the party in public office and the party in the central office assume a greater role in the PM 
process at the expense of the party on the ground.19 The party on the ground, conversely, 
determines who will become the party leader and MPs through internal selection procedures, 
which, according to some scholars, in particular those who advocate a stratified party 
                                                 
15 Karl Loxbo ‘The Fate of Intra-Party Democracy: Leadership Autonomy and Activist Influence in the Mass 
Party and the Cartel Party’ [2011] 19 Party Politics 1, 3. 
16 Nicol (n 8) 470. 
17 National Democratic Institute ‘Political Parties, Public Policy and Participatory Democracy’ (NDI 2011) 7.  
18 Anika Gauja The Politics of Party Policy: From Members to Legislators (Palgrave McMillan 2013) 2. 
19 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair ‘The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party organizational Change in 
Twentieth-Century Democracies’ in R. Gunther, J. R. Montero and J. Linz (eds), Political Parties: Old Concepts 
and New Challenges (Oxford University Press 2002) 122.  
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organisation, is the most effective way for ordinary members to control the policy direction of 
their party.20  
 As has just been seen in the case of the argumentation of scholars like Scarrow and Key, 
however, this view is not universal. Pettit, for instance, citing surveys of party members in 
Canada, Denmark and Norway, argues to the contrary that selecting party leaders and 
determining candidates for general elections are ineffective means of influencing party policy, 
since party members also want to have a direct say in the shaping of party policies.21  
Returning to the party responsibility theory, active participation of party members in 
PM encourages them to monitor the implementation process to and defend their party’s policies. 
In the words of José María Maravall, “Weak internal voice means little monitoring, a poor 
system of early warning, and growing policy inertias.”22 Engaging party members in the PM 
process allows parties to respond to their expectations and, in the meantime, helps them to 
design better policies and to improve the implementation of these policies. Parties have a 
responsibility not only to their electorates for their policies, but also to their members. If 
involvement in the PM process is granted to party members, they will become more cautious 
about controlling the party because they will have incurred responsibility to implement the 
policies. In addition to this, party leaders will be forced to be responsive to the party members 
as well as to the voters.  
                                                 
20 R. Kenneth Carty and William Cross ‘Can Stratarchically Organized Parties be Democratic? The Canadian 
Case’ [2006] 16 Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 93, 98; Robin T. Pettitt ‘Exploring Variations 
in Intra-party Democracy: A Comparative Study of the British Labour Party and the Danish Centre-Left’ [2012] 
14 BJPIR 630, 631, referring to Austion Ranney, ‘Candidate selection’, in D. Butler, H. R. Penniman and A. 
Ranney (eds), Democracy at the Polls (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute 1981), 75–106; cf. Hazan, 
R. Y. and Rahat, G. Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences 
(Oxford University Press 2010). 
21 Robin T. Pettitt ‘Exploring Variations in Intra-party Democracy: A Comparative Study of the British Labour 
Party and the Danish Centre-Left’ [2012] 14 BJPIR 630-632. 
22 José María Maravall ‘The Political Consequences of Internal Party Democracy’ in José María Maravall and 
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (eds) Controlling Governments: Voters, Institutions, and Accountability (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 157, 184. 
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 Other countervailing arguments against inclusivity in PM have approached the subject 
from the standpoint of efficiency. According to Seisselberg, “extensive participation of 
members in formulation of policies tends to be counter-productive, as it reduces the efficiency 
and flexibility of a party’s organization.”23 Similarly, Engellman holds that “political parties 
demand in their operations secrecy, flexibility, and unity, none of which permits the kind of 
open policy-making in which lay members can freely participate,”24 and again Maria Maravall 
argues that “an oligarchic and disciplined (party), can increase the political capacity of its 
government; a democratic party, with internal debates and disputes over policy, can limit this 
capacity.”25 Indeed, some scholars question the idea of even allowing party members to attend 
party meetings, let alone take part in an open PM process, since they do not have sufficient 
responsibility for the consequences of the decisions taken. These ideas reflect more or less the 
Schumpeterian understanding that puts elections at the heart of democracy, which is reduced to 
a leadership competition in national elections, since voters “must understand that, once they 
have elected an individual, political action is his business, not theirs. This means that they must 
refrain from instructing him what he is to do.”26 
 Such advocates of stratarchical party organisation defend IPD from this perspective. 
Stratarchical parties are organized according to the principle of a division of labour, “in which 
different and mutually autonomous levels coexist with one another, and in which there is a 
minimum of authoritative control, whether from the bottom–up or from the top–down.”27 Thus, 
in the context of Canadian parties, Carty and Cross argue that party policies are in reality 
decided by the party that is in public office, while the party on the ground can try to use its 
                                                 
23 Jörg Seisselberg ‘Conditions of success and political problems of a ‘media‐mediated personality‐party’: The 
case of Forza Italia’ [1996] 19 West European Politics 715, 718.  
24 Frederick C. Engelmann ‘Membership Participation in Policy-Making in the C.C.F.’ [1956] The Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science 161, 161. 
25 Maravall (n 22) 162. 
26 Joseph A Schumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper and Row 1942), 
27 Katz and Mair (n 19) 129. 
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control over personnel to shape policies indirectly. For them, party members demonstrate their 
policy preferences by nominating a parliamentary candidate or selecting a party leader 
indirectly.28 
 While acknowledging the significance of the party leader and parliamentary party in the 
PM process, I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter that the PM process in 
Turkey is in particular bedevilled by the manner in which almost every party policy is 
developed and implemented by small party elites, or even by the party leader alone. Despite the 
professed desire of Turkish party leaders to attract more members, they remain wary of giving 
their members any influence over the PM process beyond the indirect means of candidate and 
leadership selection.  
 I will therefore proceed to describe the PM process from a theoretical point of view, and 
then to analyse the provisions of the Turkish Political Parties Law (TPPL) as they relate to the 
subject from an IPD point of view and actual practice. My perspective here is institutional, the 
main question being whether the party congress, which is envisioned in the TPPL as a PM body, 
is an adequate institution for the desired level of IPD, or should instead be replaced with 
legislation that does more to encourage participation. Two possible models for supplementing 
or replacing the TPPL are ready to hand. The first is the party policy forum – which as 
mentioned already plays a significant role in overall PM in major British Parties such as the 
Labour Party, Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party – and represents a pre-existing 
participatory and deliberative PM body. I will then consider the direct democracy model, in 
which party members exert power only by approving or rejecting by internal ballot those 
policies that are put before them. The aim of these comparisons is to explore how the TPPL 
might be reformed in order to increase ordinary party members’ participation in drafting party 
policies.  
                                                 
28 Carty and Cross (n 20) 100. 
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 As most scholars and politicians are aware, PM is more than a matter of political parties, 
involving as well parliaments, bureaucracies, universities, civil organisations and unions. 
Nevertheless, by privileging the perspective of party membership, focus can be maintained on 
legislative means to empower ordinary party members, and due consideration can best be given 
to the particular political culture of Turkey. For, as Canan Akman observes, “Today in Turkey, 
political parties remain the major channel to integrate citizens into a political system that is 
given to notorious feebleness of civil society, and is characterised by a very low degrees of 
association membership among citizens.”29 An interview conducted by Semanur Karaman with 
some members of civil society organisations in Turkey sheds much light on this issue; one 
interviewee claimed that, “There are no egalitarian criteria which determine who will be 
consulted, when and how. The government gathers a group of government friendly CSOs (Civil 
Society Organisations) and consults them on a recent draft law. Since such CSOs don’t oppose 
any government action, the draft law passes as if there was a public consensus to begin with,” 
while another stated that, “Since they [the government] are not legally bound to ask our opinion, 
some Ministries invite us for public consultation, whereas others don’t bother at all. There are 
no common standards at all.”30 These findings are consistent with the claim by Gülgün Erdoğan 
Tosun that 
Civil society institutions in Turkey have been forced to cooperate with the state as a 
result of the centralized funding that has transformed them into rent-seeking 
organizations. While these civil society organizations have defended democratization in 
general, they themselves have not succeeded in getting democratic values put into 
                                                 
29 Canan Aslan-Akman ‘Democratic Consolidation and Institutional Challenges for Political Parties and the 
Party System in Turkey’ in Müge Aknur (ed), Democratic Consolidation in Turkey (Universal Publishers 2012) 
143,173. 
30 Semanur Karaman ‘How do Turkish citizens participate in decision-making?’ < www.opendemocracy.net/can-




practice. The lack of trust of Turkish society in their political institutions and politicians 
has also contributed to the weak structure of civil society in Turkey.31 
 It should further be noted that political participation in party affairs can be seen as a 
low-level problem to be solved by reform of party laws, while PM at the level of governing 
institutions is a matter for the national constitution and for extensive legislation that may 
involve reform of existing laws. Given that the ruling party has dominated the political arena 
for so long, other channels for political participation, such as CSOs and other pressure groups, 
are limited and constrained by the ruling elite. These pressure groups function almost as 
auxiliary wings of the ruling party, so that, according to Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “A relatively small 
minority of Turkish society appears to be committed to organising and mobilising, while the 
overwhelming majority fail to do so at all,”32 while according to Şaban Tanıyıcı “The dearth of 
civil societal organizations in Turkey has made parties more important to individuals.”33 
 
What is democratic policy making in the context of political parties? 
 The first issue regarding the democratic conduct of PM concerns who will be allowed 
participate in the process, whether the party elites alone, the delegates or all party members.34 
Scarrow, Webb and Farrell distinguish seven stages in the inclusiveness of the decision-making 
process. In the first, the leaders decide party policies themselves. Second, matters are decided 
by the legislative party at large, say the ministers and MPs, which is known as the party in 
public office, a situation that is more likely to result from, or in, a concentration of power at the 
top of a parliamentary party, since rank and file MPs will have less power than top party 
                                                 
31 Gülgün Erdoğan Tosun ‘Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey’ in Müge Aknur (ed) 
Democratic Consolidation in Turkey (Universal Publishers 2012) 179, 187. 
32 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu ‘State and Civil Society in Turkey: Democracy, Development and Protest’ in Amyn B. 
Sajoo (eds), Civil society in Muslim world: Contemporary perspective (Islamic Publication 2002) 268. 
33 Şaban Tanıyıcı ‘Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey Islamist Welfare Party’s Pro-EU Turn’ [2003] 9 
Party Politics 463, 469. 
34 Scarrow (n 12) 6. 
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officials. In the third stage, party executive organs, such as, in a Turkish context, the Central 
Decision-Making and Administrative Committee and Central Executive Committee, which is 
known as the party in the central office, make the decisions. The fourth stage involves sub-
national elites such as leaders of provincial or local party units, and the fifth the national party 
congress, which consists of delegates from various party levels. The sixth and the more 
inclusive stage gives a direct voting role to all party members, and the seventh and most 
inclusive allows the parties to offer a role to party voters and sympathisers. As discussed above, 
more inclusive PM is often seen to correlate with greater democracy within the party in 
general.35 Looked at schematically, in inclusive political parties, all members are entitled to 
participate in the articulation and selection of party policies through institutionalised forums of 
consultation and plebiscitary PM methods. In exclusive parties, by contrast, a single party leader 
determines party policies, as is now the case in Turkey. It is a leitmotif of the present study that, 
despite some negative aspects, in particular the difficulties involved in their implementation, 
more inclusive methods yield more democratic and beneficial outcomes to Turkish democracy 
in general.  
 
Inclusive          Exclusive 
 Voters - Members - Congress - Sub-National Elites – Executive Organ- Parliament- Leader  
         
 Legal Situation in Turkey 
Ideal situation       Actual Situation in Turkey 
 
 The second issue to be considered after inclusiveness concerns the procedures by which 
participation takes place, which has been a particular source of debate among advocates of 
                                                 
35 Benjamin von dem Berge, Thomas Poguntke, Peter Obert, Diana Tipei Measuring Intra-Party Democracy 
(Springer 2013) 11. 
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participation by ordinary party members in PM with regard to whether ordinary members will 
play role in every stage from proposal through approval, or will only have a yea-or-nay vote on 
previously-drafted policies. According to Gauja, participation by party members occurs in two 
arenas, “during the development process by drafting policy proposals in a local branch, or by 
being a member of, or consulting with, a working group; and second, by participating in (or 
being represented in) a vote to adopt, reject, or amend party policy.”36 A third issue with respect 
democratic PM concerns whether political parties will represent the views of their members, 
their voters or all citizens, which is an especially difficult question for governing parties. 
 
The deliberative model of policy-making 
 In the deliberative model of PM, political parties are expected to grant ordinary members 
an opportunity to share their opinions during the development of party policies. According to 
Ron Levy, while there is no standard model for ideal deliberation, deliberation should be widely 
inclusive of party members, and should take place on equal terms.37 Likewise, for John Gastil, 
“the more often a system deliberates, the more readily it can meet the criteria for the democratic 
process,”38 and Jo Saglie and Knut Heider concur that “the deliberative argument points to 
parties as arenas for formation of preferences through public discussion and debate. Particular 
interests may be reconciled with more general interests through intra-party deliberations.”39 
The deliberative model imagines party members who are actively involved in the PM 
process in working groups and policy commission, on either a local or a national level, since, 
as Jeroen Mimpen asserts, “democratic policy making involves a participative process of policy 
development in forums, debates, consultation meetings and other platforms, and decentralizes 
                                                 
36 Anika Gauja ‘Policy Development and Intra-Party Democracy’ in William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz (eds) 
The Challenges of Intra-party Democracy (Oxford University Press 2013) 118. 
37 Ron Levy ‘The Law of Deliberative Democracy: Seeding the Field’ [2013] 12 Election Law Journal 355, 358. 
38 John Gastil Political Communication and Deliberation (Sage 2008) 8. 
39 Jo Saglie and Knut Heider ‘Democracy within Norwegian Political Parties: Complacency or Pressure for 
Change’ [2004] 10 Party Politics 385, 386. 
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the mandate of decision-making to the rank and file of political parties.”40 So even though it is 
the most difficult model to implement, deliberation represents the most desirable PM method 
for advocates of IPD. Naturally, the success of this kind of PM is directly proportional to the 
size of a political party, since, as mentioned above, the deliberative model of democracy 
necessitates institutions such as forums for both discussion and decision-making.  
 Nevertheless, some scholars oppose deliberative PM, among them John Hibbing and 
Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, who argue that deliberative decision making “is ill-suited to many 
issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken 
place.”41 Similarly, the NDI argues that “Some policy issues move so quickly they do not allow 
for a deliberate consultation process to take place, so not every decision can be taken using 
broad consultation.”42 
 Hibbing and Morse also argue that “getting people to participate in discussions of 
political issues with people who do not have similar concerns is not a wise move,”43 and they 
raise an important issue, namely that formulating party policies usually demands technical 
knowledge, for which reason special committees need to be established and the PM activities 
of party members limited to those policy forums in which they are most interested and are best 
educated. 
 Deliberative democracy is also called “strong democracy” by some scholars, such as 
Benjamin Barber, who defines it as follows: 
It is literally self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the 
name of citizens. Active citizens govern themselves directly here, not necessarily at 
every level and in every instance, but frequently enough and in particular, when basic 
                                                 
40 Jeroen Mimpen ‘Intra-party Democracy and its Discontents:Democratization in a Volatile Political Landscape’ 
< www.nimd.org/conferencedocument/247 > accessed 27 June 2008. 
41 John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs About How Government 
Should Work. (Cambridge University Press 2002) 190-191. 
42 National Democratic Institute (n 17) 11. 
43 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (n 41) 190-191. 
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policies are being decided and when significant power is being deployed. Self-
government is carried on through institutions designed to facilitate ongoing civic 
participation in agenda setting, deliberation, legislation, and policy implementation (in 
the form of common work).44 
 Although Barber’s attention here is directed towards state level democracy, his remarks 
are also applicable to IPD in three important ways. The first concerns the level of participation: 
all party members in a strong democracy may participate in policy issues relating to the policy 
as a whole, while those relating to local issues can be decided in local policy forums by local 
party members. The second point to be taken from Barber is that the party members are not 
included in the PM process in day-to-day affairs, but do take part in such significant policy 
debates as those surrounding education, health, economy and security. Third, the establishment 
of institutions in order to facilitate participation of all party members in the PM process brings 
to mind national and local policy forums, policy commissions and so on, even if such issues 
remain within the purview of local officials.  
 My reading of the theories and of the evidence suggests that party laws can have some 
efficacy with regard to these three issues by leading to the formation of executive organs that 
can establish necessary institutions, consult party members throughout the PM process and 
establish effective criteria for gauging the level of consultation. One approach to bringing about 
these goals could be the formation of a compulsory policy forum and of policy commissions. 
Although these bodies could not necessarily be counted on to carry out the members’ wishes in 
preference to those of the leader, they cannot help but strengthen members’ positions with 
respect to those of the leaders in the context of a system like that in Turkey, where nearly every 
policy issue remains under the control of the leadership. 
 
                                                 




The direct democracy model of policy-making 
 A further consideration regarding internally democratic PM relates to direct democracy 
theory. As discussed, there is a trend in mature democracies to make their PM processes more 
open to ordinary members; thus, as Patrick Seyd observes, the “plebiscitarian party might be an 
increasingly common feature in modern democracies.”45 Although some scholars distinguish 
plebiscitary democracy from direct democracy, here these terms will both be taken to mean that 
significant decisions are made by the party members, in a manner like that of the Green Parties, 
who declare that “we will increase the use of referenda and plebiscites to strengthen direct 
democracy.”46 I will also use the terms “one member one vote” (OMOV) and “intra-party 
referenda” in the same context.  
 A direct democracy model, then, can be defined as a process that allows the party 
members to approve or reject a policy proposal (which may take the form of a party program 
or election manifesto) that is prepared by incumbent party organs. The most efficient form of 
this kind of PM is when alternative policies are presented to party members for approval 
piecemeal rather than as whole programmes or manifestos.  
 Again, it must be observed that some scholars defend the voting rights of party members 
but nevertheless reject the deliberative PM, on the grounds that it tends to generate protracted 
and fruitless discussion.47 Robert Goodin claims that “giving everyone a vote might be quicker 
than giving everyone a say, so long as you were prepared to cut off debate sharply and press 
the issue to a vote.”48  
 Currently, some parties use a kind of plebiscitary democracy in the PM process that 
limits expression of members’ opinions to a simple yea-or-nay vote on proposals drafted and 
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presented by party elites. This kind of participation has come to be known as elite-directed 
participation, “where the individual simply chooses between alternative political packages that 
are usually presented by political elites,” in the words of Thomas Poguntke.49 Dennis Kavanagh 
similarly defines this kind of procedure as “plebiscitary democracy in which democracy is 
combined with elitism.”50 
 The main drawback to this form of PM relates to setting the agenda. For when the 
political parties open the PM process to ordinary members only to the point of allowing a yea-
or-nay vote on previously drafted resolutions, the situation resembles that of a business contract 
in which the terms are decided upon by one party and the other party is simply asked to “take 
it or leave it.” This is especially the case where no alternative programme is offered, so that 
members are effectively blackmailed into approving a programme in order to avoid the creation 
of a gaping policy “hole” in the run-up to a general election. Realistic alternatives, however, 
are difficult to envision; members may be presented with a false choice between the programme 
favoured by the leader or a policy void that would represent electoral suicide. 
 The minimal level of participation required for effective PM in the context of IPD, then, 
would be to grant some power to all party members over the approval of these documents and 
over the initiation of the amendment procedure on these documents. Anstead, however, argues 
that “direct vot[ing] offer a very limited form of participation… [it] does not offer members the 
chance to enter into a discourse on policy, but instead offers binary options,”51 and it is certainly 
true that the level of participation that he describes does not bear directly on PM and could be 
considered as a procedural safeguard.  
                                                 
49 Thomas Poguntke ‘The Organization of Participatory Party: the German Greens’ [1987] 15 European Journal 
of Political Research 609. 
50 Dennis Kavanagh ‘Party Democracy and Political Marketing: No Place for Amateurs?’ (Conference on 
Political Communications in the Global World, at Mainz. 2003) 5. 
51 Nick Anstead ‘Internal party democracy in Europe and the United States: different models in a changing 
environment’ (1 - 3 April, 2008 58th Political Studies Association Annual Conference “Democracy, Governance 
and Conflict: Dilemmas of Theory and Practice”) 12. 
178 
 
 Actual arguments against plebiscitary democracy in the parties in this context are 
parallel to those proposed by the opponents of national referenda in which policies are usually 
proposed by the ruling parties and presented to the citizens either to adopt or to reject. Ideally, 
discussion should culminate in a vote, and these steps might be facilitated through such 
regulations as assigning limited speaking periods to individual members during policy 
deliberations. In my view, given current conditions in Turkey, the best system for PM would 
be a hybrid democracy that combines deliberative forums with approval of the party program 
by all party members. Such a system could be achieved through the implementation of expert 
commissions responsible for policy development and for drafting the party’s programme and 
election manifestos that must be presented to a vote of all party members for approval. Most of 
the countries in the world today practice some form of hybrid democracy along these lines, 
combining representative democracy through political parties with the popular democracy 
represented by referenda. At the very least, such a system makes sense for intra-party 
government.  
 The initiative process can also be brought within the purview of party law. Some parties 
also use the initiative process in the context of plebiscitary democracy, under which 
circumstances party members may introduce policy resolutions for approval by collecting a set 
number of signatures from fellow members. Thus, if an unexpected matter that is important for 
the country arises, party members can summon other party members to participate in internal 
ballots. As an example, among the Australian Democrats as described by Gauja, “ballots to 
adopt or change policy can be initiated in one of three ways: either by decision of the National 
Executive, one Division, or petition by five Branches or 50 members.”52 
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Issues to be considered in policy-making 
 A significant factor relating to PM is the number of party members involved. Saglie and 
Heidar assert that the quality of IPD may depend not only on the actual level of participation, 
but also on the number and nature of the opportunities that are provided for the members.53 As 
mentioned in previous chapters, direct and deliberative democracy methods are extremely 
difficult to implement, mostly owing to the size of parties and the ever-widening range of issues 
with which they must engage. The determination of party policies by the internal process of 
democratic discussion within the party organisation is important especially from the perspective 
of deliberative democracy.  
 Gauja argues that, given the difficulties inherent in direct participation in the PM 
process, its achievement depends primarily on party size, the smaller the better.54 Analysing the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of party membership, Elin Allern and Karina Pedersen 
suggest that declining membership may be a fertile ground for IPD, since smaller memberships 
can more easily find extensive and meaningful opportunities for participation in the decision-
making process. 55  Similarly, Giovanni Sartori claims that the quality of participation is 
inversely related to the number of participants.56 It is to be noted that the number of party 
members is especially significant for socialist and leftist parties, which generally seek to recruit 
large numbers of members. Saglie and Heidar, however, claim in a response to Michels that 
“we would expect lack of democracy to be more widespread in large parties, where the 
organization is complex and the distance between the individual member and the leadership is 
greater.”57 
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 Although Richard Katz argues that expanded membership may also come with some 
costs, as members can, for example, make policy demands on the party and constrain the 
leadership’s freedom to manoeuver,58 this is not the case in Turkey, since not all party members 
have an interest in or commitment to participation in the PM process. Even if parties open PM 
to ordinary members, relatively few are likely to participate, since most join a party primarily 
to receive incentives rather than out of any real desire to determine the party’s policies. 
Participation requires time, knowledge and energy, and these resources are not distributed 
equally among all the members; moreover, participation is bound to suffer if it is limited to 
dues-paying members. 
 According to statistics from 2011, Turkey has nearly 50 million voters, while those from 
2013 count 10 million party members. Such numbers all but preclude traditional forms of direct 
democracy, though modern communications technologies may eventually offer workable 
alternatives.  
 Conflict generated by power sharing is a significant issue both in PM and for the other 
components of IPD. Put simply, conflict comes about when some party members wish to have 
a say in the PM process, but the leaders of their party are opposed. As Paul Webb sees it, 
Thus, it is not hard to find examples of organizational changes which have served to 
empower members in recent years, but it is important to understand that such reforms 
have rarely enhanced membership power in the sphere of policy-making. Party leaders 
wish to reserve this domain to themselves as far as possible, in order to maximize their 
scope for strategic manoeuvre when playing the game of party competition.59 
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 Party leaders are faced with a dilemma in this context. On the one hand, it is important 
for them to meet the expectations of party members, especially if the members have a say in 
leadership selection. On the other hand, it is not easy to predict party members’ behaviour once 
they are granted a say in PM. One response to this problem would be for party leaders to grant 
different kinds of powers to individual members, such as involving them in candidate selection 
and leadership selection. 
 
Conclusions 
 The issues and arguments discussed in this chapter suggest that, despite logistical and 
other challenges, one of the most significant means of promoting IPD is to expand access of 
ordinary party members to formulating party policies. By contributing to election manifestos 
and party programs, members take on responsibility for policies and thus become invested in 
their successful implementation. 
 It has been seen that traditional models of direct participation are unlikely to be workable 
in the context of modern Turkish politics, but there exist a number of alternative methods that 
could be implemented in order to ensure that ordinary party members feel that they have a stake 
in determining and implementing a party’s stated goals. Thus, while a simple yea-or-nay vote 
on pre-existing policy will probably be insufficient to foster real democratisation, such 
procedures as granting each member the right to offer an opinion about proposed policies, the 
creation of expert boards and the parcelling out of individual powers to defined groups within 
the membership have the potential to foster inclusivity within the parties and thereby to 




Part 2: Policy-Making in Turkish Political Parties 
Introduction 
 It is generally accepted that Turkish political parties have a lack of democracy in respect 
to their PM processes, such as candidate and leadership selection. It is clear that, despite the 
necessity for IPD set out in the Turkish Constitution and in the TPPL, the current system only 
allows ordinary members to participate in the PM process indirectly, through electing their 
delegates. Even then, the role given to the party congress in PM is merely to adopt the party 
programme. Thus, Turkish political parties do not conduct their PM in a democratic manner 
with a party congress system. Though party elites are reluctant to share power, I will argue that 
the law should provide opportunities to ordinary members. Through legal reform, the state 
should take some power away from party elites and hand it back to ordinary members, where it 
really belongs. I posit that establishing more participatory democracy in PM can help in 
addressing the lack of IPD endemic to Turkish parties. Similar to the national constitution, 
which adopts referendums as a way to supplement representative democracy, party law can 
combine delegatory democracy and plebiscitary democracy within the party as well. 
 There are several reasons for the elite-driven policy process in Turkish parties. Supply 
side (party elites) and demand side (party members) factors have been identified as having an 
influence on the ability of party members to participate in PM. As just mentioned, party elites 
are reluctant to share their power with party members. The demand side is also problematic. 
Historically, party members in Turkey have been reluctant to participate in the policy forming 
process of political parties. This situation is not unique to Turkey, but is mirrored in the parties 
of many mature democracies. Explanations for this reluctance are several and diverse, and it is 
outside the scope of this chapter to identify and analyse them in depth. This part of the chapter 
considers whether the TPPL has been able to meet democratic PM criteria and, if not, how it 
could be reformed. In this study, I am looking at the problems from the institutional and 
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procedural point of view. Particular attention is paid to establishment of policy forums, such as 
in the UK with the use of internal ballots.  
 
Party Programmes and Election Manifestos in Turkey 
 In Turkey, politics centres on parties and their leaders, not on party programmes or party 
policies. Although Turkish parties prepare programmes and election manifestos, these are rarely 
consistent with what they do in the long run. Most legislation enacted by the ruling party is not 
mentioned in that party’s programme or in election manifestos. It is largely the result of a broad 
interpretation of general terms in party programmes, such as commitments to democratic 
consolidation of the country, rule of law, better economic conditions etc., and is mainly adopted 
when an issue arises. For instance, every party has a sentence in its programme such as “our 
party is committed to the consolidation of democracy,” or “steps must be taken for economic 
recovery.” According to Keyman and Heper “the party programmes in Turkey turned out to be 
nothing more than window dressing. They, in fact, very much resembled each other, consisting 
of long lists of promises with no mention of how those promises were going to be fulfilled.”60 
 Nor do parties have a good record of delivering on election manifesto promises. 
Although they publish election manifestos, it is difficult to say whether the winner of an election 
will pursue them. Office-holders are relatively unrestrained in advancing detailed election 
platforms to the electorate; fulfilling the promises of those platforms is often an entirely 
different matter. 
 
The legal context of policy-making in Turkey 
 Any analysis of the PM process in Turkish parties must begin with a review of the legal 
context in which it is set. Thus, before describing the actual situation, it may be helpful to 
                                                 
60 Metin Heper and E. Fuat Keyman ‘Double‐faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of 
Democracy in Turkey’ [2006] 34 Middle Eastern Studies 259, 262. 
184 
 
summarise the legal background. First of all, the TPPL accords special importance to party 
programmes. According to Article 90, party programmes cannot be contrary to the Turkish 
constitution or the TPPL, while political parties are not to act in contradiction with their party 
programmes.  
 It is difficult to say that the TPPL explicitly guarantees a role for members in developing 
or making party policies. Although the Law mentions the party congress as the supreme 
decision-making body, this neither means that ordinary party members have a say in the policy 
process directly, nor does it outline a specific process. The main systems in the law are as 
follows.  
 First, according to the TPPL, only the party congress can make changes in the party 
programme. Between two national congresses, a party’s executive organs are tasked with 
implementing the policies of the party in order to comply with party programmes enacted by 
the party congress.61 Second, the party congress can make a binding decision on public policies 
and party policies, provided that these issues are general in nature and within the framework of 
the country’s laws, the party constitution and the party program. 
 The TPPL also states that an amendment to the party constitution, party programme or 
other issues related to party policies should be proposed by one twentieth of the members of 
the party congress, by the party leader or by the party executive organ. It is also laid down in 
the Article that, in the case of issues related to state or public policies, proposals shall be 
approved by one third of the delegates attending the party congress. Thus a distinction is made 
between more and less important policies without mentioning who will decide the level of 
importance. If one-third of the participants of a party congress demand a new policy related to 
an important issue, the party is obligated to discuss this issue in the congress. The TPPL states 
that the party congress should establish a commission whose members are elected by delegates 
                                                 
61 Article 16 of the Turkish Political Parties Law. 
185 
 
in order to discuss these issues and prepare a report. In the end, the discussion should be held 
by the commission, which should report and put the proposal to a vote. There are two 
problematic issues here. One is that the threshold for the proposal is very high. According to 
Üçışık, such a high proposal threshold, especially in important matters, is incompatible with 
internal democracy.62 The second concern is who will decide whether the subject is important 
for the country or not. Giving substance to this distinction is extremely difficult. The threshold 
was one twentieth both in the 1965 law and in the early version of the 1983 law.  
 Another problem with party congress is that there is no actual proposal of a resolution 
mechanism from local parties or party members. The PM legwork is performed by a small 
number of party elites before the congress, and the proposal is then presented to the delegates. 
 
The actual situation in Turkey 
 When it comes to the actual situation in Turkey, there is a huge gap between what party 
laws and party constitutions say and what is actually practised. Party members are not 
influential in forming party policies, whether via congresses or other mechanisms. Although 
party members in mature democracies have found varying levels of influence in their parties, 
Turkish party members display the least sway over policy. 
 The party leader has traditionally been seen as having the power and authority to decide 
policy, while the members have never been assigned any important role in it. Although all 
parties hold occasional delegate congresses, at which party policies and programmes should be 
debated and approved according to the TPPL, and the decisions should be binding on every 
level of the party, these decisions are in fact mostly ignored by the leadership. Power is 
concentrated in the hands of the party leader and a small oligarchic cadre, which makes real 
                                                 




decisions behind closed doors. Party leaders also enjoy autonomy over the production of the 
party programme and election manifestos. According to Semanur Kahraman:  
Turkish political and legal structure, and consequently the entire bureaucracy, has no 
concrete public policy mechanism which ensures citizen and/or civil society 
participation in its policy and decision-making processes. The elected government 
perceives the result of the ballot box as a ticket to rule the country however it likes for 
four years (unless there is an early election).63 
 Major parties in Turkey neither have a real PM capacity, nor do they have the ability to 
advance and implement properly detailed plans for governing. Moreover, PM in Turkish parties 
has traditionally been such that parliamentary parties are responsible for the initiation and 
execution of policies with the well-disciplined support of MPs for the leadership. The party in 
the public office is responsible for the drafting and implementation of policy, with the help of 
the party leader’s special advisers and civil servants. Parliamentary committees (especially 
permanent committees) provide the means for some MPs, if not all of them, to have some input 
into PM. According to Bilir, Turkish parties do not have any tradition of democratic PM 
function with the participation of their members, experts and civil society organisations.64 
According to Haluk Özdalga, former MP of the RPP and the JDP, it is the privilege of the 
leaders alone to determine party policies. The leader may decide binding policies alone in all 
areas, including the most vital ones for a party, without consulting anyone. It is even common 
for party elites to hear new policy statements from the media, just like other citizens. 65 
 Although all Turkish parties hold weekly party group meetings in Parliament, these 
meetings are no more than the announcements of the new party policies by the leader to the 
MPs, most of whom are not involved or know anything about them. According to İlter Turan: 
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The enhanced powers of the party leader have transformed the function of the party 
group meetings in the parliament. Presumably, these meetings are to provide a forum 
where deputies discuss and debate party policies, and question and criticize the 
leadership. Over the years, they have evolved into ritualistic occasions where the party 
leader (who is at the same time leader of the party group) enters as deputies stand up 
and applaud. He then renders a speech defending what they have been doing and 
criticizing other parties. Usually there is no discussion or debate.66 
 As was mentioned earlier, the party organisational model, which is imposed by the 
TPPL, is more or less the same for all Turkish political parties. Thus, the role of the party 
congress in determining party policy is the same in all Turkish parties.  
 Similar to established Western democracies, political parties in Turkey are an important 
source of PM capacity. However, this capacity is mostly used, first, by the party in the public 
office, which means ministers and MPs; and second, by the party in the central office, which 
means party executive organs. PM is not a concern of the party on the ground. Cabinet ministers, 
especially, play a very important role in Turkish PM. Fredrick Fray describes them as “an elite 
within an elite,”67 so much so that they need no party programme or election manifesto to win 
elections. According to Heper and Bilgin: 
the ministers who serve in the cabinet have two important roles. First, they are involved 
in the policy-making process, since most decisions on key political issues have to be 
approved collectively by the cabinet. Second, each cabinet minister also serves as the 
head of a government department where he/she plays an important role in the 
formulation and implementation of its policies.68 
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Heper and Keyman analyse the PM role of Turkish parties and argue that: 
in any case, political parties have remained indifferent to rational policy-making. They 
did not have research bureaux let alone think tanks for this purpose. Also, they hardly 
paid attention to carefully prepared and debated policy proposals by independent 
research foundations and think-tanks.69 
 For some members, it is taken for granted that the party leadership is in a better position 
to see and meet the different needs that exist in society, and that they alone should decide party 
policies according to the country’s circumstances. They are also content with the party’s broad 
philosophy rather than demanding a policy role. Most of the members are reasonably satisfied 
with the leadership and follow their leaders emotionally and, in most cases, unconsciously. 
They do not join political parties in order to participate in PM; they simply trust their leaders. 
For the realisation of IPD party members’ interest in party affairs, a willingness to engage in 
the PM process is highly important. The absence of such a demand increases the impediments 
to the implementation of desirable reforms. However, if party members take part in PM, this 
will help in keeping a party in line with its overall philosophy. A party’s failure to implement 
these policies provides the impetus for the development of IPD. 
 
The Justice and Development Party 
 Like most other party rules, it is easy to find a commitment to internal democratic 
practices in the PM process of the JDP as described in its party constitution and program. 
However, the JDP has never granted its members any real influence over the policy process, 
which has generally been the preserve of senior party elites. Although the party constitution 
declares that “We shall ensure that party members will be able to freely express their opinions 
                                                 
69 Heper and Keyman (n 60) 262. 
189 
 
within the framework of the Regulations and the program of the Party,”70 party members only 
have power to vote in delegate selections. Furthermore, the party constitution addresses the 
participatory aspect of PM as follows: 
Our party shall ensure for the collective will to replace the singular wills not only within 
the party but also in the Parliament and society. Laws shall be the expression of the 
common will of the society, not just the majority in the Parliament. For this reason, our 
Party shall draft the bills it will prepare, by taking suggestions from non-governmental 
organizations.71 
 This wording is vague and therefore gives a great deal of leeway to party leaders. Also, 
in their actual practices, Turkish political parties show that there is a sharp counter-reaction to 
both constitutions and party laws. According to Akman, “democratization in Turkey remains a 
flashy word in the party programmes and in the rhetoric of leaders amidst the unresolved 
institutional deficiencies of the major parties, which makes democratic consensus and 
consolidation of democracy still elusive.”72 
Democracy in the JDP functions best during its grand party congress. According to the 
JDP constitution, the Grand Congress, held at least every three years, decides and determines 
policies and programmes and elects the party leadership and 50 members of the Central 
Decision and Administrative Committee. In addition to the Party Congress, the Central 
Decision and Administrative Committee is also responsible for policy issues according to 
Article 74.1 of the party constitution, which states that: 
to use such powers and authorities, and to make, implement, or cause to be implemented, 
such decisions that are necessitated by the interests of the Party and thus of the Country 
during any period of time elapsing between two meetings of the Grand Congress, in 
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each field which is not forbidden by laws on political parties and elections or other 
applicable laws and regulations, or by the Bylaws and programs of the Party.73 
Moreover, the CDAC has the authorisation to form a government on its own or in coalition with 
other parties, and to leave the government or the coalition whenever it considers it necessary.  
 The party also has a Central Executive Board to which members are nominated by the 
party leadership from among members of the Central Decision and Administrative 
Committee.74 The CEC conducts the daily functioning of the party. It is composed of the Party 
Leader, Deputy Chairpersons (at present there are eleven), the General Secretary, and the 
Deputy Chairpersons of the Party Parliamentary Group (at present there are four). According 
to Hale and Özbudun, together with the party leader, the Central Executive Committee is the 
most powerful body in the party.75 However, the Grand Congress and the CDAC do not play 
any significant role in policy-making other than to endorse leadership positions, which 
generally cannot be challenged because of the JDP’s absolute party discipline and democratic 
centralisation.  
 Among the most important events of the JDP for PM are its regular consultation and 
evaluation meetings with MPs. However, the aim of these meetings is to bring the MPs and 
ministers closer together and to discuss policy issues. Another important event is the party 
leaders’ meeting with the leaders of provincial party organisations to listen to their problems. 
However, none of these consultation meetings represent real PM. 
 According to Sultan Tepe, “The JDP sponsored reforms emphasize the urgent need to 
eliminate the state’s ineffective structure and authoritarian policies, while the party itself 
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continuously limits its internal democracy and develops a hierarchical party organization.”76 
For instance, she observes that “when the [party’s] policies fail, the party points to the 
insufficient involvement by civil society or traditional groups as a reason for the failure, even 
though the party allows the civil society only a limited role in the policy-making process.”77 
 
The Republican People’s Party 
 Similar to the Central Decision and Administrative Committee in the JDP, the RPP has 
a policy body, the Party Council, which has 60 members selected by the Party Congress. Among 
the functions of this body, the most important one is the “determination of party policies related 
to internal and external issues, within the framework of the party programme, congress 
decisions and election manifestos.”78 
 The RPP accepts IPD as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation in the country and 
promises IPD and inclusiveness both in party organisation and functioning.79 However, the 
actual situation does not resemble the text. According to Levent Önen, if the party leader deems 
consultation with the party organs necessary for PM, he asks for their opinion, but he has no 
such obligation. He summarises the process as follows: 
The amount of debate taking place in the party organs of the CHP [the RPP] is very low. 
Party organs do not meet on a regular basis and are not venues for debate. The character 
of debate is not issue-focused, but scattered determined by daily developments. Only 
the leader and his circle are involved in the policy-making process.80 
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 Altan Öymen, who was a member of the Party Council between 1995 and 1998, as a 
former party leader succinctly draws the picture of PM in the party: 
Often you wake up in the morning and see that a policy is formed. Although it seems 
that there is a discussion in the party group, at the beginning the general chairman makes 
a long speech, then time for meal… There is no one staying to listen to speeches of 
others.81 
 
The party congress and delegate democracy 
 It would be mistaken to consider policies adopted by a party congress via delegatory 
democracy as illegitimate. Mair and Katz explain this situation from the perspective of a mass 
party model: 
This legitimacy depends, in turn, on direct popular involvement in the formulation of 
the party programme and, from an organizational perspective, this implies the need for 
an extensive membership organization of branches or cells in order to provide avenues 
for mass input into the party’s policy-making process, as well as for the supremacy of 
the extra-parliamentary party, particularly as embodied in the party congress.82 
However, in Turkey, as has repeatedly been pointed out, political parties have enormous power 
over party membership registration and dismissal, delegate selection and the composition of 
party congress. For instance, according to Gençkaya: 
The right to dismiss local party organizations (Articles 19 and 20) and party members 
(Article 53), which is very widespread among the major political parties, provides an 
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unlimited power in the hands of the party leadership which leads to leadership 
domination and weakens the internal party democracy.83 
 Thus, for instance, in the first version of the JDP constitution, it was stated that, if the 
local party leader were to be dismissed by the central party, the new leader would be determined 
by election. However, in the 2006 amendment it is stated that:  
If all the full and reserve members of a district or city Administrative Committee resign 
for any reason whatsoever, then a new board shall be formed through appointment by 
the Central Decision and Administrative Committee. The new board appointed as such 
shall use the rights and authorities which have been vested in the former elected board. 
…If only the chairman of a grade is dismissed, or if the seat of chairman becomes vacant 
for any reason whatsoever, then a chairman shall be appointed by the Central Decision 
and Administrative Committee.84 
 According to the law, the central party office can unseat a provincial party leader and 
executive board. In such a situation, a new provincial party congress must be held within 45 
days and a new local leader and executive board must be elected. However, implementation of 
this rule is very loose. Most parties have not hold a new party congress within the specified 45 
days, and temporary local leader and executive boards have ended up running the local party 
for long periods of time. On some occasions, if the prosecution office informs the constitutional 
court, the court cautions the party. 
 PM under a party congress has advantages, such as being both economically and 
technically easy. It has been acknowledged that, as mentioned in previous chapters, parties 
reduce transaction costs and solve collective action problems by establishing an institutional 
arrangement – party organisation – which allows the party members to contribute to the 
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collective goal in a country-wide democracy.85 PM with all party members might be inefficient 
in terms of being technically difficult and expensive. So a party congress seems to be an 
organisation which reduces transaction cost and collective action problems within the parties. 
However, as stated before, the party congress system itself creates its own elites and destroys 
the equality of the membership since delegates are in a more important position. While the 
TPPL claims that all party members are equal, this is true only on the paper. Moreover, this 
kind of PM has been highly criticised as being mostly a rubber stamp event and does not give 
party members a meaningful role. For Mair and Katz, “while a party congress is the official 
policy-making forum, its influence ‘in reality’ is severely limited.”86 In a survey of congress 
delegates and party members in Norway, it was revealed that the delegates are happy with IPD 
based on the congress system.87 It is not surprising that the party delegates do not wish to 
replace their PM process with a system that would diminish their powers. According to Saglie 
and Heidar, “Delegatory democracy is often regarded as unsuitable for the new information 
society, where individualization, decentralization and flat structures are required. This may lead 
to experiments with new structures and procedures, regardless of current member 
satisfaction.’88 
 
Case Study: The British Labour Party 
 The use of policy forums is widespread among the British parties for the involvement 
of party members in the generation of party policies. In the Labour Party, a special PM body 
was established, the National Policy Forum. The importance of the Policy Forum is mentioned 
in Rule Book Clause V.2, which states that “Party conference shall decide from time to time 
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what specific proposals of legislative, financial or administrative reform shall be included in 
the party programme. This shall be based on the rolling programme of work of the National 
Policy Forum.” Perhaps the main difference between the party congress and policy forums lies 
in the quality of the debate, which is expected to be higher in the latter, and the fact that the 
members have more opportunity to talk over proposing resolutions. These bodies are specially 
designed for this purpose.  
 Using the Labour Party as a case study, I will explore the extent to which policy forums 
have a positive effect on democratic PM. There are several reasons for choosing this party as a 
case study. First of all, the Labour Party has a distinct place in IPD literature: most of the 
scholars studying IPD have given special attention to IPD debates in the British Labour Party 
throughout its history. Second, it is one of oldest major parties, with a long experience in 
government and as the main opposition experience and a world-wide reputation. Third, there is 
the 2010 version of the provision mentioned provision:  
Party Conference shall decide from time to time what specific proposals of legislative, 
financial or administrative reform shall be included in the party programme. This shall 
be based on the rolling programme of work of the National Policy Forum and shall be 
subject to approval by an OMOV ballot of the eligible membership once in each 
Parliament.89 
This provision combines an understanding of both deliberative and direct democracy in a way 
that some call hybrid democracy, and as such is what this thesis believes to be the best model 
for PM, and the one that should be incorporated into the TPPL.  
 In the 1990s, the Labour Party underwent important changes and started reforming its 
party organisation. In 1990, the party’s General Secretary, Larry Whitty, prepared a document 
titled Democracy and Policy Making for the 1990’s arguing that there was a need for a change 
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in the whole PM process. This resulted in the establishment of a national policy forum in 1993. 
Party leaders at this period, such as John Smith and Tony Blair, believed that improving IPD 
would help reconnect the organisation with its supporters. Thus the party moved away from a 
model of delegate democracy and introduced OMOV for the election of the leadership and some 
intra-party PM processes.90 According to Faucher-King and Treille, the Labour Party used two 
different methods for solving some of the problems emerging from the party congress system, 
which they identified as individual member ballots and policy forums.91 For them, the Labour 
party in this way tries “to balance pluralism and unity, input from below and efficient policy-
making.”92 
 The first step of PM is the Joint Policy Committee, which is composed of members of 
the shadow cabinet, the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the National Policy Forum. 
Once they set the priorities for the PM process, the policy commission’s role starts. The NPF is 
one of the key institutions in the PM process and is responsible for the administration of policy 
development work in the party. The NPF is composed of 199 members who together represent 
all of the 14 major groups in the party such as Constituency Labour Parties, Trade Unions, and 
MPs. Each group has the power to select its members for the NPF. The NPF receives reports 
from eight Policy Commissions, whose work is coordinated by a Joint Policy Committee. 
 There are 8 policy commissions: 
• Stability and Prosperity Policy Commission  
• Work and Business Policy Commission  
• Living Standards and Sustainability  
• Stronger Safer Communities 
• Education and Children 
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• Health and Care 
• Better Politics 
• Britain’s Global Role 
 The Party Conference is the official PM body, approving the policies presented by the 
NPF. Every party member has a right to make submissions to the policy commissions via the 
Your Britain website.93 This website is devised for ordinary party members to have a say on 
policy and to make a contribution to the party’s election manifesto. Members can get involved 
by commenting on policy proposals, proposing new policies or joining in on online debates. 
Policy Commissions meet regularly to consider the submissions made through the website or 
from other channels. For instance, between 2010 and 2014, about 200,000 policy submissions 
were received by the policy bodies. 94 
 For many scholars, the reason for the introduction of direct democracy and the adoption 
of such inclusive policy forums is to exclude activists from PM, thus strengthening the party 
leadership.95 According to Mike Simpson, policy forums can be regarded as token gestures 
from the leadership to enhance the appearance of internal party democracy.96 For him, they 
remain under the control of the leadership and strengthen his grip over the party. According to 
Turpin and Tomkins of the Labour party, “in the process of consultation and debate through 
which policies are filtered to the party conference, the leadership has a commanding role.”97 
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 According to Seyd, “internal ballots may provide the means by which leaders can 
demonstrate to the public that they are in control of their party.”98 For him, “balloting the entire 
membership is a means of bypassing the activists if they appear to be unrepresentative of party 
voters.”99 According to Paul Webb, although the new PM process in the Labour Party “certainly 
allows for input by individual members, local branches and their representatives, the rolling 
programme approach enshrines a powerful role for the leadership.”100 
 Furthermore, the Labour Party has used members’ ballots to accept major constitutional 
change (the reform of Clause 4), to approve its 1997 general election manifesto and to elect one 
division of its National Executive Committee. 101  According to Webb, “In 1996, Blair 
introduced a referendum of all party members on what he promised would become the main 
features of the forthcoming election manifesto. This device, rarely deployed hitherto, offered 
members the chance to state a simple ‘yes/no’ answer to the question of whether they would 
support the overall package of policies likely to be included in the formal manifesto.”102 Nick 
Anstead offers a similar critique: “The development of membership referenda is even more 
antithetical to deliberative democracy, as it ensures that political decisions become a private, 
rather than a cooperative, matter. The simple binary options offered on a ballot paper offer little 
scope for deliberation.”103 
 
Conclusion: What can be done within the law? 
 After outlining the theoretical framework, the actual and current legal situation in 
Turkey and the case study, it is now time to discuss whether legislation can set some of the 
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conditions for deliberative or direct democracy. In the words of Ron Levy, “in spite of its 
genuine limitations, law may yet directly or indirectly aid deliberative democratic design 
projects.”104 Similarly, Saglie and Heider claim that “The abstract principles of democracy must 
be embodied in concrete institutions and procedures.” 105  The role of laws in deliberative 
democracy is less studied by legal scholars. According to Ron Levy, “legal scholars have been 
slow to join this turn. Only a handful have examined law’s roles in contributing to and 
constructing—or at times frustrating— more deliberative forms of democracy.”106 
As mentioned in previous chapters, those who write the democratic party laws are those 
who stand to lose power as a result. Scholars often recognise the likelihood of this recursive 
pattern, according to which parties entrench themselves in power despite voter demands.107 For 
Mair, “democratization on paper may actually coexist with powerful elite influence in 
practice.”108 Mair has also argued that, with direct democracy “it is not the party congress, or 
the middle-level elite, or the activists, who are being empowered, but rather the ordinary 
members, who are at once more docile and more likely to endorse the policies (and candidates) 
proposed by the party leadership.”109 In my view, this paradox is not necessarily valid for all 
parties. While there is no real activism or IPD in Turkey, we cannot say such a reform will 
result in the further empowerment of the already powerful party leader.  
 The legislation on Turkish political parties hardly seems fertile ground for democratic 
PM. Internal democracy is an increasing trend among parties, with more and more parties 
introducing provisions to elect their candidates and leadership on a OMOV basis, and it is easy 
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to regulate this process through legal reform. By contrast, the prescription of democratic PM 
by law is difficult. Despite Turkey’s passive political culture, having PM structures which are 
more democratic might in the long run gradually lead to less passivity. Establishment of policy 
forums for policy development and OMOV system for the approval of party programmes and 
election manifestos can be provided by law. However, just like the current party congress 
system, it is doubtful whether such a scheme would work properly. Party reform will not 
necessarily have the direct and immediate impact required to change the way policies are made. 
The purpose of the reform is to encourage political parties to take positive action towards the 
participation of ordinary members in the PM process, and thus to improve their participation in 
intra-party business. However, in the Turkish context, while the rank and file do not have any 
input into the policy process, giving them a voting right might be a good start. As Steven Griner 
and Daniel Zovatto rightly argue, “each country needs to design and enforce its own system in 
accordance with its political values and culture, its political party system, institutional 
capabilities and the overall extent of democratic development.”110 
 Since party constitutions are silent on this subject, and party leaders and elites are 
reluctant to share PM power with party members, the best way to encourage power-sharing is 
to regulate PM through party laws, at least in Turkey. As mentioned above, Turkish political 
parties have not been programmatically coherent or much concerned with PM. They do not 
have well-defined party programs or election manifestos. The current system of PM, which 
only gives to delegates an opportunity to vote in PM, is both inefficient and incompatible with 
the equality of the party members. Although participation in the nationwide PM process is 
necessarily indirect because of some difficulties, grassroots democracy can be implemented in 
political parties more easily. According to the National Democratic Institute: 
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In some systems, the move towards participatory or consultative policy development is 
an initiative of party leaders trying to keep members more engaged and deliver policy 
which is more meaningful to voters. In other cases, the movement towards participatory 
policy development is coming from the members themselves, or even from external 
organizations with a special interest in policy who are demanding that political parties 
become more open and inclusive in their policy development.111 
Again, the paradox of the closeness issue comes to mind: the lawmakers and party elites are the 
same people. Formally, the degree of access to party PM permitted ad hoc and constituency 
party delegates in party congress that were held only on a biannual basis. 
 This issue may be overcome in several ways. First, parties such as the Greens that have 
a commitment to grass-roots PM could acquire the legislative power to amend the law. 
However, as mentioned above, the actual practice is contrary to what parties promise for IPD.  
Second, party members could demand more powers from party elites and push party elites to 
legislate in this matter, a move that is related to the educational level and democratic 
understanding of party members. As Harmel argues, new generations of party members are 
“less willing to take direction from leaders and more demanding of opportunities for meaningful 
participation than the established parties would provide.”112 Dalton and Wattenerg similarly 
argue that the modernisation process leads to the emergence of post-material issues such as 
environmental quality, lifestyle choices and consumer rights, which have participatory aspects. 
Thus, this post-materialist generation “eschew[s] the hierarchic and structured nature of partisan 
politics in favour of methods of direct democracy.”113 As Ronald Inglehart finds in his analysis 
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of forty-three societies, post-materialist generations do not welcome the “hierarchical, 
oligarchic” structures of old-style centralised political parties.114 
 The third way to deal with the problem of closeness between legislation and the party 
elites is judicial activism. According to Gary Thomas Johns, “Legal intervention could have a 
democratic impact, by transferring power from the leaders to the members.”115 The Turkish 
Constitution could mandate the equality of party members and intra-party democracy. If party 
members appeal to the courts for the annulment of provisions related to PM in the TPPL, a 
broad interpretation of the law is possible what would allow lawmakers to legislate regarding 
IPD in a more participatory way.  
 Although the TPPL needs reform, this reform should be focused mostly on the quality 
and the quantity of membership participation. In my view, it is the former where improvement 
is particularly significant. Party members should take part in PM instead of merely selecting 
the congress delegates, who are in practise close friends of party leaders and are appointed 
because of their loyalty in party congress. Reform of the TPPL that at least allowed for the use 
of direct democracy in PM would increase the interest of members in party issues.  
Reforming legislation alone is unlikely to make important changes in the levels of participation 
in PM overnight. The amendment of practices by law, which have developed over the years and 
have become part of the political culture of the country, is difficult. Steven Griner and Daniel 
Zovatto argue that  
The argument that – together with a dynamic and gradual process of legal reform – a 
change in the political culture of citizens and political leaders is critical, has gained 
relevance. Consequently, in addition to the political consensus needed to approve legal 
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reforms, political leaders must necessarily make a true commitment to abide by the new 
rules of the game, and such commitment must reflect in their coherence between 
discourse and political practice.116 
 According to Caroline Lancaster, “in emerging democracies, the need to entrench a 
democratic spirit and culture is of paramount concern.”117 Inge Amundsen sees IPD as a “school 
of democracy.” For her, “parties should be the incubators that nurture citizens’ political 
learning, socialization and competence. Opportunities for participation in decision making 
within the political parties can help citizens expand their civic skills.”118 
 Despite the fact that legal intervention should, at least theoretically, be useful in 
countering such difficulties as power sharing among party elites, finding solutions which will 
help party members to participate in PM is difficult.  
 Regulation of party finance can also help improve participation in PM. For instance, 
Policy development funds can be introduced in parties in order to establish the PM process and 
open it up to ordinary members. In the UK, this system is already being used. Policy 
development grants are regulated under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 
2000. These grants are given to help parties in developing their policies.119 
Most of the parties’ own programmes are clearly acknowledging that the TPPL must be 
reformed. While this cannot be disputed, and new practices and procedures must be introduced, 
it is important that the existing party members, within all levels of the party, be educated in 
democracy. 
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 The existence of party programmes and election manifestos drafted by ordinary 
members should at least gradually help the intra-party democratisation of Turkish parties. 
However, some scholars advocate this kind of deliberative and plebiscitary democracy mixture 
on the grounds that including party members in the very process of PM means more discussion 
before political decisions are legislated. For them, party policies should emanate from lower 
levels of parties upwards towards the party congress. For instance, Maravall argues that: 
Internal debates and disputes are greater, by definition, in democratic parties: activists 
and competing politicians can demand information from the leadership and discuss 
alternative strategies. Whether explanations are accepted or not is irrelevant: what 
matters here is that useful information flows within the party under conditions of internal 
democracy.120 
In conclusion, if the opinions of regular party members are taken into account, the 
democratic values and the benefit to Turkey will greatly increase. The only possibility of a fair 
accounting for party members’ opinions is through bringing broader legislation into effect, and 
for this to happen there must first be reformation of the existing TPPL and an increase in 
democratic education. In essence though, it is the responsibility of party members themselves 
to demand that their opinions be taken into account. If the party leadership and elites 
consistently deny them their rights, then the party members should understand that there are 
legal alternatives through which reform can be effected, and that such alternatives should be 
exercised thoroughly whenever applicable to ensure that their voices are heard. 
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One of the most important indicators of IPD is how a party selects its leaders. The 
inclusion of all party members, on a one-member-one-vote basis, in selecting a party leader has 
been an increasing trend among the parties in mature democracies over the last two decades.1 
It has been argued that parties have opened their leadership selection procedure to all party 
members in an effort to reduce their elitist and oligarchic tendencies by attracting more aspirants 
to leadership and producing more competitive contests, and therefore more IPD.2 The methods 
used by parties to elect and remove leaders thus represent a measure of their democratic ethos.3  
 Leadership selection is of course important, not only for party politics, but also for the 
state as a whole, especially when a party in government chooses a new leader who will also be 
a new prime minister. For instance, six of the last eleven British prime ministers came to office 
following an intra-party leadership election held in a period between two general elections. 
Similarly in Japan, nine of the prime ministers who served between 1996 and 2012 came to 
office following a party leadership contest between one general election and the next.4 In 
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Canada too, four of the country’s last eight Prime Ministers assumed office by winning a party 
leadership contest rather than through a general election.5 
 The ascensions of Yıldırım Akbulut and Ahmet Davutoğlu to the office of prime 
minister in 1988 and 2014, respectively, are similar examples from Turkey. These figures came 
to power in the following way. Turgut Özal was prime minister and the leader of the Motherland 
Party when he was elected president in 1988. After this election, he engineered the election of 
Yıldırım Akbulut as the new party leader, who later became prime minister. More recently, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected to the presidency, and after officially resigning from the 
leadership of the JDP, managed to secure the election of Ahmet Davutoğlu as the new leader 
of the party.  
 As discussed in previous chapters, there has been much criticism and debate about the 
undemocratic nature of party leadership selection in Turkey and the heavy concentration of 
power in the leadership, especially in the case of the party in power. This is because it is 
understood that the capture of state power and authority brings with it control of state resources, 
which can be utilized for the leadership’s personal benefit. There is also a generally accepted 
perception that Turkish parties are highly oligarchical institutions controlled by a handful of 
uncompromising leaders who are unable to produce solutions to the country’s pressing 
problems.6 In the words of Sabri Sayari, 
The importance of leaders in shaping political outcomes in Turkey stems largely from 
[their] near absolute control that they exercise over party organisations. By controlling 
the nomination of candidates in the elections, serving as the principal gatekeepers in the 
distribution of political patronage, and enjoying extensive authority (such as legal means 
to abolish local party units that oppose the central executive leadership and expel 
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dissident party members from the organisation), party leaders have managed to amass a 
great deal of personal power at the expense of organisational autonomy.7  
 This chapter examines the formal and informal aspects of leadership selection in Turkey, 
with particular focus on its undemocratic nature and ways in which it might be reformed. The 
main question about the election of party leaders in Turkey is whether the choice should be 
made through a more delegatory system of democracy, or one that is more participatory. Since, 
as mentioned, political parties worldwide have been granting party members increasing power 
in the selection of their party leader, the TPPL might accordingly be reformed so that party 
members are granted direct influence in the process of leadership selection. As will become 
clear, ordinary party members currently have only an indirect say in the selection of their leaders 
in Turkey, a situation that could be remedied through reform of the law relating to political 
parties so as to shift power away from party delegates and toward ordinary party members. 
 
Party leadership and IPD 
  
Max Weber’s observation that political organisations are necessarily managed by a 
person who is interested in the management of politics is consistent with the fact that, generally 
speaking, few people are interested in political life or having a share of political power.8 Brain 
Farrell has aptly observed that “in almost all political systems, executive dominance and the 
personification of this domination in a single leader is a central fact of political life.”9 The 
autonomy of the leadership, however, has always been defended in the name of healthy 
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democracy.10 For instance, Robert McKenzie argued that “oligarchical control by the party 
leaders of the party organization is indispensable for the well-being of a democratic polity . . . 
intra-party democracy, strictly interpreted, is incompatible with democratic government.”11 For 
McKenzie IPD, could lead to a conflict between the internal and external accountability of party 
leaders. Similarly, Robert Michels argued that 
In theory, the leader is merely an employee bound by the instruction he receives. He has 
to carry out the orders of the man, of which he is no more than the executive organ. But 
in actual fact, as the organization increases in size, this control becomes purely fictitious. 
The members have to give up the idea of themselves conducting or even supervising the 
whole administration, and are compelled to hand these tasks over to trustworthy persons 
specially nominated for the purpose, to salaried officials.12 
 Some scholars, on the other hand, are in favour of internal accountability, and they see 
leadership selection by party members as a complementary form of accountability. According 
to José María Maravall, the accountability of the party leaders and the ability of the party 
members to replace them if they become dissatisfied with their policies or distrustful of their 
electoral prospects is highly important for IPD,13 and both are severely lacking in Turkish 
parties. Similarly, the APSA report that has been cited repeatedly in this study states that “party 
responsibility includes also the responsibility of party leaders to the party membership.”14 Ron 
Lehrer also argues that “inclusive parties, which rely on rank-and-file membership to select 
their leaders, will respond to their members” because “candidates are motivated to respond to 
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rank-and-file party members to the extent that these members have influence in selecting 
them.”15 In the same vein, James Wilson argues that “in order to insure that party leaders are 
responsive to the rank-and-file, the parties would be internally democratic, with party members 
choosing party leaders and holding them accountable.” 16  In sum, it has become widely 
recognized that the manner in which leaders are elected and the means by which they may be 
removed are vital control mechanisms for the exercise of power within the party by members 
at large. In my opinion, though the exercise of this power is strictly limited situations in which 
there is a broad consensus, proper implementation of IPD would force party leaders to display 
caution and greater wisdom in their decisions, lest they lose the next selection. 
Formal leadership selection in Turkey 
 
Before proceeding, it is of course necessary to take into consideration the way in which 
leaders are selected in Turkey. At first, every party was free to select its own leaders in its own 
way in accordance with its own constitution, but as the importance of leadership selection 
became clear to lawmakers, they were prompted to pass the 1965 first Party Law, which gave 
this task specifically to the party congresses.17 Since then, the party congress has served as the 
official mechanism for the selection of party leaders, which is carried out under the auspices of 
the judiciary. Theoretically, party delegates control their leaders by replacing them through 
internal elections. Turkish party congresses thus give the appearance of a democratic process 
of leadership selection, but the reality, as will be seen, is very different.  
 Another important factor in leadership selection in Turkey is the number of candidates 
that take part in the leadership contest. Although the TPPL requires that the parties select their 
                                                 
15 Ron Lehrer ‘Intra-Party Democracy and Party Responsiveness’ [2012] West European Politics 1295, 1295. 
16 James Q. Wilson The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities (University of Chicago Press 1962) 
341. 
17 Article 10 of the Law on Political Parties (SPK— Siyasi Partiler Kanunu No: 648), Turkish Official Gazette 
16 July 1965. 
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leaders in a particular manner, it does not specify how leadership candidates may gain access 
to the ballot at the party congress in the first place; and in fact the difficulty of gaining such 
access represents a significant obstacle to IPD. For in the absence of regulations regarding 
access to candidacy, incumbent party elites have found ways to prevent potential candidates 
from participating in leadership contests by imposing a high threshold for the number of 
signatures required from delegates in order for a candidate to stand for election. For instance, 
in the second grand party congress, the JDP amended its constitution so that the support of a 
minimum of twenty per cent of the delegates was necessary in order for a leadership candidate 
to gain access to the ballot.18 Such restrictions have meant that, in most parties, only current 
leaders are presented as candidates to the delegates.  
 The nature of the body responsible for choosing candidates is generally considered the 
most important dimension of leadership selection.19 For Maurice Duverger, “the election of the 
leaders of a party by a small group of delegates is not the same in character as their direct 
election by the mass of the members.”20  Similarly, Bram Wauters states that “There is a 
difference between an election in a small circle of decision-makers and an election by all party 
members.”21 Duverger criticises two aspects of the delegation system. First, he cites Rousseau 
when he observes that: the mentality of the delegates is never the same as that of those who 
delegate them, with the result that every additional stage of delegation increases a little more 
the gap between the will of the base and the decision of the apex”; second, he argues that, in 
situations where the number of voters is restricted, as in a delegation system (as opposed to 
grass roots voting), it is easier to manipulate elections.22 
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19 Kenig (n 2) 243. 
20 Maurice Duverger Political Parties (Methuen and Co., 1961) 140. 
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 Turkish political parties, then, use a delegate-centred model of leadership selection in 
which rank-and-file party members almost never have a say in the selection of the leader, since 
the law dictates that they may only take part in the process through the selection of congress 
delegates. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, generally thirty per cent of the delegates enumerated 
in the TPPL are granted delegate status ex officio, for which reason party members can influence 
seventy per cent of the delegates only indirectly. This category of ex officio delegates includes 
members of Parliament, ministers, founders of the party, and members of the central executive 
office. 
 According to the TPPL, the party leader is to be elected by the absolute majority of 
members of the party congress and by secret ballot. If the candidate does not receive the 
necessary vote in the first two rounds of voting, the one who receives the most votes in the third 
round is selected.23 Under the current form of the TPPL, a party leader may be elected for a 
maximum of three years, and may stand for re-election. The first form of the TPPL, however, 
stated that a party leader could be elected for a maximum of two years, and that the same person 
may serve a maximum of six consecutive terms, after which a four-year hiatus is required before 
running again. 
 
Actual practice in Turkey 
  
According to Ofer Kenig, Gideon Rahat and Reuven Hazan, leadership is important for 
some parties because “parties grant their leaders the authority that they do not grant to anyone 
else in the party. In some parties, the leader is the party; he or she makes all the important 
decisions, including those that concern candidate selection and policy making.” 24  Their 
observations here well describe the current position of the party leaders in Turkey.  
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24 Kenig, (n 4) 5. 
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 As is the case in most developing democracies around the world, political parties in 
Turkey are built around a charismatic style of leadership, with an attendant lack of 
accountability to the party members. For the fact is that general elections in Turkey are often 
decided by the nature – or at least the image – of the party leaders, a phenomenon that has been 
termed the “presidentialization” or “personalization” of politics, and has been heavily criticised 
by scholars.25 Susan Scarrow, for instance, claims that 
In the short term, this may not be a concern, because having a charismatic leader gives 
a party a memorable “brand” that is easy to promote, and such a leader can define the 
direction of the party. In the long term, however, the lack of formal decision-structures 
often leads to problems with leadership succession and policy definition.26 
Most of the party leaders in Turkey have held their positions largely as a result of their 
roles in the formation of their respective parties rather than on account of any demonstrable 
vote-winning qualities. A brief glance at the scholarly literature on Turkish politics reveals that 
almost all parties have been identified with leaders who want to reserve all political power for 
themselves, so that parties tend not to outlive their founders. 
 This kind of charismatic leadership is one of the main obstacles to the realisation of 
internal democracy in Turkey, a problem that is exacerbated by the fact that it emerged directly 
from the country's political culture. Turkey came from a tradition of Ottoman “sultanism.” 
Under Ottoman rule, the ruler had two different offices and titles, that of sultan and that of 
caliph, both of which refer to religious authority.27 The political term “sultanism” was used by 
Max Weber to refer to sultanates in which the power of the leader is not restricted by law.28 
                                                 
25 Kenig (n 2) 241. 
26 Susan Scarrow ‘Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Implementing 
Intra-Party Democracy’ (NDI 2005) 16. 
27 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America and Post-Communist Europe, (Johns Hopkins University Press 1996) 52. 
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This model of powerful leadership is one of the most influential political traditions that Turkey 
inherited from the Ottoman Empire. According to Ödül Celep, 
Leader-worshipping and leader-idolization are inherent components of Turkey’s 
political culture also stemming from not only the early Republican years led by Mustafa 
Kemal but also the late Ottoman years of late padishahs. ... The political culture of 
Turkey still tolerates one man-driven, charismatic leader parties administered with 
excessively centralized and authoritarian leadership structures…. What they differ on is 
not the presence or absence of intra-party democracy, but their type of intra-party 
autocracy.29 
 A party’s conception of leadership is more important than even its policies on most 
issues, for, rather than being seen as the source of a party’s programs or policies, its leaders 
come to be seen as the country’s saviours in times of difficulties. This is because it is the 
privilege of the leaders alone to create party policies and to make binding policy statements in 
almost all areas, and especially the most vital ones, sometimes without even consulting anyone 
else in the party. On some occasions, important party figures have been introduced to new 
policy statements through declarations by the party leader in the media. Thus, for instance, in 
analysing Turgut Özal, who was accepted as one of the more democratic party leaders in 
Turkish political history, Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman find that: 
...compared to such previous leaders as Menderes and Demirel, Özal seems to have 
consulted others more frequently before making decisions. ... However, Özal used 
others basically as suppliers of data; otherwise, he made all the critical decisions 
himself.30 
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11, 2. accessed 18 May 2015. 
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According to Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, there are three main problems regarding the party 
leadership issue in Turkey. First, the majority of party leadership positions in Turkey have been 
held by the same people for a considerable period of time. Second, Turkish parties tend not to 
foster future leaders since to do so would endanger the position of current leaders. Third, in 
almost all parties, the same elite group governs the party through co-optation, which means that 
all the party elites are happy with their current positions, and so have no incentive to change 
the system.31 In a survey conducted in Turkey by four political scientists, Turkish voters were 
asked whether Turkish parties were led by oligarchies, to which 55 per cent of participants 
responded in the affirmative, with 75 per cent describing the leadership of parties other than the 
one to which individual respondents belonged as oligarchical and 43 per cent thus describing 
their own parties.32  
 The main criticism of the Turkish system of leadership elections is that party leaders 
appoint those delegates by whom they themselves will be chosen, so that the delegates remain 
beholden to their leaders in a kind of vicious cycle. Accordingly, one of the chief concerns of a 
party leader is to design the party congress in a manner that will ensure his or her own re-
election. As long as the party organisation and delegate selections are under the absolute control 
of the party leader, it is, not surprisingly, almost impossible to change party leaders in the 
context of a party congress. According to İlter Turan, “Criticizing the leader is the topic of 
disciplinary action, while becoming a candidate for leading the party is often seen as an act of 
betrayal and constitutes a prelude of leaving the party.’”33 
 Haluk Özdalga, who was a MP for both the RPP and the JDP, claimed that, despite 
democratic provisions contained in both parties’ constitutions, a party leader who does not want 
                                                 
31 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye’de Demokrasi ve Politik Partiler, (Alfa Yayınları 2001) 94. 
32 Saime Müjde Önal ‘Türkiye’de Parti İçi Demokrasi: CHP ve AKP Örneği’ (T.C. Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi 
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University Press 2015) 199. 
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to work with one party local organisation, or who is suspicious of opposition by local leaders 
to his or her views of local party organisations, cannot remain in office without the appearance 
of having come to power through the votes of local party members in a local congress.34 Thus 
it is common for party leaders to follow the lead of provincial party congresses and to exert an 
influence over provincial delegate selection. This being the case, the party congress system can 
be described accurately as an institutional device that has been designed to protect party elites, 
and particularly party leaders, against intra-party opposition. Erol Tuncer argues in like manner 
that party leaders design party membership, delegate selection, and party organisation in a way 
that secures future leadership selections, for which reason party leaders are unlikely to support 
IPD.35  Similarly, Özge Kemahlıoğlu claims that, “If there is a real competition for party 
leadership positions, one of the key determinants of this being open and participatory selection 
mechanisms, the party leader feels threatened by potential challengers to her power in the 
party.”36 
 An incumbent party leader can also influence who becomes a candidate for leadership 
by seeing to it that aspirants are disqualified before leadership contests for a violation of party 
rules, even if the alleged violations have not actually happened. Ümit Özdağ’s dismissal from 
the Nationalist Movement Party in 2006 is a good example. Before the 2006 party congress, 
Özdağ announced his candidacy for a leadership position. However, before the election, he was 
dismissed from the party and his path to the candidacy was blocked. Although he appealed his 
dismissal decision to the Civil Court, the court dismissed his appeal on the grounds that he 
should first exhaust the party’s internal dispute mechanism. Similarly, Ahmet Reyiz Yılmaz 
was dismissed from the party during a 2009 party congress after he announced his candidacy.  
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 Most often, incumbent party leaders are the only candidates offered to the congress 
delegates, a practice that leads to unchanging, and domineering, party leaders. Compared to the 
means by which established democracies choose party leaders, Turkish methods seem quite 
unusual. For while party leaders in mature democracies may be replaced for moral or ethical 
reasons, or for such practical reasons as defeat in general elections, leaders are much less likely 
to step down for such reasons in Turkey, where change instead comes about owing to a leader’s 
death, promotion to the presidency, which requires resignation from party leadership, or 
forcible removal in the context of a military coup. Thus, for instance, former political party 
leaders were banned from politics through a temporary law during the 1960 and 1980 coups, 
while Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan left the party leadership after 
becoming president in accordance with the constitutional mandate; Bülent Ecevit stepped down 
as party leader and left active politics because of health problems just two years before his death 
in 2006, in like manner as Alpaslan Türkes, the influential founder and former leader of the 
Nationalist Movement Party, died while still serving a leadership role in 1997, and Necmettin 
Erbakan, another prominent party leader, died in office in 2011. 
 In Turkish political history, there has been a small number of party leaders who have 
lost a leadership challenge. Bülent Ecevit is one example; as mentioned above, he won 
leadership elections in 1972 in the RPP over İsmet İnönü, who was 88 years old at the time. 
Another example occurred in a party congress in 1991, when Mesut Yılmaz drove the then 
prime minister Yıldırım Aktuna from the leadership of the Motherland Party.  
 Turkish political parties have been in the grip of unchanging, dominant party leaders 
since the beginning of their existence. According to İlter Turan, from the early times of the one-
party era, intolerant and hostile attitudes towards internal dissent have been one of the main 
problems of Turkish parties.37 It is often and justifiably said in Turkey that, because of the lack 
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of IPD, challengers to the established leadership are forced to resign from the party, often 
resulting in the establishment of a new party that takes part in elections. Turkish parties are not 
always congenial places, and moments of crisis often bring to light factions that remain hidden 
when a governing or opposition party is faring well. 
 Since political parties and their leaders have been willing to limit the terms of the 
president, prime minister and judges on the constitutional court, the question arises whether the 
terms of party leaders should be similarly limited. It is widely accepted that, the greater the 
seniority in party leadership, the greater the risk, since party leaders seem to equate length of 
service with competency and wisdom.  
 Party leaders increasingly bypass the members of their parties for fear of diluting their 
own power. Comparing the authoritarian structures of the two biggest Turkish political parties, 
the Republican People’s Party and the Justice and Development Party, Pelin Ayan concluded 
that the RPP resembles an oligarchic type of authoritarianism in which the voices of party 
activists are coercively dominated by the party leadership through negative incentives such as 
the threat of marginalization, while the JDP resembles a hegemonic type of authoritarianism in 
that party activists remain indifferent to the authoritarian party structure because they receive 
incentives that encourage ideological commitment and loyalty to the party leader.38  
 These considerations will serve to introduce a closer consideration of how the two major 
parties in Turkey choose their leaders, which method of choice is in turn a measure of how 
internally democratic they are. It is fortuitous that each of these parties, at the time of this study, 
went through the process of selecting a leader in a party congress. 
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The Justice and Development Party 
 The JDP is a leader-centred party, rather than a member-centred party, with considerable 
power heavily concentrated in the hands of one person, which tends to be the case in other 
Turkish parties as well. The leader of the JDP has enormous authority over the MPs, ministers 
and provincial leaders. According to Smith and Gauja, leader-centred parties also involve 
democracy; this, however, is an elitist understanding of democracy, in which trusted leaders are 
authorised by election to act on behalf of the party as a whole.39 
 Competitive leadership elections have not been held by the party since it was established 
in 2001. Although it has been assumed that a greater number of contested leadership elections 
will result in a higher level of IPD,40 in the five national congresses in the period from 2003 to 
2015 there was only one candidate in all of the elections within the JDP. 
 All of this is despite the fact that the JDP was when it was established opposed to the 
idea of charismatic leadership. For while it has not once held a truly democratic election, the 
party actually emerged from a competitive election process within the now defunct Virtue Party. 
During the Virtue Party congress of 2000, the reformist candidate Abdullah Gül challenged 
Recai Kutan, the incumbent leader and candidate of the traditionalist group, for leadership. 
Although Gül lost the contest, he gained 521 votes against Kutan’s 633, which was an 
unprecedented situation in the history of Islamist parties.41 After the Virtue Party was dissolved 
by the Constitution Court in 2001, its reformist wing established the JDP, while the other wing 
established the Felicity Party. According to Quinn Mecham, 
[the reformist group] asserted that Erbakan’s style of leadership was increasingly out of 
touch with the Turkish electorate, and argued that Virtue should redefine itself as a 
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contemporary political group with internal party democracy and European-style 
sensitivities. ... A fundamental tenet of the party was internal party democracy, a legacy 
of the reformists’ reactions to Erbakan’s personalistic leadership style. This was to be 
guaranteed by primary elections for the party list, transparency in decision making, and 
extensive debate on policy-formulation issues.42 
When the party was first established, it accepted principles of democratic leadership and 
rejected leader hegemony. However, this changed very quickly. 43  There are two decision-
making bodies in the JDP, the Central Decision-Making and Administrative Committee 
(CDAC) and the Central Executive Committee (CEC). According to the party’s constitution, 
members of the CEC are appointed by the party leader from among the members of the CDAC, 
who are elected in the party congress. Sultan Tepe claims that the JDP, when it was first 
established, sought to distinguish itself in this respect and so formed a more democratic 
decision-making body. When the party was first established, members of the CEC were 
accordingly not appointed but elected from among the members of the CDAC by a secret ballot. 
In 2003, however, in the wake of the previous year's elections, the party constitution was 
changed so that the party leader gained the power to choose the members of the CEC.44 
 After serving for 13 years as leader of the ruling JDP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan handed 
over this role to Ahmet Davutoğlu. Among politicians and academics, the selection of 
Davutoğlu was described in such terms as “the appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu to head of the 
JDP,” and “Erdoğan’s selection of Davutoğlu as his successor.”45 The CEC meeting that was 
convened under Erdoğan’s leadership decided to propose Davutoğlu’s name for leadership of 
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the party during the JDP’s extraordinary congress in Ankara on August 27, 2014. Many 
members of the party elite wanted to be candidates at the party congress, so a democratic 
selection might have been more fitting, but such a scenario was not even discussed. The retiring 
President, Abdullah Gül, made a bid to return to the party as leader, but Erdoğan, by deciding 
to convene the party congress on the day before Gül would hand over the presidency, effectively 
blocked Gül’s bid for leadership. As regards party leadership, the JDP’s Statute introduced a 
novelty by limiting the tenure of the leadership position to four terms in Article 75 of the party 
constitution. 
 
The People’s Republican Party 
 In the 80-year period from 1923 to 1980, and again from 1992 to the present, the RPP 
has had only five real party leaders. (The RPP was shut down during the military coup of 1980, 
along with all other political parties of the time.) In contrast to the JDP and its early periods, 
the RPP has witnessed more opportunities for leadership selection in its second period, though 
the standard oligarchic tendencies have prevailed, as exhibited through incumbent leaders 
usually emerging victorious. 
 According to the first RPP party constitution of 1923, the party leader was elected by 
the party congress from among the members of the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly). 
In 1927, however, the constitution was amended and in Article 6 Atatürk was the permanent 
leader. Furthermore, an Article 7 declared that the first six articles could not be amended.46 
 In stark contravention of the constitution, which declared that permanent leadership of 
Atatürk could not be absolved, the RPP formally renounced permanent leadership in 1946. The 
oligarchic tendencies and abuse of the leadership position to legislate specific and unfair 
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candidate criteria continued, as İsmet İnönü remained party leader for 34 years.47 It wasn’t until 
the 1972 election that he, at the age of 88, was finally defeated by Bülent Ecevit, as mentioned. 
Even then, according to Uyar, Ecevit was only able to defeat İsmet İnönü because of his age.48 
Ecevit claimed in an interview at the time that “if İnönü really wants to stay as a leader, he can 
easily impress delegates and can win the election. However, he also wants me to win so he 
didn’t do that.”49 
 Even after its disbandment following the military coup of 1980, former party members, 
with the permission of the National Security Council, established two leftist parties in 1983, the 
Social Democracy Party and the People’s Party. In 1985, these two parties merged to become 
the Social Democratic Populist Party. In the unification agreement, Aydin Güven Gürkan, the 
leader of the People’s Party, held the leadership position. In 1986, the party held a congress and 
Erdal İnönü won the leadership contest as the uncontested candidate. This reflects what happens 
at majority of the cases with Turkish parties. In 1988, the party held its second congress and 
had a unusually high number of candidates, none of which even came near the number of votes 
that the incumbent leader received; Erdal İnönü won 710 votes in the leadership contest, 
followed by İsmail Cem with 151, Azimet Köylüoğlu with 10 and Cemil Gerçek with 12 votes. 
 After 1990, deep competition  began to occur between two major party leaders; 
however, less-famous candidates participated in the election, demonstrating a lack of proper 
IPD in the party. Erdal İnönü competed against Deniz Baykal in congress for the party 
leadership. Ultimately, İnönü was selected as the leader of the SDPP, receiving 504 votes 
against Deniz Baykal’s 405; likewise, at the congress held the following year, Baykal ran 
against İnönü again, but again İnönü won the election with 534 votes to Baykal’s 451. 
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 After 13 years of disbandment, the RPP was re-activated again by 21 of the MPs who 
had resigned from the SDPP in 1992. After its re-establishment, the party held a congress, in 
which Deniz Baykal ran against Erol Tunceri. Baykal won the election with 679 votes against 
Tunceri’s 227, becoming the party’s fourth leader after Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and Bülent Ecevit. 
It can be noted that none of these elected leaders were junior members. Then in 1995 the SDPP 
decided to re-join the RPP and another congress was held, in which Baykal won the support of 
681 delegates against Karayalçın’s 309, once again becoming the leader of the RPP. A trend of 
persistently electing the same candidate can be noted for the internal elections of the RPP: again 
the lack of proper IPD made sure that regular members could not fairly participate in the 
elections.  
 Disaster struck the party in the country’s general election of 1999, in which the RPP 
failed to pass the ten per cent general election threshold and did not win any seats in Parliament. 
As a result, Baykal resigned from leadership, and in the party congress election later that year, 
Altan Öymen garnered 521 votes in the third round, edging out his closest competitor, Hasan 
Fehmi Güneş, who received 508. It is apparent that the unexpected resignation of the incumbent 
leader led to a power struggle between the next two most influential candidates. Had the 
resignation been planned, there may have been a single unopposed candidate, probably the 
former incumbent leader. After his election, Öymen started to reform membership registration, 
which he saw as the party’s biggest problem. However, the local organisations, which mostly 
depended on fake members, opposed the idea. Since the central party and the local organisations 
were dominated by Baykal’s supporters, Öymen could not implement his reforms and decided 
to call an extraordinary congress to address the situation. After a 16-month absence, Baykal re-
gained the leadership, defeating Öymen in the National Congress of September 2000.50 During 
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this election, four candidates competed for leadership of the RPP. In the first and second rounds 
of balloting, no one received the 521 votes needed to win, but in the third round, Baykal 
received 543 votes, Öymen 355, Güneş 12 and Sirmen 3, making Baykal party leader.51 
 In 2001, the RPP witnessed another leadership contest, with Baykal being re-elected 
leader at the 29th party congress with 732 votes, while Ertugrul Günay received 380 and Birol 
Başaran 6 of 1,118 votes cast. In 2003, Baykal entered the party leadership contest as the only 
candidate, and received 973 out of the 1089 valid votes. This continues the overall trend of 
regular party members zealously following the most influential leader in the party, since most 
delegates vote only for the candidates who offer them the most benefits. 
 In the January 2005 leadership race, Mustafa Sarıgül ran against Baykal for party 
leadership, and received the support of only 460 delegates against Baykal’s 674. After Baykal 
reaffirmed his dominance over the party at the congress, he began to eliminate opposition within 
the party: Sarıgül was dismissed from the party. and the RPP party executive office deposed 
eleven provincial-level party administrations; seven provincial administrations were also 
discharged for failing to hold official congresses on time.52 In December of the same year 
another congress was held, in which Baykal ran unopposed and received all of the 1158 valid 
votes. Again, the lack of IPD grants the party leaders the ability to abuse their positions with 
no worry about potential repercussions. Had there been effective IPD in place, Baykal would 
have had to think twice before acting against his competitors. 
 The next round of RPP leadership contests, in 2008, revealed another problem with IPD 
in Turkey. In this election, potential candidates had to receive the signatures of 253 delegates, 
representing twenty per cent of the total, but of those who attempted to do so, Haluk Koç 
                                                 
51 In the first round, Baykal received 420, Öymen 280, Hasan Fehmi Gunes 190 and Sefa Sirmen 52 votes. In the 
second round, Baykal's votes rose to 510, while Öymen got 369, Gunes 62 and Sirmen 3 < 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=chp-gives-baykal-a-second-chance-2000-10-02 > 
accessed 22 May 2014. 
52 < www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=chp-geared-up-for-crucial-congress-government-
or-chaos-2005-11-18 > accessed 15 May 2014. 
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garnered only 168 signatures, Umut Oran 15 and Ayhan Yalçin only one. So Baykal again ran 
unopposed and was selected by 1,021 of 1,231 delegates. 
 A basic measure of authoritarianism within the parties, then, is the number of candidates 
who take part and the number of votes leaders received in the process. Thus, as has been seen 
in the case of the RPP, Deniz Baykal, after strengthening his position, was selected in December 
2005 and again in 2008 to be the leader of the RPP by around 1100 votes. After 18 years of 
leadership, Baykal announced his resignation following allegations that he had appeared in a 
sex clandestinely recorded tape with a female MP, after which, in 2010, Kılıçdaroğlu was 
elected as leader unanimously, becoming the RPP’s seventh leader. In 2012, Kılıçdaroğlu ran 
unopposed and received 1,164 of 1,282 of the votes cast. 
 In August 2014, the deputy leader of the RPP, Muharrem İnce, declared his intention to 
run against Kılıçdaroğlu. During a press conference at the Parliament, İnce resigned his position 
in the RPP as party deputy leader and declared his candidacy for the leadership. Before the 
election he declared that, if he were to win the election, he would amend the party constitution 
and open leadership election to all party members. Ince, in fact, lost the election, exhibiting the 
poor level of interest that party members had in acquiring their own rights. 
 In total, the RPP has held 52 congresses, 34 regular and 18 extraordinary, since its 
inception in 1923, most of which took place while the party was out of power. As discussed in 
previous chapters, IPD is much more in evidence in left wing parties and opposition parties 
than in ruling and right wing parties. Yet while the RPP seems more democratic from the 
perspective of the number of candidates who have sought the leadership, it has not in practice 
experienced significantly more IPD than has the JDP. 
 As in the JDP, a potential candidate for leadership of the RPP must be nominated by at 
least twenty per cent of the delegates in order to stand for election. The RPP adopted this policy 
in 2003, three years before the JDP took the same step. This 2003 increase to twenty per cent 
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from the previously mandated five per cent was clearly intended to forestall unexpected 
challenges so that incumbent leaders might secure their own positions for the long term. In 
2012, after Kılıçdaroğlu’s accession to the leadership post, the twenty per cent threshold was 
decreased to ten. 
 By focusing on actual leadership selection in the two major parties, it has become 
possible to gauge the level of internal democracy in relation to leadership selection. Thus, as 
has been seen, the RPP gives the appearance of a democratic leadership selection process in 
terms of number of candidates and frequency of elections, but actual practices reveal that party 
leaders, committed to their own political interests, continue to preserve their power and 
authority. So it is that, despite the clear differences between the JDP and RPP with regard to 
the frequency of leadership selection and the number of candidates, the parties share a 
preoccupation with controlling their delegates and limiting challenges to incumbents through 
the imposition of high thresholds for qualification for candidacy. 
 
How to reform the TPPL? 
 As mentioned above, the delegatory system in Turkey has cast considerable doubt on 
the process of leadership selection, since in practice most of the delegates are appointed rather 
than elected. Thus there would seem to be a great deal of truth in the widely-held impression 
that the party leader and the central party elites in Turkey are able to exercise a high level of 
control over the congress delegates by strategically controlling the process whereby they are 
selected. From this perspective, it is easy to understand why the party leaders have not sought 
to reform the leadership selection process, since they already exercise considerable control over 
the conference of delegates. 
 The selection of party leaders in Turkey has traditionally been criticised as being a 
rubber stamp event in party congresses. Moreover, the selection of candidates by delegates 
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strengthens their power over the ordinary members and creates new party elites, which process 
is contrary to the idea of equality among party members. Given the problems of leadership 
selection in Turkey, this kind of leadership selection method must be changed if there are to be 
greater levels of IPD. The problem, however, is identifying a leadership selection process more 
amenable to IPD that could take the place of the party congress.  
The recent increasing demands for more participatory democracy in every field of life 
in Turkey also influences the administration of parties. As mentioned above, political parties in 
mature democracies are increasingly turning to some kind of hybrid method to select party 
leaders.  
 Many political scholars claim that the introduction of plebiscitary democracy 
strengthens the position of a party’s leadership.53 Yet, although one-member-one-vote elections 
would provide a stronger position for the party leader than the delegatory leadership selection, 
such elections also pose more risk to incumbents than they would face in the delegate system. 
Thus, in a discussion of parties in Belgium and Israel, Bram Wauters, Gideon Rahat, and Ofer 
Kenig claim that “While primaries may look like a method that would democratically legitimize 
the leader and strengthen his or her position, in comparison to the past, leaders are actually 
challenged more frequently and also lose their position more frequently.”54 
 Even though the party leaders easily control one or two thousand delegates, it would be 
difficult to control hundreds of thousands of members. Thus Kenneth Carty and William Cross 
argue that this model provides for a party leadership “that is at once both strong and fragile: 
leaders have enormous power and discretion to move and manage the party as they please, but 
they can be challenged and removed by (or through) the party on the ground. …this power 
                                                 
53 Patrick Seyd ‘New Parties / New Politics? A Case Study of the British Labour Party’ [1999] 5 Party Politics 
383, 385. 
54 Bram Wauters, Gideon Rahat and Ofer Kenig ‘Democratizing party leader selection in Belgium and Israel’ 
(7th European European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) General Conference, 2013). 
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allows the party on the ground scope for influencing the direction of party policy.”55 Dennis 
Kavanagh claims that party leaders still feel the need to pay at least lip service to the views of 
members, 56  and, according to Robert Garner and Richard Kelly, party leaders cannot be 
effective unless they have the support of the party members, for which reason the waning 
acquiescence among parties indicates that such support cannot be won simply by demanding it; 
the leadership must have an ability to echo as well as mould grass-root concerns.57 
 Again, what is needed is an external model that can serve as a point of reference for 
considering ways in which the TPPL might be reformed. In what follows, the British 
Conservative Party, which changed its selection method from very exclusive to more inclusive, 
will serve as one such model. 
 
Case study: the British Conservative Party 
 In Britain, at the national level, all major parties ultimately choose their party leaders, 
with the participation of all party members in a one-member-one-vote system. These procedures 
are codified in each party’s own constitution, but there is no special party law in the UK. This 
may be due to long running history of democracy within Britain that did not necessitate the 
implementation of special party laws, unlike Turkey, which is still relatively new to democracy 
in general. The selection of party leaders by the votes of MPs in the Parliament had been the 
dominant method in British parties until the mid-1970s. Realising that such a practice did not 
incorporate the views of root members in general, the three major parties have since reformed 
this system in order to guarantee more inclusive electorates.58 Parties currently mainly practise 
                                                 
55 Carty and Cross (n 5) 98. 
56 Dennis Kavanagh ‘Party Democracy and Political Marketing: No Place for Amateurs?’ (Conference on 
Political Communications in the Global World, at Mainz. 2003) 5. 
57 Robert Garner and Richard Kelly British Political Parties Today (Manchester University Press 1998) 11. 
58 Kenig (n 2) 243. 
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the one-member-one-vote procedure in the selection of party leaders following some kind of 
pre-selection process. 
 Even in the absence of formal rules, the leader of the Conservative Party began to be 
elected by the parliamentary party in 1965; prior to that time, the leaders had emerged through 
an informal, shadowy consultation process known as the “magic circle,”59 suggesting that past 
leadership election had been a sort of oligarchic process in Britain, quite like Turkey but without 
the ruse of being thoroughly democratic. Leon Epstein defined the old leadership selection 
method as follows:  
The Conservatives before 1965 had no election when their leader and prime minister 
died or resigned, but relied on consultation among their elder statesmen to produce an 
emergent consensual choice to be recommended to the monarch and subsequently 
accepted by the party.60  
 Next, in 1975, a formal procedure was introduced into the party constitution for 
selecting and removing its leader by the parliamentary party.61 The march towards greater 
inclusivity continued after the 1997 electoral defeat, when there were “widespread demands for 
an immediate change to give the extra-parliamentary party a share of the votes in deciding the 
succession.”62 This refers to the fact that, when grass root members actually start demanding 
their rights without fear of repercussion or materialistic greed, some sort of progress can be 
achieved; thus for example in Turkey regular party members do not demand their rights to vote 
or to voice their concerns. As Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda assert, party changes do not 
happen immediately and for a single reason, but rather typically arise as a consequence of 
                                                 
59 Andrew Denham ‘From grey suits to grass roots: Choosing Conservative leaders’ [2009] 4 British Politics 
217-218. 
60 Leon Epstein ‘Redistributing power in British Parties’ in Vernon Bognador (eds), Parties and Democracy in 
Britian and America (Praeger 1984) 53. 
61 Denham (n 59). 
62 Keith Alderman, ‘Revision of Leadership Selection Procedures in the Conservative Party’ [1999] 52 
Parliamentary Affairs 260, 265. 
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various factors, including changes in leadership, changes in the relative influence of factions 
within the party and changes brought about by external factors.63 Thus William Cross and 
André Blais observe that eight of the nine relevant cases offer support for the argument that 
organisational change follows disappointing election results, and report, following interviews 
with party officials, that “Some party officials in …the UK Tories suggest that their parties 
would not have made the change if in government, and some express doubt as to whether their 
party will use the current expansive electorate rules in the future should they find themselves 
selecting a prime minister.”64 
 A few years earlier, in 1988, in response to increasing demands from party members for 
a greater say in leadership selection, the Conservative Party prepared a document entitled “The 
Fresh Future,” which outlined six principles: unity, decentralisation, democracy, involvement, 
integrity and openness. The leadership rules were set out in a chapter entitled “Democracy: 
giving power to the members” with a strategy to make the party more accessible and responsive 
to party members and their constituencies and to increase the number of party members.65 Party 
members were directed either to accept or to reject the reforms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
One-third of the members participated in the vote, of whom 96 per cent favoured the reforms66; 
this vote demonstrated widespread acknowledgement of positive reforms, and there is little 
doubt that Turkish party members would not accept such an attempt at reform.  According to 
Thomas Quinn, William Hague, after he became leader, wanted members to take part in future 
leadership contests, but he didn’t want MPs to lose their leading role.67 Hague eventually lost 
this battle, and since 1998 party members have had the final say on Conservative leadership 
                                                 
63 Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda ‘An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change’ [1994] 6 Journal 
of Theoretical Politics 259, 262. 
64 William Cross and A. Blais, ‘Who Selects the Party Leader?’ [2012] 18 Party Politics 127, 134; cf. APSA 
‘Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties’ [1950] 44 
American Political Science Review 13. 
65 Richard Kelly and Paul Lester ‘Leadership Elections: Conservative Party’ (House of Commons Library 
SN/PC/1366 7 December 2005) 3. 
66 Thomas Quinn, Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain. (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 98. 
67 ibid 100. 
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selection. In this way Conservative Party became the latest among the UK parties to open its 
leadership selection to the party grass roots. 
 After Hague resigned his position as leader of the Conservative Party in 2001, all party 
members for the first time took part in the vote for leader under the new procedures adopted in 
1998.68 This selection process includes a hybrid form of democracy, which has two stages. In 
the first, MPs choose two candidates from among the applicants. In the second, party members 
select one of these candidates as a party leader on a one-member-one-vote basis. A leadership 
election can be triggered by the resignation of the party leader, or if fifteen per cent of 
Conservative MPs call for a no-confidence vote in the leader. This process can be initiated after 
sending letters to the chairman of the party’s backbench 1922 Committee.69 After the chairman 
of this committee receives the letters in writing, either collectively or separately, the chairman, 
without disclosing the names of any of the signatories, is instructed to inform the leader of the 
party that a vote of confidence is to be held.70 The first leadership selection conducted under 
the new rules led to debates and controversy about where the balance should lie between the 
rights of members and those of MPs.71The UK’s implementation of IPD is carefully designed 
to consider equal the contributions of both senior party members and grass root party members, 
which combats oligarchic tendencies as leaders are forced to submit two candidates for voting. 
Furthermore, to deal with a situation of appalling incompetence, there are also measures to vote 




                                                 
68 Eligible voters: 328,000; turnout: 256,797, or 79%. 
69 < http://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/snpc-01366-2-1.pdf >.accessed 19 June 2014. 
70 < http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~tquinn/leadership_election_rules.htm >.accessed 19 November 2015. 
71 Thomas Quinn, Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 97. 
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An analysis of both the formal side of leadership selection, the TPPL, and the actual 
situation in the political parties makes clear the lack of democracy in the leadership selection 
process in Turkey. From the beginning of the multi-party era, party leaders in Turkey have been 
playing an increasingly dominant role in their capacity as the embodiment of the party image 
and, given their power, the selection of party leaders is a crucial aspect of IPD in Turkey. Even 
though the Turkish political parties have long been oligarchic in nature and controlled by party 
leaders whom ordinary members are unable to hold accountable, this situation could be 
remedied if the participation of all party members were guaranteed and systematically enforced 
by party law. As things stand, the current delegatory leadership selection system has left 
considerable doubt as to whether the delegates actually reflect the views of the party members. 
 One of the most common criticisms levelled against the present arrangement is that 
incumbent leaders have considerable powers over their own re-nomination. To be more precise, 
the criticism is that party delegates are only elected after obtaining the consent of party leaders 
behind closed doors, leaders who fear the democratisation of the leadership selection process 
as a threat to their power. The formal and informal connections between the central party and 
local organisations means that, in controlling local delegate selections, incumbent party leaders 
try to select delegates who will vote for them in the party congress. For all of these reasons, 
abolition of the leadership selection party congress would lead to greater democratisation within 
the system and thus render party leaders more responsible and accountable. 
 The reform of the TPPL is necessary if ordinary members are to have a greater say in 
selecting the party leader. At the very least, the leadership selection process ought to be codified 
in law in a detailed manner. The TPPL would benefit particularly from reform as a “hybrid 
system,” in which the party on the ground, the party in the central office and the party in the 
public office are involved at different stages of the selection procedure. The hybrid system 
employed by the British Conservative Party offers a good model for Turkey. Parliamentary 
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party groups could be influential in the leadership selection, as is the case in the Conservative 
Party. Hybrid systems like these may enable party leaders to ensure that the divergent groups 
just mentioned are given due consideration, and that party leaders will be responsible to both 
the party on the ground and to the party in public office. Since the party in the central office 
and the party in public office are composed of almost the same figures in Turkish parties, all 
party groups would be represented by the party leadership under this sort of arrangement.  
 The need to strengthen intra-party competition for the selection of party leadership has 
been pointed out by numerous theoreticians. The advocates of IPD believe that the large number 
of candidates in the leadership selection contest and the inclusivity of as many party members 
as possible in the election are the keys to intra-party democratisation. At present, while there 
are some requirements with regard to the methods whereby the party leader will be selected in 
the TPPL, political party constitutions are playing an important role in leadership candidacy 
requirements. Thus it was that, in order to prevent unexpected challenges, both the RPP in 2003 
and the JDP in 2006 adjusted the nomination threshold for leadership candidates, increasing the 
percentage of delegates needed to endorse a candidate from five to twenty, mainly as a response 
to the desire of incumbent leaders to secure their own positions for as long as possible. In order 
to combat this tendency, thresholds for participating in leadership contests that protect 
incumbents must be lowered by law. 
 Self-interest could play a role in effecting these kinds of changes, for a party leader who 
has been selected through a democratic process by all party members may be seen in a more 
positive light by the party’s potential voters than one who is known to have been chosen by a 
handful of appointed delegates. It should be noted that, with the help of modern technology, the 




 Further, while the goal advocated here is to broaden the electorate of political parties to 
include all members, it would be expedient to restrict full participation to those who have been 
members for at least two years. This solution not only rewards the party members who are 
devoted to their party long term, but also limits the possibility of the infiltration by party 
opponents into the selection process. The plebiscitary model for leadership selection is so open 
as to facilitate such infiltration, for which reason an early cut-off date for membership would 
also be expedient, as would payment of a membership fee. All of these measures would help to 
ensure that leaders are selected by members who are truly committed to their chosen parties. 
 The legally compulsory one-member-one-vote systems advocated here, at least at one 
level of the selection process, would certainly promote IPD within the Turkish parties. 
However, as has been mentioned repeatedly in the context of attempts to enhance the influence 
of party members, while it may be possible to influence the ways in which party leaders are 
elected through legislation, those who aspire to party leadership will always be able try 
alternative methods for achieving the same goal. For this reason, it remains difficult to 
determine for certain whether procedures such as one-member-one-vote leader selection would 








The selection of candidates is a fundamental function in democratic political systems 
that is carried out by political parties. These are the “processes by which candidates are chosen 
from among the pool of potential candidates.”1 The methods used by political parties to choose 
candidates for general elections differ significantly among nations. For instance, at the end of 
this process, a party may designate its list of candidates in a multi-member proportional 
representation system, or only one candidate in a first-past-the-post-system, depending on the 
country’s electoral system. Another main aim of this process is to narrow the electorate’s choice 
before the elections.2 
 The question of how political parties choose their candidates for public office has been 
debated by scholars and international democracy promoting organisations since the emergence 
of political parties. Schattsneider claims that “The nominating process…has become the crucial 
process of the party. The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; 
he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party.” 3  The Venice Commission 
summarises the issues of candidate selection as follows:  
Recognizing that candidate selection and determination of ranking order on electoral 
lists is often dominated by closed entities and old networks of established politicians, 
clear and transparent criteria for candidate selection is needed, in order for new members 
                                                 
1 Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern (eds), Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate 
Selection in Latin America (The Pennsylvania University Press 2008) 8. 
2 Bonnie N. Field and Peter M. Siavelis ‘Candidate Selection Procedures in Transitional Polities: A Research 
Note’ [2008] 14 Party Politics 620, 621. 
3 E.E Schattschneider, Party Government (Rinehart, Winston 1942) 64. 
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(including women and minorities) to get access to decision-making positions. Gender-
balanced composition of selecting bodies should also be commended.4 
The candidate selection procedures in Turkish political parties are controlled by the 
party leader. The participation of party members is unsatisfactory and does not meet the 
expectations of both voters and party members. This is not only a problem of Turkey alone, but 
of most politically underdeveloped countries. Pérez-Mares and Marco Alejandro summarise the 
issue as follows 
In the developed world, candidate nomination within political parties appears largely 
informed by inclusive and democratic practices. In contrast, in the less-developed world 
events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination 
decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses.5 
As said in previous chapters, this study conceptualises IPD on the basis of the 
inclusiveness of political parties. For Scarrow  
[u]nder the most exclusive rules, key decisions are controlled by a single leader or a 
small group of leaders, and others have no binding role in the process. In the most 
inclusive parties, all party members, or even all party supporters, are given the 
opportunity to decide on important issues, such as the choice of party leader or the 
selection of party candidates [or on important policy issues].6 
 This chapter sheds light on candidate selection processes and examines the situation in 
Turkey from both a legal and a practical perspective. The first part of the chapter offers an 
overview of candidate selection methods and the most important issues related to it from the 
perspective of my research. In the second part, I will analyse the candidate selection process in 
                                                 
4 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) CDL-AD (2010) 024 27. 
5 Pérez-Mares, Marco Alejandro, ‘On the Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness: The Role of Candidate 
Selection for General Elections’ (CGU Theses & Dissertations. Paper 34. 2012) < 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/34 7 >. accessed 8 March 2015. 
6 Susan Scarrow ‘Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Implementing  
Intra-Party Democracy’ (NDI 2005) 6. 
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Turkey. This part of the research seeks first to establish how party law impacts on the candidate 
selection in Turkey, and second analyses candidate selection in Turkey from an inclusiveness 
point of view, comparing the current candidate selection process with a more inclusive 
candidate election method, namely primaries. Special attention is given to the question of 
whether party law should require primaries as a candidate selection method in order to provide 
IPD or instead parties should be left to decide on this issue for themselves. I will consider the 
arguments in favour of primaries, asking whether compulsory closed primaries would help the 
democratisation of Turkish parties. I shall be arguing in the course of this chapter that candidate 
selection can be democratised to a certain degree, by means of adopting compulsory primaries 
in public law. 
 
Part 1: Theoretical Perspectives 
 
The importance of candidate selection for the political system and intra-party 
democracy 
 The level of participation of party members in the candidate selection procedure is 
another important indicator of IPD, and is therefore one of the most studied issues in literature 
on the subject. Scarrow, Webb and Farrell claim that “opportunities to influence candidate-
selection are one of the most politically significant of the selective benefits which parties are 
able to offer their members.”7 It will therefore be useful at this point to examine this process 
from a theoretical perspective, in order to arrive at a more complete understanding of the basic 
principles and arguments involved. 
 Not surprisingly, political scientists have repeatedly identified candidate selection as a 
crucial facet of a healthy democracy. According to Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh,  
                                                 
7 Susan Scarrow, Paul Webb and David Farrell ‘From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing 
Distribution of Power within Political Parties’ in Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds), Parties 




The quality of candidates selected determines the quality of the deputies elected, of the 
resultant parliament, often of the members of the government and, to some extent, of a 
country’s politics. A change in parties’ selection procedures in any given country might 
thus have direct consequences for the way politics operate there.8 
For instance, the position of MPs with respect to the party on the ground and the party in public 
office can be measured in terms of the candidate selection methods used in a political party.9 
 Thus, according to Gideon Rahat, different methods yield different political 
consequences because the composition of parliaments and the behaviour of their members 
mostly depend on the selection method. For instance, Rahat claims that, since “there are ‘safe 
seats’ in virtually every legislature, in many cases it is the candidate-selection procedure—and 
not the general election—that determines who will become a member of parliament.”10 Gary 
Thomas Johns likewise argues that the :competition between parties fails to provide the public 
with an effective choice of candidates, the real competition between candidates is displaced to 
a competition for party endorsement within particular parties,”11 while, according to Norm 
Kelly and Sefakor Ashiagbor: 
In democracies where voters primarily identify with parties and/or where there is a party 
list electoral system which gives the party the power to rank its candidates, the most 
important campaign for a potential candidate may be the party’s pre-selection process – 
to secure pre-selection for a ‘safe’ constituency, or a winnable position on the party’s 
list in multi-member constituencies.12  
                                                 
8 Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds), Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret 
Garden of Politics (Sage 1988) 1; similar argumentation in Alan Ware Political Parties and Party System 
(Oxford University Press 1996) 259. 
9 Richard S. Katz ‘The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy’ [2001] 7 Party Politics 
277. 
10 Gideon Rahat ‘Candidate Selection: the Choice before the Choice’ [2007] 18 Journal of Democracy 157, 159. 
11 Gary Thomas Johns ‘A Study in Democracy- Candidate Selection for the Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia’ (Phd Thesis School of Political Science and International Studies University of Queensland) iv. 
12 Norm Kelly and Sefakor Ashiagbor ‘Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical 
Perspectives: Parliamentary Groups’ (NDI 2011) 7. 
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An inclusive candidate selection procedure can also help the democratic image of the 
party and strengthen the bond between party members and prospective MPs. As Epstein argues, 
“democratic legitimacy has long been accorded only to relatively open methods of candidate 
selection.”13 In the same vein as Ware, Epstein equates high levels of party membership with 
the legitimisation of the parties with its voters,14 and Türköne sees an inclusive candidate 
selection as a way to bolster party members’ sense of belonging and this strengthens the 
political party.15 Furthermore, granting party members involvement in the candidate selection 
procedure might create a kind of positive feedback loop in this respect by attracting more 
members to the party, which in turn increases inclusivity. 
 While the scholars just cited emphasize inclusiveness, others focus on the centralisation-
decentralisation or formal-informal dichotomies. Rahat and Hazan categorize candidate 
selection processes in terms of the following criteria: (1) candidacy (who can be selected, and 
the types of restrictions that apply to candidates), (2) party selectorates (those who choose and 
how they qualify for this role), (3) decentralization (the level at which candidates are chosen) 
and (4) voting/appointment systems (the nature of the nominating procedure).16 Alan Ware 
notes two other significant facets of the selection process, namely “whether candidate selection 
procedure is controlled by public law, or by party’s own constitutions” and “whether the 
incumbent MPs are in an advantageous position for reselection.”17 In what follows, I will be 
concentrating on three of these considerations: the selectorate, the selection system and the 
nature of regulations regarding selection 
                                                 
13 Leon D. Epstein ‘Redistributing Power in British Parties’ in Vernon Bognador (ed), Parties and Democracy in 
Britain and America (Praeger 1984) 42. 
14 Alan Ware ‘Activist-Leader Relations and the Structure of Political Parties: 'Exchange' Models and Vote-
Seeking Behaviour in Parties’ [1992] 22 British Journal of Political Science, 71, 74. 
15 Mümtaz’er Türköne, Siyaset, (Lotus Yayınları, 2005) 273. 
16 Gideon Rahat, and Reuven Y. Hazan ‘Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework’, [2001] 7 
Party Politics: 297-322. 
17 Alan Ware Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford University Press 1996) 259-261. 
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 From the perspective of IPD, as Rhys Williams and Akash Paun observe, “There is no 
perfect candidate selection system; there are often trade-offs between the different objectives 
that selection processes are designed to deliver and different selectorates have different 
priorities in the selection of candidates.”18 The alternatives may be schematised as follows: 
 
FIGURE—PARTY SELECTORATES 
Voters     Party Members      Party Delegates        Party Elites     Single Leader 
 
Inclusive                Exclusive 
    FIGURE Party selectorates19 
 
Also useful for conceptualising candidate selection are the six broad categories 
formulated by Lars Bille: 1) the national party organs completely control the selection of 
candidates; 2) the subnational party organs propose candidates, but the national party organs 
make the final decision; 3) the national party organs provide a list of names from which the 
subnational party organs can select the final list; 4) the subnational party organs decide, subject 
to the approval of the national party organs, including the right to add or take away names 
according to a variety of stipulated qualifications; 5) subnational party organs completely 
control the process and make the final decision; and 6) a membership ballot, which renders the 
process even more inclusive.20 
 
                                                 
18 Rhys Williams and Akash Paun ‘What works in candidate selection?’ 2. < 
www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/our-work/c5/40/Innovations+in+candidate+selection >. accessed 29 
September 2014. 
19 Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat Democracy within Parties Candidate Selection Methods and Their 
Political Consequences (Oxford University Press 2010) 35. 
20 Lars Bille ‘Democratizing a democratic procedure: Myth or Reality? Candidate Selection in Western European 
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Issues for consideration in candidate selection 
Party cohesiveness 
 The candidate selection method is also important from the perspective of the 
cohesiveness of national parliaments. For instance, there will be differences between the voting 
behaviour of MPs who are elected by all party members on the one hand and candidates 
appointed by party leader on the other, with the latter process representing a real challenge to 
party unity in regard to relations between leaders and democratically selected candidates. 
According to Penning and Hazan, “Party cohesiveness is important because it directly affects 
the quality of the democratic political process.”21 
 It has been argued that opening the candidate selection process to the all party members 
has led to a decline in the influence of the party leader over MPs after they have been elected. 
According to Scarrow, “inclusive candidate selection procedures can weaken the cohesiveness 
of legislative parties, because national party leaders may lose the power to deny re-nomination 
or re-election to rogue members.”22 Rahat makes a similar point: 
In cases when candidates are selected by the party leader or by a small party elite, those 
legislators who want to be reselected are likely to demonstrate high levels of party 
cohesion and discipline. When selection is decentralized and conducted by wider 
publics (all party members or party supporters, for example), legislators are more likely 
to be responsive to various interests and may thus demonstrate lower levels of party 
cohesion.23 
Candidate selection is, of course, merely one of several factors affecting party 
cohesiveness. Thus, according to the analysis of Shaun Bowler, for example, incentives and 
                                                 
21 Paul Pennings and Reuven Y. Hazan, ‘Democratizing Candidate Selection’ [2001] 7 Party Politics 267, 271. 
22 Scarrow (n 6) 4. 
23 Rahat (n 10) 159. 
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powers within the legislature need equally to be taken into consideration.24 For even if the MPs 
were selected in primaries, the party leader still could still manipulate them with material 
incentives or the lure of ministerial appointments, committee memberships and other influential 
positions within the central party.  
 A democratic candidate selection and reselection process, by contrast, strengthens the 
responsiveness of MPs to the rank and file party members regardless of any incentives offered 
by the leader. As Marco Alejandro Pérez-Mares puts it, “Aspirants to party tickets must first 
respond to the demands of those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot, or 
face the threat of losing the party nomination.”25  Furthermore, the choice of a candidate 
selection method has fundamental implications for a candidate's chances of becoming an MP, 
which office offers a path to involvement in policies for re-selection. For instance, if the party 
leader has a large say in the selection process, those who are selected are likely to be beholden 
to the party leader, while candidates will try to get the support of party members if these latter 
play a significant role in the process. As Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern have observed 
in the context of Latin America,  
...where the prospect of re-election exists, candidates are more likely to continue to serve 
the constituencies that brought them to power, and re-election will likely foster the 
further cultivation of party or group loyalty (depending on the constituency that brought 
the candidate to power), whereas bans on re-election foster relatively lower levels of 
loyalty.26 
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To some extent, these two concepts clash with each other. For instance, IPD often entails 
the diffusion of power more evenly across a greater number of actors within a political party, 
whereas party cohesion calls for greater centralisation of power in a party elite, a strong party 
leader and autonomy in the decision-making process. 
 Party cohesion is also relevant at the state level, since in ruling parties it nearly always 
leads to authoritarian governments that place little value on democracy, and this is especially 
true for developing democracies such as Turkey. Critics of the inclusive candidate selection 
process accordingly point to its potential to weaken party cohesion and thus efficiency, though 
many of these critics also point out that the risks of IPD discussed in the third chapter are not 
valid in Turkey. This type of argument is also problematic given the paucity of empirical studies 
that document any consolidation of democracy by authoritarian parties. To the contrary, some 
empirical studies have shown that it is internally democratic parties that contribute to the 
consolidation of democracy in a country. Although efficiency and cohesion are indeed essential 
for a party to implement its policies, especially once in government, this efficiency and cohesion 
can be brought about by the party leadership and by the commitment of MPs to the party 
programme and election manifestos. In the early years of the JDP in Turkey, for example, the 
party implemented its policies efficiently and in an atmosphere of cohesion among all MPs, 
resulting in more IPD than the party evinces at present. In those times, most of the JDP MPs 
were coming from different political ideologies; however, all of the MPs supported a bid for 
membership in the European Union and the consolidation of democracy that membership 
entailed because they all shared the goals of economic recovery, improvement in the health and 
education systems and an outward-looking foreign policy.  
 Candidate selection through an appointment system impedes MPs from acting freely, 
and weakens parliaments’ role in accountability and policy making. Loyal MPs fail to hold the 
executive accountable, and the parliament’s role in public policy-making suffers. The 
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nomination process is therefore critical for party leaders in determining the loyalty of 
prospective MPs.  
The dilemma posed by popular and female candidates 
 Democratic candidate selection methods have also received criticism for their purported 
effect of “preclud[ing] parties from choosing candidates they regard as most appealing to the 
electorate.”27 It has been argued that party elites, especially senior politicians, are often in a 
better position to know what voters want, and that, since their loyalties go beyond the party 
members, they tend to choose candidates who will attract more votes to the party. 28  It is 
however difficult to see how the central party or the party leader can be expected to remain 
responsive to each electoral district. Party members are also aware that the candidates should 
have appeal beyond the circle of party members and supporters. As mentioned in earlier 
chapters, ordinary party members in Turkey tend to reflect the views of their parties’ voters, for 
which reason participatory candidate selection favours the more popular candidates within a 
given constituency. Noteworthy in this context is the statement by the Venice Commission that 
Legislation on political parties should ensure that women and men have an equal chance 
to be candidates and to be elected. In addition to the measures discussed earlier to ensure 
equality in candidacy (voluntary party quotas, gender balanced selection committees, 
and training for female candidates as well as gender equality action plans and clear and 
transparent rules for candidate selection), parties must respect all other measures 
enacted by the state to ensure gender equality in elections, including provisions 
regarding gender equality in candidacy and party lists.29 
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Although neither the TPPL nor the Electoral Law set rules that would favour the 
selection of disadvantaged groups such as women and minorities, some parties compel 
confrontation with this issue in their constitutions. The RPP, for example, amended its party 
constitution in 2012, mandating that the party allocate no more than 67 per cent to either gender, 
and imposing a 10 per cent youth quota for candidate selection for those candidates determined 
by the party central office.30 
 One motivation for adopting quotas based on such factors as gender or disability is 
strategic; thus, some case studies suggest that party elites generally adopt quotas after a rival 
party does the same.31 This concern is of particular importance for a party seeking to overcome 
a long period in opposition or of decreasing popularity.32 Thus the aforementioned amendment 
of the RPP party constitution has come at a time when the party has long been in an opposition 
position in the TGNA.  
 In sum, while political scientists remain divided on the relative importance of candidate 
selection among the many factors that influence IPD, in the case of Turkey, party elites’ control 
of the process has impeded inclusivity. Concerns about party cohesiveness, I have argued, are 
exaggerated. Further, the success of quotas in promoting inclusivity provides further support 
for one of the tenets of this study, namely that legal remedies can in fact further IPD. 
 
Part 2: Candidate Selection in Turkey 
Introduction 
 Democracy in Turkey is mostly identified as a competition among parties. The Turkish 
electorate consists of around 55,000,000 people. Voting is done by stamping the party emblem 
and dropping a piece of paper into ballot boxes once every four years. As is widely recognized, 
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election is the most powerful device known for providing both responsiveness and 
accountability in government. However, the candidate selection process is one of the most 
problematic areas in Turkey’s democratic history as well as for the Turkish Political Parties 
Law. Although most of the parties in Western societies have gradually developed more 
inclusive ways of choosing candidates, Turkish parties have not made any real progress since 
the first emergence of political parties in the country.  
Historical background 
 While the 1876 Constitution stipulated that the election of MPs would be regulated by 
a special law, the first such legislation was not introduced until the Elections of MPs Law of 
1908. The two elections prior to 1908 were conducted under the auspices of the Provisional 
Electoral Regulations (which was an administrative document rather than a national statute), 
the provisions of which have been seen as an early example of democratic candidate selection 
in Turkey. These regulations established Muslim and non-Muslim provincial quotas for 
candidates who were elected to legislative chambers.33 When the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) began to control Parliament, a new Electoral Law was enacted that removed 
any quota arrangement. For the CUP, a “Confessional representation based on a quota system 
would be incompatible with Ottomanism, as it would promote division rather than the unity of 
different ‘elements’ in Turkey.”34 This Law remained in force until 1942, except during the 
1920 elections, and it contained no provisions relating to candidate selection procedure. 
Whatever party rules were in effect during the one-party era (1920-1946), candidates 
for the RPP were determined by the People’s Party headquarters, indeed solely by Mustafa 
Kemal, and after him by İsmet İnonu, on the basis of loyalty. 35  According to the RPP 
                                                 
33 Hasan Kayalı ‘Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919’ [1995] 27 International 
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constitution of 1923, the party council was responsible for candidate selection. This council 
was composed of ministers, members of the party executive committee and members of the 
parliamentary party executive committee.36 In 1927, the RPP made an amendment to the party 
constitution and transferred the candidate selection power from the Party Council to the Party 
Leadership Council.37 This council was composed of three men, the Party Leader, the Vice 
Leader and the General Secretariat,38 and it became the most powerful decision-making body 
within the party and assumed responsibility for selecting its candidates. According to Cemil 
Koçak, Atatürk was the only powerful man on this council. He alone appointed the two 
important positions within the party, Vice Leader and Party General Secretariat, from among 
members of the party council.39 Koçak argues that “Often, candidates were ignorant of the fact 
that they were indeed candidates – some learnt of their candidacy through newspapers.”40 
Referencing Uyar and Tuncay, Koçak summarises those days as follows: 
As party leader, Atatürk had personally selected the MP candidates. He had thus made 
it clear that he preferred the MPs to be persons of his own choice, and furthermore that 
he expected everyone’s compliance in this matter. Although a few people did stand as 
‘independent’ candidates, outside of this official list of candidates, these people did not 
succeed in being elected.41 
 Among elections held in this period, those in 1939 stand out as the most internally 
democratic with regard to candidate selection. Prior to the 1939 general elections, party leader 
İnönü sought out the opinions of party members from 28 provinces and the Party Council before 
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he decided the candidates.42 This trend continued into the 1945 general elections, in which the 
People’s Party nominated more than the required number of candidates in some constituencies 
from among whom the electors chose.43 
 With the end of one-party rule in 1946 and the emergence of an opposition party, the 
RPP initiated reforms of the candidate selection process for general elections, amending its 
constitution in 1947 so that in every province 70 per cent of the candidates would be determined 
by local party elites, namely the members of the provincial executive committee, members of 
the sub-provincial party executive committee, the councillors of municipalities and the mayors 
of the cities and towns in each province. The remaining 30 per cent was determined by the 
central party council. With this amendment, the RPP began to move slowly toward greater 
consideration for the wishes of its members and of the public at large.44 After a defeat in the 
1950 elections, the party again amended its constitution and increased the power of local 
authorities, this time to 80 per cent, and further decreased the power of the central party, to 20 
per cent. Furthermore, the number of selectorates responsible for determining the party 
candidates in the local party was increased through such measures as including the leadership 
of the local youth wings, women’s wings and other such groups.45 In 1951, the party yet again 
amended its constitution, now granting full authority to local party organisations for 
determining party candidates; a further amendment in 1967, however, returned five per cent to 
the party central office.46 The ruling Democrat Party at that time used similar rules. In its second 
party congress, it was decided that 80 per cent of party candidates would be determined by local 
party organisations and 20 per cent by the central executive party. 
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 From 1942 to 1961, three different national Election Laws were adopted, though none 
regulated candidate selection methods.47 Then, in 1961, following the previous year’s coup, 
two pieces of relevant legislation were adopted, the No: 304 Law on the selection of Republican 
Congress Members and No: 306 the Election of MPs Law, which gave ten per cent of the 
candidate determination power to the central party office and 90 per cent to the local party 
organisations. In 1965, the first special Party Law, No: 648, specifically its Article 29, stated 
that candidates must be selected through primaries with the participation of all party members 
in a given constituency, and that only 5 per cent of candidates for general elections could be 
determined by the central party. In 1973, however, this article was amended and the parties 
were left free to determine their own candidate selection processes in accordance with their own 
constitutions.  
The current legal system 
 In assessing how party law has impacted the candidate selection process in Turkey, 
particular attention needs to be given to the formal rules that serve as the core instruments for 
selection. In Turkey, external regulations generally cover such details as candidates’ criminal 
reports, age and citizenship requirements, while internal regulations govern the selection 
procedure itself, including party membership status. In Turkey, it is the state, not the party 
organisation, that establishes the rules for candidate eligibility. 
 According to Pelin Ayan, the TPPL suffers from three defects that foster the rise of 
authoritarian party structures. First, it makes the parties dependent on state revenues, which has 
given rise to a kind of cartelisation effect; second, the law creates barriers to inclusivity; and 
lastly, it limits the scope for alternative models of party organisation and instead encourages a 
homogeneous hierarchical party model. 48  Cem Toker similarly claims that the TPPL, the 
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Electoral Law and the Governmental Procurement Law together play a crucial role in 
determining the level of Turkish democracy that is in fact detrimental to the Turkish political 
system; for him, 
The system that has allowed party chairmen, very rarely chairwomen, to handpick the 
parliamentary candidates without any input from the citizenry has resulted in legislative 
bodies with so-called “representatives of the people” yet unknown and not accountable 
to the people who supposedly elected them.49 
Indeed, the existing legal provisions are inadequately prepared to meet the IPD 
requirements mentioned earlier. Also as mentioned in previous chapters, the military regime, 
before ceding control of the government to civilian authorities, imposed a series of 
constitutional and electoral changes, including the adoption of compulsory primaries in Article 
37. Turkish parties were required to hold membership primaries for the selection of candidates 
under the auspices of the High Election Board. The law specified in a very detailed manner how 
primary elections were to take place. The military regime believed that unsupervised political 
parties had led to an oligarchic system, and in order to combat this trend they demanded 
comprehensive laws governing intra-party candidate selection. Looking to the theoretical 
assumptions behind and actual practice in American elections, the military regime assumed that 
compulsory primaries would lead to a reduction in the power of party elites and thus to more 
democratic political parties. İlter Turan summarises the situation as follows:  
In its original planning, it was anticipated that intra-party primaries would be the 
standard method of identifying candidates, while national party organs would intervene 
in a few districts where holding primaries seemed problematic for one reason or another. 
                                                 
49 Cem Toker ‘Why Is Turkey Bogged Down?’ [2008] 7 Turkish Policy Quarterly 25, 27-31. 
 250 
 
Practice has evolved in the opposite direction. All parties have opted for determining 
their candidates at the center.50 
Thus, although the military regime did not want to leave candidate selection methods to 
political parties’ own discretion, and so legislated for compulsory primaries, political parties 
moved rapidly to amend the legislation after the return to civilian rule, since politicians objected 
to increased state restrictions on the freedom of party elites to determine the method of 
candidate selection. In October of 1986, the Turkish Parliament passed a law that political 
parties could use the methods called for in their own constitutions; a year later, Parliament 
passed a law that eliminated compulsory primaries in the next election (the 1987 general 
elections). Both of these amendments betray the ruling parties’ unwillingness to limit their own 
freedom in candidate selection in the approaching elections. The main opposition party brought 
cases concerning these two laws before the Constitution Court. The 1986 law was allowed to 
stand, on the grounds that it did not completely ban compulsory primaries. In its second ruling, 
as regards the 1987 law, however, the Court annulled the ban on compulsory elections.51 
Specifically, the Court ruled that  
The candidate selection procedure is directly related to intra-party democracy. Inclusion 
of party members and delegates in candidate selection as far as is possible is a more 
democratic process than to limit selection to only component authorities. Amendments 
enacted by the Parliament represented an attempt within the parties to transfer power 
away from party members to the party elites by changing the candidate selection 
methods.52 
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According to the TCC, the reason for regulating in favour of compulsory primaries was to 
ensure that the composition of the Parliament would not be directed by arbitrary or unjust 
election methods designed by party elites.  
 One of the most important characteristics of candidate selection in Turkey is its semi-
public nature. While the TPPL codifies a number of details regarding the candidate selection 
procedure and the limited range of options available, in the end it gives discretion to a party’s 
own constitution. In this respect, Turkey does not differ markedly from mature democracies; it 
merely specifies such criteria as a secret ballot in cases where parties decide to use primaries as 
part of their selection process. Such elections must be held under judicial supervision, and the 
party must abide by the results. According to law, even under these circumstances (in which 
parties are to inform the High Election Board beforehand so that it may observe the primary 
election results), the party central office will still have a 5 per cent quota (representing the total 
number of MPs that could be elected to Parliament, which is 550) to change the list. For 
example, if a party were to decide to hold primaries throughout the entire country, it could put 
forward twenty-seven names in any province for any rank. 
 The current practice in almost all parties is for candidates to be selected by the central 
executive committee, where the influence of the party leader is paramount.53 So it is that, in the 
absence of more detailed regulations on candidate selection, parties have been left to establish 
their own methods, and these methods have tended to be oligarchic. It therefore stands to reason 
that legislation regarding candidate selection could serve to enhance the roles and rights of 
ordinary members in this process, and that direct primaries in particular would go a long way 
toward breaking the monopoly that the party leaders hold over the candidate selection.  
                                                 




Elections in Turkey 
 The basic facts of Turkish elections are as follows: the minimum voting age is eighteen, 
and the country's eighty-one provinces send representatives to the National Assembly in Ankara 
on the basis of the population of that province. Elections essentially take the form of contests 
between political parties, rather than between individual candidates; thus, though some 
candidates are able to gain votes through charisma or other forms of personal influence, very 
few of them would be elected without a party affiliation. And in fact, since the transition to a 
multi-party system in 1946, most of the candidates have been elected to Parliament under a 
party label. As Özbudun argues, Turkish voters vote for parties, not with any degree of 
enthusiasm, but with the intention of choosing “the least evil” among them.54  Also, as in other 
parliamentary countries, the role of a general election in Turkey is less about choosing MPs 
than it is about choosing a government, the quality of which is of course directly related to the 
quality of MPs. Thus the selection of candidates has been regarded as one of the prerogatives 
of party leaders rather than of local party organisations. 
 The 1982 Constitution declares Turkey’s governmental system to be a democratic 
republic with a parliamentary representative system. Supreme legislative power is exercised by 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), a unicameral body consisting of 550 deputies 
elected by universal franchise and secret ballot for a term of four years from among the 84 
multimember districts (in 81 provinces). Turkey elects its MPs on the basis of the d'Hondt 
method of proportional representation, with a minimum threshold at the state level of 10 per 
cent of valid votes and a system of closed party lists. 
 According to C. H. Dodd, the main reason for adopting proportional representation in 
Turkey was that “by increasing the number of parties in the legislature, [it] would make single 
party government unlikely and would prevent the division of the country into two hostile camps, 
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a condition widely attributed to the two-party system, the anticipated result of which would be 
to impede the establishment of a one-party dictatorship.”55 
 Each political party has to prepare a list of candidates equal to the number of seats 
allocated to given district. The electoral law as mentioned stipulates the use of closed party lists, 
in which the party determines the order of the candidates' names as they appear on the ballot, 
and voters cannot alter the order in which the candidates are elected. In most of the parties, the 
central executive committees of the party (its leadership) make the crucial decisions regarding 
the ranking of candidates, each of whom naturally desires to appear at or near the top of the 
ballot.56 
 A system in which voters choose among political parties, but cannot influence which of 
the prospective candidates actually assumes office, gives parties a higher level of control over 
the selection of candidates than would be the case if some of the alternative methods discussed 
earlier were used. Simply put, closed lists allow the party leader enormous power over the 
selection of candidates. 
Also important for civil servants or businessmen with the intention of obtaining 
promotion after elections or public jobs from the government is participation in the early levels 
of candidate selection. However, this is a risky venture that depends on the ability to predict the 
result of an election. For instance, a public servant under Turkish laws can return to his or her 
previous job if not selected as a candidate or after having lost an election. Thus, when a party 
in power loses an election, members who are public servants will find themselves at the mercy 
of the new, incoming party. 
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The actual situation in Turkey 
 It is not enough simply to look at legal texts and party constitutions, for analysis of the 
informal mechanisms also play a role in how parties determine their candidates. According to 
Massicard and Watts, “Because parties are exposed to strong legal constraints, there is a wide 
discrepancy between official, legal and visible party life, on the one hand, and how parties really 
work, on the other.”57 Indeed, in Turkey such factors as financial resources, ethnic origin, 
seniority in the party and loyalty to the party leader have a significant influence on candidacy. 
Moreover, the lack of transparency with regards to their selection processes that characterizes 
most parties means that they remain mysterious to party members and the public.  
 Ulaş Bayraktar and Cemal Altan identify three main pathways to candidacy in Turkey.58 
One is through close friendship with party elites, in particular the party leader. To be sure, 
neither party membership, nor even attendance at party events, are pre-conditions; many 
candidates are elected as MPs without being party members prior to the elections. Elise 
Massicard states that “there is a relatively high large [sic] share of ‘outsiders’ into [sic] the 
TBMM, who had not previously pursued a political career.”59 All the same, candidates in 
Turkey do generally rely on the campaign and popularity of the party leader in order to obtain 
victory. 
 The power of the party leader is naturally greater over constituencies that are strongly 
allied with the party than it is over constituencies that are competitive. The majority of Turkish 
MPs are elected to these uncompetitive “safe seats.” If a party has little chance of winning a 
given seat, it will often have recourse to more democratic ways to choose its candidates. 
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Another important point related to this situation is the size of the constituencies. According to 
Duverger, 
The larger the constituency, the greater is party influence; the smaller the constituency, 
the more restricted is party intervention. The smaller the constituency, the more possible 
is it for the electors to have individual knowledge of the candidate and the more does 
the campaign become a clash of personalities, between whom the elector chooses, 
because of their personal qualities and not because of their political allegiance.60 
In the proportional representation model, the size of the constituency correlates 
inversely with demands for IPD in candidate selection. In small constituencies, representatives 
are generally close to, and known to, the voters. In some provinces, such as İstanbul, Ankara or 
İzmir, electoral districts are large, as is the number of MPs that will be elected, for which reason 
candidate selection is highly centralised and selection powers are concentrated mostly in the 
party leadership. Thus the first ranks of Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir are generally viewed as 
secure and are accordingly allocated to party leaders and senior party elites. Candidacies at the 
top of a list in these cities are worth much more than others because election is a foregone 
conclusion and candidate selection is as important as general elections.  
 A second path to candidacy in Turkey is through support from ethnic or religious groups, 
or civic or professional organisations, in which the key factors are personal popularity and 
facility at garnering votes. For candidates from the southeast region of the country, for instance, 
the central party mostly relies on the support of well-entrenched local power and is able only in 
exceptional circumstances to impose its own candidates “because of the still strong influences 
of the tribal structure of the local society.”61 The heads of workers’ and public servants’ unions 
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are in similarly favourable positions, especially in cases where members are ideologically 
affiliated with specific parties. 
 The third path to candidacy identified by Bayraktar and Altan is through exploitation of 
personal wealth.62 Donations to the party and contributions toward election expenses are very 
important for Turkish parties. Bayraktar and Altan offer as an instructive example a provincial 
municipal council candidacy, which carries less weight than a general election.  
Widespread speculation in the city suggests that astronomical sums were paid for AKP 
[the JDP] candidacy position in the 2009 local election in Mersin: 400.000 lira 
(approximately 200.000€) for the first five ranks on the municipal list (seats closed to 
guaranteed); 200.000 lira (approximately 100.000€) for ranks 5 through 9 (seats likely 
to win) and 100.000 lira (approximately 50.000€) for the rest. Given that the eventual 
winners of these seats will each earn less than €1000 per month – that is less than 
€60.000 over the course of the entire mandate- such sums represent a massive, 
irretrievable loss for candidates.63  
 One important factor that is not listed by Bayraktar and Altan is loyalty. Broadly 
speaking, Turkish parties have equated loyalty to the party leader with increased unity and 
decreased conflict in the legislative process, so most MPs gain their seats at least in part on the 
basis of loyalty to the party leader, rather than any personal political skills or proven vote-
getting ability. Many formerly high-ranking civil servants who cannot officially be party 
members become candidates and then MPs as a reward for lifelong loyalty to their parties. 
According to Poguntke, “In the age of party-dominated politics and, particularly, in systems 
with proportional representation, parties view MPs as their own creatures and hence as subject 
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to their command.”64 Naturally, since the candidates are appointed by the party leader, Turkish 
MPs reciprocate with loyalty to the leader in order to secure selection in future contests and the 
material incentives that accrue to an MP. The increasing loyalty-reward alignment of candidate 
selection leads to a vicious circle that progressively empowers the party leader. The party leader 
also guarantees a number of delegates whose vote is equal to the number of MPs in Parliament, 
since MPs are automatically delegates of the party congress. For instance, the JDP has 300 MPs 
and 1400 delegates so that the party leader is guaranteed almost one quarter of the votes in a 
leadership selection. 
Roles of local party offices 
 Provincial party offices have little if any autonomy in the management of such tasks as 
candidate selection. In some situations, the party central office imposes its candidates on the 
provinces without even consulting anyone in the party on the ground. Although the provincial 
party organisations seem to have a role in selecting candidates for parliamentary elections, the 
central office uses the party’s provincial branches merely as consultative bodies. Although party 
leaders seem to take local party members’ interests into account when deciding candidates, 
loyalty to the party leader is rewarded and dissent, even by an important public figure, is 
punished. In order to be re-elected, incumbent MPs neither maintain a connection with local 
party nor return to provincial party associations for re-nomination. The most important 
activities of a provincial association are voting in opinion polls for prospective candidates and 
managing campaigns for candidates. Generally, only provincial party elites cast votes in these 
opinion polls. The local branches forward a list of potential candidates to the central office, 
which then narrows down the selection, in which process candidates determined by local party 
offices have no guarantee that the party leader will choose them.  
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 Although such intervention by the central party is unwelcome to local party activists, 
they have little scope for response apart from resigning their party membership. However, party 
leaders generally try to strike a balance between giving members a choice and ensuring that 
selectees will be loyal to them. Thus Ersin Kalaycıoğlu argues that “the political party 
leaderships always try to balance the local popularity against the personal loyalty of the 
candidates to the party leader.”65 Returning once more to the analysis of Bayraktar and Altan, 
“the influence of local offices on the choices of local candidates does not appear to be decisive. 
Competition among future candidates thus mainly takes place in Ankara through the 
mobilization of all available resources to secure the support of central actors.”66 
 As we have seen, according to the TPPL, political parties are to determine their 
candidates in accordance with methods stipulated in their constitutions. Three of these methods 
are common to all party constitutions, namely closed primaries, central consultation, and 
organisational consultation. Central consultation means the determination of candidates by 
executive committees in the central offices, while in organisational consultation the party 
consults the relevant local parties before reaching a final decision. It is important to note that 
the candidate selection procedure of parties varies with the nature of party competition within 
a particular constituency. 
 In a survey conducted in 2007, 100 MPs were asked which method their parties 
employed in selecting candidates; 89 per cent identified their party organisation roll and central 
party roll, and 66 per cent claimed satisfaction with this system.67 When asked whether any 
party organ should have the right to veto a candidacy, 55 per cent answered in the affirmative, 
while 45 per cent answered no.  
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With respect to the candidate-selection practice, the evaluation of the awkwardly named 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) on Turkey’s 2011 election states that 
Although the LPP [Law on Political Parties] recommends that parties select their 
candidates through primaries, only a few parties resorted to this procedure. In most 
cases, the candidates were chosen by the parties’ executive committees with some input 
from district and provincial branches. Some parties also conducted local and regional 
polls to identify popular candidates. In order to strengthen internal party democracy and 
to increase the representativeness of the closed list system, political parties could be 
encouraged to be more transparent in their decision-making.68 
As mentioned, parliamentary candidates in Turkey eighty years ago were chosen by the party 
leader and his inner circle. Little has changed today, despite several attempts to enforce 
compulsory primaries by law. Further, when parties conduct primary election nominating 
contests, these contests remain under the control of the judiciary, but even so the parties manage 
to maintain control over who can seek candidacy under their party label. In provinces where 
the party’s hope of winning the seats is low, parties are moved to try to find moderate 
candidates, a situation in which open primaries can play a decisive role. 
 The following discussion will make clear how the two main Turkish parties, the ruling 
JDP and the main opposition RPP, select their candidates; the other parties use more or less the 
same methods. 
The Justice and Development Party (JDP) 
 For around 13 years, Turkish multi-party democracy has been characterised by the 
dominance of the JDP under charismatic leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The JDP won 
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huge majorities in the four general elections held between 2002 to 2015, for the most part 
steadily increasing its share of votes from 34.43 per cent in 2002 with 365 seats (of 550), to 
46.58 per cent in 2007 with 341 seats, to 49.90 per cent in 2011 with 327 seats and 40.90 per 
cent with 258 seats in June 2015. Because of this massive electoral support, almost two thirds 
of these seats can be seen as safe seats.  
 In the spectrum of inclusivity, the JDP is located at the extreme point where party 
candidates for general elections are appointed by the central office or the party leader alone, 
who is left virtually free to choose anyone from any province and from any rank without having 
to answer any objection, even though the provincial organisations hold opinion polls. This state 
of affairs was confirmed by a study conducted among the JDP MPs in 2003, in which 80 per 
cent claimed that candidates are determined by the party leader or the central administrative 
committee. 69  In the same study, 56 per cent of MPs expressed a desire for local party 
organisations to have power for the candidate selection process.70 
 In addition to the power to choose candidates, the leadership exercises the power to 
dismiss candidates from the party or to vet re-selection for the next election. The experiences 
of 2013-2014 provide ample evidence that those who have dared to criticise the party leader 
and to challenge the lack of internal democracy within the JDP have been labelled as betrayers 
and unceremoniously dismissed from the party. Democratic centralisation and absolute party 
discipline in the JDP are part of the inheritance of the party’s Islamic background; according to 
Hazan and Rahat, religious and right wing parties appoint rather than select candidates.71  
 Candidate selection methods are regulated in Article 124 of the JDP constitution, which 
is copied from the TPPL. The constitution names three methods:  
1) Primaries: participation of all party members 
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2) Local Branch Polls: voters eligible to take part in organizational roll calls include 
a) The Party’s Founders 
b) Former Ministers and Parliament Members of the Party 
c) Former mayors and city and district chairmen  
d) Former city and district chairmen of subsidiaries  
e) Ministers and parliament members of the city who are members of the 
Party 
f) Chairmen and full members of Administrative Committees of grades of 
the Party’s organization present in the city, who are members of the Party  
g) Chairmen and full members of provincial disciplinary boards 
h) Mayors and municipal assembly members of the Party 
i) Provincial general assembly members of the Party 
j) Chairmen and full members of city and district Administrative 
Committees of the Party’s subsidiaries  
k) Village and avenue headmen, who are members of the Party  
l) Primary delegates of district and city congresses  
m) Primary delegates of city grand congresses  
n) Avenue and village representatives of the Party, who were nominated at 
least one year before the date of organizational roll call, and who are still in 
charge, and  
o) Those individuals named in the Regulation on Election Affairs as voters 
who are eligible to take part in organizational roll calls.  
3) Central Executive Office: identification and ranking of candidates of the Party 




According to the party constitution, the Central Decision and Administrative Committee 
(CDAC) has the power to adopt regulations that cover the principles and methods of 
nominations for general parliamentary elections in accordance with applicable laws.72 The 
CDAC determined which methods would be used in which province and to what extent, as well 
as deciding which names would be sent to the constituencies for pre-election process. Not 
surprisingly, JDP party leaders tend to pay close attention to opinion polls.  
 Although the JDP still claims adherence to IPD and asserts that primaries should be the 
only method for determining the party candidates, the reality is more difficult to assess. The 
JDP’s party programme states that “The pre-election system to be conducted with the 
participation of all the members shall be taken as the basis for determining party candidates.”73 
As it happens, the first version of the party constitution stipulated that 50 per cent of the 
candidates must be determined by primary elections or by local polls, but this article was 
changed to read, “consideration shall be given to the identification of candidates, either through 
preliminary elections or organizational roll calls, in at least 50 per cent of all election regions 
in connection with parliamentary elections.” However, in practice, as has been seen, almost all 
candidates are determined by the special organ that is established prior to elections. It is 
important to note that members of this organ are also seeking candidacies either for themselves 
or a close associate. However, there are no criteria for shortlisting candidates who will appear 
on the ballot paper. 
 
 The JDP uses similar methods for candidate selection, for which the selection of 
candidates for the 2015 (June 7) national elections will serve as an illustration. In the 2015 
elections, the JDP established 12 Screening Committees, each composed of 4 members of the 
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CDAC, to work on the selection of candidates. The party leader appointed the members of the 
committees from among 50 members of the CDAC. A total of 6,233 candidates applied for 
candidacies and each then went through a ten-minute, face-to-face interview with one of the 
Screening Committees in order to narrow the pool. The JDP in the meantime held opinion polls 
in local organisations among two to three thousand local party elites. Around 2,000 potential 
candidates who were endorsed during the first evaluation and received support from local 
organisation polls moved on to one of four commissions set up to conduct a second round of 
evaluations. This second round reduced the number of potential candidates to approximately 
1,000, after which the supreme evaluation board decreased the number to 550. The supreme 
board consists of seven members: the party leader, three of the eleven vice chairmen, the general 
secretary, the chairman of Election Coordination Centre and the heads of the women’s Youth 
branches. Also attending these meetings were the four Parliamentary group deputy chairmen 
(each of which is responsible for the MPs of a specific province). Yet despite all of these careful 
deliberations, in the end it was Erdoğan himself who chose the party’s candidates. According 
to K. K. Kaya, “even though the president is supposed to be politically neutral and not involved 
in active politics according to the constitution, Erdoğan has been fully involved in the 
nomination process of the party’s candidates for the election, playing a decisive role.”74 
 
The Republican People’s Party (RPP) 
 According to William Cross and Richard Katz, “the type of electoral system, the number 
of competitive parties, the ideological range of party system, whether a party is in government 
or opposition, whether it competes in a federal or unitary state, the degree to which (and the 
condition under which) state subventions are available, all might encourage a party to adopt 
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particular approaches to IPD, as indeed might the approaches to IPD taken by other parties in 
the same political system.” 75  That is why the RPP uses more democratic methods in its 
candidate selection process.  
In a study conducted among RPP MPs in 2003, 84 per cent of asserted that the party’s 
candidates were determined by the party leader or the Party Council.76 In the same study, 62 
per cent of MPs expressed the desire that local party organisations should have control over the 
candidate selection process.77 
 According to Article 38 of the RPP party constitution, the party council decides which 
method will be used to select candidates in the provinces, and itself chooses the candidates if 
the determination is to be made by the central office. As in the JDP, the methods employed are 
central roll calls, organisational roll calls and primaries. Each Turkish province has its own 
peculiarities, so different methods are used in different provinces. In the words of Nahomi 
Ichino and Noah Nathan, “Since weaker parties are less likely to win the election and have the 
opportunity to implement their preferred policies ex ante, leaders of these parties should be 
more likely to adopt primary elections.”78 
 In the 2015 elections, the RPP, unlike other parties, and for the first time in many years, 
held primary elections to determine its candidates, but only in 55 of the 81 provinces, though 
most of the major cities were included. For the remaining provinces, the RPP central office held 
internal opinion polls among its members, leaving a limited number of candidacy positions to 
be directly named by party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.79 According to Murat Yetkin,  
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The main reason behind Kılıçdaroğlu’s decision to hold primary elections was to be able 
to reform his party, with the aim of becoming a viable alternative to the AK Party's [the 
JDP] domination in at least the next election, if not in this upcoming one. ... young local 
leaders and a surprisingly high number of women candidates, who have been working 
for years within the people, were preferred by the grassroots over the names representing 
the old establishment. The names with nationalist tendencies were pushed down to the 
bottom of the lists, while names with social democratic tendencies rose. This could be 
the beginning of a transformation of the CHP [RPP]; perhaps not overnight but 
seemingly in the right direction.80 
81 
 
 According to Michael Daventry’s analysis, 
Group A contains 160 seats and members here will pick all of the RPP candidates for 
parliament; 
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Group B contains 167 seats and includes Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, the country’s 
largest cities. Here the party leadership has reserved 28 spaces on local lists but will 
allow members to fill the remaining spaces; 
Group C contains 76 seats, of which eleven are reserved by headquarters. The RPP will 
allow members to vote on their nominees but it will be a consultative ballot and the 
outcome will not be binding; 
Group D, containing 147 seats, will have no primary at all and the party leadership will 
select all the candidates. 
The system means that the party leadership is reserving 186 places for itself, while RPP 
members will be able select just shy of two-thirds of the party’s 550 nominees through 
primaries.82 However, not all of the rankings were open for primary elections. For instance, 
only the second, fourth, sixth and eighth positions in the electoral districts of İstanbul, Ankara 
and İzmir are open for primaries, and the remaining ranking is reserved for the central office as 
part of the quotas. The approach taken by both the RPP and the JDP is consistent with the well-
known argument that primaries are used more often by opposition parties while ruling parties 
are more likely instead to allow party leaders to select candidates in Turkey.83 Interestingly, the 
party leader has no obligation to justify the complexities of these arrangements with convincing 
reasons; thus, he might explain the situation as the special conditions of the given constituency.  
 
Part 3: Closed Primaries in the United States as a Participatory Model for Candidate 
Selection for Political Parties 
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For many parties and scholars in Turkey, the candidate selection process represents an 
arena in which there is the potential for effective legislative regulation to advance IPD.84 In 
other parliamentary countries, the selection of candidates through primaries creates a context 
in which to engage directly in the political process.  
 In the United States, the selection of candidates to national office, that is, the US House 
of Representatives, Senate, President and Vice President, is mainly governed by the individual 
election laws of the various states and usually takes the form of primaries conducted under the 
guidance of state election officials. Again quoting Epstein, :it is the state, not the party 
organisation, that establishes the rules for both candidate eligibility and voter participation, and 
the state that runs the nominating contests as it does the general elections.”85 While the rules 
vary from state to state, each state party employs one or the other of two types of primary, “open 
primaries” in which any registered voter may cast a ballot for candidates from either or both 
parties, and “closed primaries” in which only voters who have registered their affiliation with 
one or another party may participate.  
 The first law regulating the candidate selection process via primaries was adopted in 
1882 by the state of New York, and by the beginning of the twentieth century 43 other states 
had followed suit.86 For over a century, then, primary elections have been an established feature 
of the two-party system of the United States.  
 Primaries are a uniquely American political innovation that were established as part of 
a wave of political reform associated with Progressive movements in the early twentieth 
century, their purpose being to ensure that party members, rather than the party organisation 
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played the key role in choosing candidates.87 In the words of Jonathan Thessin, “many of the 
hallmarks of our current political system, such as primary voting, originated as a mechanism to 
ensure that significant elements of the election process be democratic.”88 Jonathan Hopkin 
notes that “primaries serve as a useful means of ‘getting the rascals out,’ cutting off a potential 
escape route for discredited politicians.”89 It should be stressed that the leadership allowed this 
process to take root even at the cost of some of its own power; as Russell Dalton and Martin 
Wattenberg put it, a “growing number of individual parties, or entire party systems, have 
accepted primaries or other methods of candidate selection that actually weaken their role in 
selecting candidates.”90 
 In closed primaries, party candidates tend to shape their messages to take into account 
the concerns of members rather than those of the party leadership. David Mayhew, for instance, 
argues that compulsory party primaries render incumbents in the US Congress remarkably 
receptive to the demands of their electorates, often to the point of challenging the directives of 
the party leadership.91 Since sitting members of congress who wish to remain in office are held 
accountable because they will be forced to face the voters in a primary in order to secure a place 
on the ballot in the general election. For this reason, as Mayhew points out, for their political 
survival, incumbents tend to support the policies of grassroots party members that in most cases 
are amenable to average voters.92 To quote Epstein again, a direct primary “transfers a most 
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consequential power from party leaders and also from party activists to a much more numerous 
and loosely defined body of participants.”93 
Arguments about primaries 
 Primaries are not an unmitigated good in democratic politics, and some of their 
drawbacks have already been mentioned in earlier chapters. One major critique is a perceived 
tendency for primaries to damage party unity. According to Paul Pennings and Reuven Hazan, 
“The reason is that primaries invoke a direct relationship between voters and candidates that 
can weaken the cohesiveness and the intermediary role of the party organs.”94 Another concern 
about primaries is the level of representativeness that they achieve; as Ware sees it, 
Controlling selection procedures by law does not ensure that candidates from all social 
groups will be given equal consideration by the selectors. If the selectors happen to 
prefer white, middle-aged, middle-class males then there are going to be numerous ways 
in which they can ensure that such candidates continue to get selected. You cannot 
legislate against the preference or prejudices of the selectors. Indeed, the American 
experience is testament to this--in the short term the introduction of primaries did not 
transform who was nominated. Existing party elites often found ways of adapting to the 
new rules of the game.95  
Some scholars are sceptical that inclusive candidate selection can effectively 
democratise political parties, since party leaders can be expected to manipulate this system like 
any other. According to Gideon Rahat, highly inclusive selection methods remain liable to fairly 
shameless manipulation by candidates and other powerful actors: “Research also points to the 
large advantage that incumbents enjoy in primaries (especially in the United States), thanks to 
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their ability to make news and to their advantage in raising the huge sums of money that are 
needed to win a typical U.S. primary.”96  
 However, in the current situation in Turkey, most of the MPs have been appointed by 
the party leader and tend not to be well received by local organisations, to which they may seem 
apathetic regarding the problems of their provinces. An example of the kind of negative 
repercussions this strained relationship can generate is the recent fortunes of the RPP: most of 
the MPs who were chosen as candidates in 2011 by the central office and won seats in 
Parliament lost their positions in the 2015 RPP primaries. The potential for manipulation by 
powerful actors within the party system also exists in the registration of party members. As the 
former party leader of the RPP Altan Öymen observed in an interview, 
Normally in my local party organisation there were 14 members from my 
neighbourhood. Before local congress election, when I checked the list, I saw 80-90 
party members from my neighbourhood. However, no one knows who they are or where 
they came from. In the end the local party congress was crafted by means of those fake 
votes.97  
 In a similar vein, Ergun Özbudun has claimed that primaries will not give democratic 
outcomes in the absence of a working member registration system.98 It is of course necessary 
to impose some restrictions on participation in primaries in order to eliminate fraudulent 
registration intended to influence candidate selection and infiltration by opponents of the party’s 
vision.  
 In what follows, I shall discuss whether the Turkish political system would benefit from 
compulsory party primaries like those used by American parties. In particular I would like to 
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suggest that the potentially high monetary cost of such a system could at least in part be offset 
through innovative use of new communication technologies such as online voting. 
Applicability of Primaries in Turkey for reforming candidate selection 
 In light of the theoretical discussions about the candidate selection process and the 
potential for undesirable outcomes from inclusive candidate selection methods, the question 
arises whether it is even desirable that Turkish political parties adopt primaries as a candidate 
selection method, and, if so, how this procedure should be externally enforced, and to what 
extent legal measures can guarantee that selection remains in the hands of the membership. 
According to Altan Öymen, one of the main reasons for the lack of IPD in Turkey is to be found 
in the regulatory regime, the TPPL; according to his analysis, primaries have a vital role to play 
in the realisation of IPD.99 
 Bahri Savci identifies three elements that are necessary in order to democratise 
candidate selection in Turkey: increasing the number of participants involved, reducing the role 
of the central office and reducing the power of local party organisations.100 This last directive 
is addressed, not to ordinary party members at the local level, but to local party elites, since, as 
things stand, a potential candidate needs only the support of the local party leader. According 
to Hazan and Rahat, this kind of  
[d]ecentralization could mean only that control over candidate selection has passed from 
the national oligarchy to a local oligarchy. For example, if the selectorate is 
decentralized from a national party conference of several thousand participants to ten 
local committees each consisting of a few dozen activists and leaders, the overall 
selectorate has been decentralized, but has not become more inclusive—and has actually 
become more exclusive.101 
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It is therefore possible to conclude that undesirable side effects of closed primaries could 
be minimised through the use of hybrid models, which would allow parties to correct for any 
lack of representativeness and help disadvantaged groups to gain access to the Parliament, 
which is another democratic goal of reforming candidate selection.  
 In a study conducted by Fuat Keyman, Bekir Agirdir and Tarhan Erdem, 16 political 
scholars and influential politicians, 10 civil society organisations, 8 unions and 11 political 
parties agreed on the following:102 
a) Despite some negative consequences, primaries are better than the current system 
b) Candidates must be determined by the participation of all party members 
c) The current party membership system if a primary system is to have the desired results 
d) Quotas may be useful for the central party organs 
e) Judicial organs could be empowered intervene into the primaries in order to prevent 
malpractice 
Of course, parties could run open or closed primaries and limit participation to established, 
dues-paying members. In the US, for instance, parties generally require membership for a 
number of months prior to the vote as a precondition to participation in the selection process.103 
 It is obvious that the collective voice of party members in a given constituency, even if 
they number only a few thousand, has greater democratic legitimacy than does the imprimatur 
of the party leader of the party executive office. In my view, at least 90 per cent of candidates 
must be selected by the local members at a constituency level on a one-member-one-vote basis 
if IPD is to be a reality.  
 
                                                 
102 Fuat Keyman, Tarhan Erdem, Bekir Ağırdır ‘Türkiye’nin Demokratikleşmesi için Kapsamlı bir Siyasi Parti 
ve Seçim Sistemi Reformu Önerisi’ (İstanbul Policy Center 2013) 16. accessed 14 June 2015. 
103 Lisa Young ‘Campaign Finance and Women’s Representation in Canada and the United States’ in Steven 
Griner and Daniel Zovatto (eds), Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns in the Americas 




 As mentioned above, Turkish political parties enjoy a considerable degree of freedom 
from state intrusion in the management of candidate selection. There is a general consensus 
among Turkish scholars that the democratisation of candidate selection is a necessary 
precondition for further democratic development in Turkey. Thus, in order to overcome the lack 
of IPD in Turkey, priority must be given to reforming candidate selection methods by ensuring 
direct involvement of party members through closed primaries. 
 Turkish Parties are in general more or less reflective of the electorate as a whole. Some 
party activists hold more extreme positions than the majority of party supporters, but their 
numbers tend to be small, for which reason activists do not pose a real threat to inclusiveness. 
In any case, increasing the influence of party members in candidate selection could potentially 
increase the party’s electoral appeal, since the views of ordinary party members, as opposed to 
those of activists and leaders, more closely reflect those of party voters. 
 While there is a general agreement that party primaries promote IPD, their beneficial 
effects can be amplified and guaranteed through regulations that mandate free participation of 
the membership in candidate selection. Such legislation would require a reformulation of 
current Turkish party law, which grants all candidate selection power to political parties, with 
the result that, as has been seen, the party leader retains a monopoly on nominations.  
 An obvious benefit of a more democratic candidate selection process in the parties 
would be improved accountability of the MPs, which would in turn advance the consolidation 
of democracy in Turkey. In this way, MPs would have greater accountability to the ordinary 
party members and thus the electorate than to the leadership, for the simple reason that, in order 
to be chosen as a candidate in future elections, they would be answerable to the membership 
rather than the leadership. 
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 Since the Turkish parties function essentially as public utilities and receive a huge 
amount of public funds, and since it remains very difficult for new parties to gain a foothold, 
regulation of parties seems to be in order. It could alternatively be argued that extant elements 
of the Turkish system, such as compulsory voting, the high threshold for access to general 
elections and public funding, necessitate that the parties select their candidates in a democratic 
manner, but the fact is that current law has not brought about a significant advance in IPD, or 
in democracy at large, in Turkey. Compulsory primaries would also help to correct the endemic 
problem within the Turkish electoral system of such unethical actions as infiltration of parties 
by covert opponents and the registration of voters with political parties without their knowledge 
or consent. Primaries, then, would undoubtedly increase vastly the number of individuals 








REFORMING THE TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES LAW 
 The lack of IPD is neither a new phenomenon nor is it unique to Turkish political parties. 
In contrast to those in Turkey, political parties in mature democracies have more recently been 
reforming their rules and giving more power to their ordinary party members on important party 
decisions. They are using internal ballots more frequently to select party leaders, to formulate 
and adopt party programs, to approve coalition agreements and to select parliamentary 
candidates. At the same time, democracy-promoting organisations have stressed the importance 
of participatory decision-making procedures and called for political parties to open up these 
procedures to their ordinary members. However, in less democratically developed countries, 
party elites are still reluctant to share power with their party members. 
 One of the biggest problems with participatory democracy concerns institutional 
arrangements and procedures. Democratic rights granted to party members on paper cannot 
directly facilitate the effective participation of ordinary members in a party’s decision-making 
process. Since political parties are essential for modern democracies to function properly, they 
should operate democratically so that ordinary members have an opportunity to elect leaders of 
the party and candidates for national elections directly and to take part in the development and 
approval of party policy. Democracy cannot be consolidated in society without democratic 
parties, as they are the building blocks of democracy. Moreover, the internal functioning of 
political parties and the procedures that they offer have a highly educative role for the party 
members that participate in them. According to Kebapetse Lotshawao, the lack of IPD poses a 
threat to the consolidation of democracy in developing democracies and it could lead to the 
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:gradual decay: or “slow death” of democracy in the long run.1 One of the major findings of 
this study is first and foremost that there is a correlative relationship between the level of 
democracy in a given country and the level of IPD within that country’s political parties. Parties 
in mature democracies appear more democratic than parties in democracies that are still 
developing, which shows the positive correlation between state level and intra-party 
democracies and vice versa. Thus the weakness in state level democracy can be strengthened 
by making political parties more democratic institutions. 
 This study was motivated by the popular view that parties in Turkey have suffered from 
the lack of IPD and that the TPPL is insufficient to overcome this problem. The objective of 
the study therefore has been to analyse the TPPL and the practice of two large parties, namely 
the ruling party JDP and the main opposition party RPP, for the way in which candidates for 
parliamentary elections are selected, the way in which party policy is formulated and the way 
in which leaders are chosen; these are three important indicators commonly used when 
assessing the extent to which a political party is internally democratic. The British Labour Party 
was chosen as a comparison for the policy-making process, the British Conservative Party was 
chosen for the leadership selection chapter, and the closed party primaries from the US were 
chosen for comparing the candidate selection procedure. The idea was to look at the approach 
of parties in mature democracies to IPD since there is much that could be learned by Turkish 
parties, as they faced similar problems in the early stage of democratisation. Since IPD is 
measured by the extent to which ordinary party members have power within a given political 
party, party membership is also analysed. Additionally, the effect of party financing on IPD is 
analysed briefly.  
 Most of the scholars studying Turkish political parties have concluded that an 
amendment to the TPPL is both possible and necessary in order to consolidate democracy 
                                                 
1 Kebapetse Lotshawao ‘The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the African National Congress: A Threat to 
the Consolidation of Democracy in South Africa’ [2009] 35 Journal of Southern African Studies 901, 903. 
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within political parties. In a 2013 report, three prominent Turkish political analysts, Fuat 
Keyman, Tarhan Erdem and Bekir Ağırdır, state that, in order to consolidate democracy in 
Turkey, it is necessary to reform the TPPL.2 According to Suat Kınıklıoğlu, “there is a direct 
relationship between the requirements of a participatory democracy and an intra-party 
democracy. 3  For him, consolidating democracy in Turkey necessitates the careful 
implementation of provisions related to IPD both in the constitution and in the TPPL. 4 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, these provisions only pay lip service to IPD without 
providing any real solutions. Therefore, the present study sought to investigate the legal 
obstacles to IPD in Turkey, and whether these could be overcome by legal reform including 
more participatory institutions than those in the present system. The present party law of Turkey 
entrenches oligarchic tendencies within political parties where the interests of party elites are 
paramount. Legal reform is only one of the possible strategies for improving IPD; others include 
the development of political culture and membership training. Often, laws are amended but 
values are not, so good laws may be implemented badly. However, party law reform reinforces 
democratic values by giving party members a chance to be heard. Whether or not legislation on 
IPD is useful for party organisation is dependent on one’s perspective. A voter without 
membership in any party, a constitutional lawyer or a political scientist, is likely to advocate 
some sort of legislation on IPD in Turkey. Those who belong to the party elite, serve as an MP 
or are happy with the status quo, will probably oppose this idea. 
 In the Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I have noted some barriers to IPD in Turkey. First, while 
party membership is very high in Turkish parties, they do not have any real power, as parties 
                                                 
2 Bekir Ağırdır, Fuat Keyman and Tarhan Erdem ‘Türkiye’nin Demokratikleşmesi için Kapsamlı bir Siyasi Parti 
ve Seçim Sistemi Reformu Önerisi’ (Istanbul Policy Center, 2013) < 
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/publication/turkiyenin-demokratiklesmesi-icin-kapsamli-bir-siyasi-parti-ve-secim-
sistemi-reformu-onerisi/ >. accessed 14 June 2015. 
3 Suat Kınıklıoğlu ‘The Democratic Left Party: Kapikulu Politics Par Excellence’ in Barry Rubin and Metin 
Heper (eds), Political Parties in Turkey (Routhledge 2002) 19. 
4 ibid 20. 
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are leader-centred and authoritarian in their functioning. Second, while the TPPL established a 
party congress for the purpose of the realisation of IPD, it is open to manipulation by party 
leaders. 
 There is no doubt that the problem of IPD cannot be attributed solely to the TPPL. The 
political culture of the country, the centralised administrative structures inherited from the late 
Ottoman era, and the authoritarian, and protracted single-party era are also accepted as 
contributing significantly to the problem. Although democratic culture is important both to 
bring about and to maintain a genuinely democratic organisation, the normative and 
institutional arrangements are necessary to encourage participation of ordinary party members 
in a decision-making process for the preservation of democratic standards.  
 In Turkey, although parties attempt to portray themselves as internally democratic and 
inclusive, they have not realised internal democracy in practice for decades. Thus it can be said 
that a well-designed party law is a necessary pre-condition for establishing IPD or maintaining 
its practicability at least in terms of democratising countries like Turkey. While established 
democracies do not need such strong, normative protection for IPD thanks to their deep-rooted 
cultures of democracy, in countries like Turkey, where democratic culture is weak, detailed 
regulation of IPD is necessary. Thus the TPPL should be amended and made to conform to the 
requirements of modern notions of democracy. 
 This thesis also argues that the theoretical desirability of IPD and the practical 
possibility are different categories and mostly depend on the strength of the real democratic 
values of lawmakers and party leaders and their willingness to implement them, as well as on 
party members’ willingness to participate in the process. Of course, the enforceability of such 
reform varies, and there may be many ways of circumventing it, but there can be some progress. 
However, as has been repeated in every chapter, there is no simple solution to the problem of 
IPD in Turkey, since every reform package has its pros and cons. It is very useful to make 
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theoretical assumptions about internal democratic procedures, but there is no guarantee that 
they will be work in practise. The benefits of IPD depend on the instruments used, the 
implementation method and interaction with the political context.5 As mentioned repeatedly, 
the parties have shaped laws suited to their own wishes. At the same time, they are reluctant to 
open themselves to ordinary party members because they believe that they are in a better 
position to meet the demands of the wider public. 
 The process of party law reform can take many forms. According to Mair, Muller and 
Plasser, “parties begin with two goals: the first is survival, the second is success.”6 In this 
respect, if Turkish parties want to survive beyond the lifespan of the founder leader, they should 
empower their members. One possibility for reform is that, if party members actively push for 
change in party decision making in their favour, then reform by the Parliament becomes 
possible. Reforms also depend on the individual motivations of party leaders. For instance, 
some leaders may think that empowering party members could increase their intra-party power 
or they may believe that reforms could improve the working and votes of the party by affecting 
the preferences of members and voters. The motivations of party leaders, party elites and party 
members are important in the process of party law reform, but they do not alone determine 
outcomes. Moreover, it is certainly true that some people become members of a party because 
they support the party’s values, and therefore might be reluctant to take action in a public forum. 
Others, however, when granted the explicit right to comment publicly by law, will become more 
aware of their options and will seek legal remedies if their rights are not respected by their 
parties. In this way, it is more likely that, because of the fear of legal action, parties would 
gradually open decision-making process to party members. 
                                                 
5 Jeroen Mimpen ‘Intra-party Democracy and its Discontents Democratization in a Volatile Political Landscape’ 
(NIMD Publication 2007) 2. 
6 Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller and Fritz Plasser (eds), Political Parties and Electoral Change: Party 
Responses to Electoral Markets (Sage 2004) 265. 
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 Some of the biggest problems with participatory democracy involve institutional 
arrangements and procedures. Democratic rights granted to party members on paper cannot 
directly facilitate the effective participation of ordinary members in a party’s decision-making 
process. There should be some institutional mechanisms to make this possible. Unlike the 
decreasing numbers of party membership currently witnessed in most of the advanced Western 
democracies, membership numbers in Turkish parties have not decreased since the weakening 
of the mass party era. While addressing the undemocratic nature of Turkish parties through law 
reform, along with suggesting participatory democracy as the alternative, we should look at 
how party members may participate directly, and inexpensively, in policy-making, candidate 
selection and the leadership process. One important proposal could be for political parties to 
hold internal plebiscites via the internet for the approval of party programs and election 
manifestos, selection of party leaders and to determine candidates. Now that the internet is a 
part of our daily lives, an OMOV system would be easy to achieve.  
 According to Nick Anstead, new technology means that we have to re-think the 
traditional understanding of democracy within parties.7 In the late 1990s, the internet emerged 
as a powerful means of communication through which citizens can exercise most of their legal 
rights. The advent of the internet along with sophisticated communication technologies could 
be used as an online participatory device for the implementation of plebiscitary democracy 
among ordinary party members. 
 Nowadays, Turkish parties have recognised the potential of the internet. Since the new 
generation has been brought up in the internet era, they are doing everything online. Use of 
internet technology in party organisation can increase participation, reduce the cost of 
participation and reduce the need to travel to a specific place in order to participate. For 
instance, when a party holds a party congress, party members can easily watch the congress, 
                                                 
7 Nick Anstead ‘Internal Party Democracy in Europe and the United States: Different Models in a Changing 
Environment,’ (Conference Paper, Political Studies Association, 1 - 3 April 2008, Swansea University). 
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listen to policies, attend the debates and vote from their homes using secure devices. Moreover, 
an online party platform can help increase participation among groups that are not able to attend 
face to face meetings, such as people with disabilities, the elderly or stay-at-home mothers.8 
The advantage in Turkey is that there is a judicial body keeping the records of all party members 
online. For instance, anyone can easily control his/her registration status online with his/her 
party. Similarly, Turkish citizens use electronic identity code in order to access governmental 
services. For example, one of the Turkish parties (the MHP) used an electronic voting system 
in its 2007 candidate selection process in order to determine potential candidates9. 
 Reforms to the TPPL are possible only to the extent that parties are ready to accept them. 
In Turkey, most of the parties’ own constitutions are more democratic than the TPPL. If they 
were to convert their own commitments, party constitutions and party programs on IPD into 
legislation, the reformed party law would doubtless be better than the current one. It is generally 
agreed that legislation will function best if it is developed through the deliberation and mutual 
consent of those who will be subjected to it.  
 As indicated in Chapter 2, democracy is a contested term which is difficult to define and 
differs from one group of people to another. IPD is no exception. Clearly, the present discussion 
of IPD is trapped by the inherent contested nature of the concept.  
 With regard to policy making, Turkish political parties are still far from adopting and 
binding their leaderships to implement any particular approach. Although party congresses are 
established as the top organs of internal decision making under the TPPL, party leaders would 
sooner consult their aides and bureaucrats on policies than party members. As a solution, policy-
making committees and forums should be established and their members should be elected by 
all ordinary party members through a one member, one vote electoral system. After the party 
                                                 
8 Stephan Ward, Rachel Gibson and Wainer Lusoli “Online Participation and Mobilisation in Britain:  
Hype, Hope and Reality” [2003] 56 Parliamentary Affairs 652, 653. 




program and election manifesto have been composed, these documents should be approved by 
the participation of all party members. 
 Regarding the process of candidate selection, the TPPL is, as with policy making and 
leadership selection, very far from being internally democratic. In Turkey the law lays out a 
general framework and several options for candidate selection, but leaves it to party 
constitutions to choose which option to use. Therefore many aspects of the candidate selection 
procedure are determined by party constitutions. For instance, parties can hold primary 
elections, and if they choose this option they must use certain legally stipulated procedures and 
the primaries must run under the control of High Election Board, which is a judicial body 
governing all elections in Turkey. Adoption of compulsory primary elections would reduce 
oligarchic tendencies, but not completely eliminate them. With the help of the TPPL, the party 
central office exerts a huge influence on the selection of candidates. The main reason for this is 
that the TPPL gives all power to parties and party head offices, which can easily control and 
manipulate local party offices. The central party uses local offices only for consultation 
purposes in which local party elites are mostly appointed by the central office. Adopting party 
primaries for dues-paying party members would provide a good income source for parties and 
enable members to determine the composition and ranking of the candidate lists, as well as 
improving the party image in the eyes of the electorates and party members. Also party 
primaries should be implemented with a central party quota, as in the first version of the TPPL 
and, five or ten per cent of the power should be given to the central party in order to enable 
disadvantaged groups accession to candidate lists.  
 Regarding leadership selection, the party leader and the members of the executive 
committee should be directly elected by party members on a one-member-one-vote system. 
Also useful would be hybrid approaches whereby the popular element functions to strengthen 
the representation of the party on the ground, and the parliamentary element gives a formal role 
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to MPs. There should be a provision in the TPPL to facilitate contested elections for leadership 
positions. The rules should be clearly laid down in the TPPL. The current party law gives this 
authority to the party constitutions, which usually makes it difficult for candidates to contest. 
The consecutive re-election of leadership may be limited as was the case in the previous party 
law. Party leaders should be elected for a maximum of two or three consecutive terms; those 
who desire to seek re-election after finishing three terms must wait for one term. Each term 
should be a minimum of two years and a maximum of three, as is provided for under the current 
law. 
 This study has also sought to establish that legal reform on some specific areas such as 
party funding and membership registration would have a positive effect on the level of IPD in 
Turkish parties. Strategic public funding of political parties and reform of membership 
registration are important areas where legal reform can be effective and implemented easily. 
Since political parties are heavily funded by the state, the state has a right to regulate their 
activities. The current system of party funding, it has been argued here, has opened the way to 
oligarchic tendencies and will have a detrimental impact on IPD because parties with a huge 
state fund underestimate their members. Heavy public funding makes political parties less 
active in attracting and representing party members, making them less dependent on party 
members and their views. When members pay membership fees, they should be able to regard 
themselves as partners of the party and to express their opinions easily and demand a voice in 
making IPD work. The pressure on the leadership to adopt more participatory methods, in turn, 
incentivises party leaders to be more receptive to the demands of party members and thereby 
enables IPD to flourish.  
 It is further assumed that, with unreliable membership registration, party leaders can 
easily control delegate selection in favour of themselves and party elites. Participation in party 
decision-making activities will educate party members. Under current conditions, the demand 
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for change has not been very strong among the party members, so organisational change has 
been unlikely. 
 Moreover, regulation of party funding and membership registration will lead to 
declining membership in Turkish political parties, where the dues-paying membership is very 
low and fake membership very high, which will in turn threaten the legitimacy of the parties 
and lead party leaders try to make their parties more attractive and give more power to their 
members. Hybrid forms can be used to strengthen intra party representation and accountability 
in all components of IPD, leadership selection, policy making and candidate selection, which 
also will help to ameliorate the difficulties inherent in OMOV. Since the Turkish Constitution 
is based on a “hybrid democracy” model in which people have power via a popular referendum 
option in addition to being represented in Parliament, the TPPL can be reformed in these hybrid 
terms. As seen in each chapter, mature parties use some form of hybrid democracy for their 
decision making.  
 Regarding the regulation of intra-party matters by public law, many scholars have taken 
positions either for or against the idea. Those who oppose the idea use the argument that 
political parties are protected by freedom of association, or that it is difficult to reform 
democracy by way of legal reform. For instance, Dan Avnon claims that “accordingly, 
democracy within parties cannot be created by declarations or by legislative acts that are 
contrary to the democratic culture of the system in which they are found.”10 This point has also 
been made by Von Beyme, and we endorse his sentiment that “well designed party law can 
generate better quality IPD to some extent.”11 
 It can be easily understood that the Turkish constitution enshrines the “desire to 
encourage IPD” with an explicit requirement for equality among party members. Use of public 
                                                 
10 Dan Avnon ‘Parties Law in Democratic Systems of Government’ [1995] 1 The Journal of Legislative Studies 
297, referring to Klaus Von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies (St. Martin's Press, 1985), 232-40. 
11 Klaus Von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies (St. Martin's Press 1985) 234. 
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law to correct the deficiencies of IPD is the starting point of this thesis. If political parties are 
not capable of behaving in a democratic way, changing the law may be a solution in order to 
achieve the desired outcome. It is important to note that formal law is not a guarantee of IPD 
per se; it also depends on the democratic values of party members and party leaders themselves. 
Changing the law is the easy part. Reform of the TPPL will not necessarily have a direct and 
immediate impact on the realisation of IPD. Reforms in party law should not be considered as 
a panacea and do not offer instant solutions for the problems mentioned in this thesis. Clearly 
there are very many limitations to intra-party democracy as discussed throughout. Rather, 
reform may have gradual effects on citizens and party members. Nevertheless, it is necessary 
to start somewhere. This thesis believes that in the short run the priority is reforming the TPPL, 
but in the long run cultural transformation is needed. Democratic culture and cultural 
transformation need democratic institutions. Indeed, such a culture emerges as result of 
democratic institutions. Although economic and educational development foster significant 
cultural development, these processes are not sufficient to bring about cultural change in the 
absence of democratic institutions. 
 A crucial issue is the extent to which areas should be regulated by law or instead left to 
the constitutions of political parties. The scope of regulations on IPD is bound to remain a 
subject of debate. Yet it is important to look for the complementarily of internal and external 
control. As Janda points out, “if governments have no oversight over what parties and 
politicians can and cannot do, nations risk ruthless politics with little or no public 
accountability. Yet if governments enact too strict laws specifying how politics should be 
conducted and campaigns organized and conducted, regimes can discourage or prevent political 
entities from participating in public affairs.”12 The system of IPD requires checks and balances; 
                                                 
12 Kenneth Janda, ‘Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives, Adopting Party 
Law’ (NDI 2005) 3. 
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at the same time, however, the checks should not be such as to prevent political parties from 
carrying out their functions.  
 Parties can infringe on the rules in a number ways, such as was seen in the context of 
the delegate selection process in Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish party law must be designed in 
favour of a hybrid model, according to which party members select candidates, shape party 
programmes and vote in at least in one phase of leadership elections. To achieve hybrid 
democracy within the party, Turkey will have to enforce it by public laws. In this way, party 
leaders cannot easily control a large number of members as they do delegates. Mass-based 
participation in decision making requires changes in patronage relationships. Membership 
participation might in this case be interpreted as an increase in patronage, for which it may be 
difficult to compensate. In the modern era, thanks to technological developments, the rule of 
political parties through direct democracy is no longer technically impossible. It can be said 
that Turkish parties still have a long way to go to achieve IPD, but the democratic reform of the 
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